India's Recent Inward Foreign Direct Investment: An Assessment by KS, Chalapati Rao & Dhar, Biswajit
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
India’s Recent Inward Foreign Direct
Investment: An Assessment
Chalapati Rao KS and Biswajit Dhar
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development
2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/88992/
MPRA Paper No. 88992, posted 17 September 2018 09:02 UTC
 India’s Recent Inward  
Foreign Direct Investment 
An Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K.S. Chalapati Rao 
 
Biswajit Dhar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
 
July 2018 
 Authors 
 
K.S. Chalapati Rao 
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
4, Institutional Area Phase 2, Vasant Kunj 
New Delhi, India 
Email: rao@isid.org.in; kschalapatirao@gmail.com 
 
Biswajit Dhar 
Centre for Economic Studies and Planning 
Jawaharlal Nehru University 
New Mehrauli Road 
New Delhi, India 
Email: bisjit@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
The findings/views/opinions expressed in this book are solely those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher. Whilst every effort has been made to 
ensure that the information contained in this publication is correct, the authors and the 
publisher disclaim all liability arising out of any error or omission. Product or corporate 
names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and 
explanation without intent to infringe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
4, Institutional Area Phase II, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi - 110 070, India. 
Phone: +91 11 2676 4600 / 2689 1111; Fax: +91 11 2612 2448 
E-mail: info@isid.org.in; Website: http://isid.org.in  
i 
Contents 
Tables, Graphs, Diagrams & Exhibits  iii 
Abbreviations v 
Preface vii 
 
 I  Introduction  1 
Identification and Classification of FDI     5 
Limitations of International Data on FDI Flows Impact  
Cross-country Comparisons     7 
Concern about India’s Manufacturing Sector and FDI     10 
Post-MII FDI Inflows     12 
India’s Ill-preparedness to Assess FDI     14 
The Present Study     15 
 
 II Changes in FDI Policy in 2016 19 
Defence Industries     21 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices     22 
Civil Aviation     23 
Single Brand Retail Trade     24 
Agriculture & Animal Husbandry     26 
Security Agencies     27 
Broadcasting Carriage Services     27 
A Round-up     27 
 
 III Trends in and Characteristics of the Reported FDI Inflows 29 
Reported Sectoral Classification of Inflows     35 
Analysis of Individual Tranches of Inflows (October 2014-March 2016)     38 
Inflows According to the Period of Incorporation of the Top  
Investee Companies     44 
 
 IV Some Serious Issues with the Reported Inflows 50 
Serene Senior Living: Improbable Inflow of $2.25 billion     50 
Suryadev Alloys & Power: Eight-year Lag in Reporting     51 
United Biscuits: Clearing the Backlog and Duplicate Reporting     52 
DV Travels Guru: Reported Inflows had been Already Divested     53 
Some Large and Important Cases     53 
Duplicate Reporting     60 
Non-reporting: A Facet of Delayed Reporting     65 
 
 V Data Infirmities and Distortions at the Sectoral Level 69 
Automotive Sector     71 
Computer Hardware and Software     73 
Food Processing Industries     75 
ii 
Telecommunications     79 
Other Problem Cases     81 
Largest FDI Recipient Manufacturing Industries in 2016-17     83 
 
 VI Changes in the Reporting Requirements 95 
Reliable Data on FDI is not required for BoP Purposes Alone     97 
Duplicate Reporting has been a Continuing Phenomenon     104 
RBI Receives Considerable Amount of Data     107 
 
 VII Summing Up 114 
FDI Policy Changes     114 
Limited Impact of FDI Policy Changes on Inflows     115 
Influence of Past Decisions on Recent Inflows     117 
However, a Number of Factors Cast Doubt about the ‘Real’ Size  
of Yearly Inflows     117 
FDI is Neither an Unmixed Blessing, nor is it Homogeneous     121 
Relevant Data on Inflows and Investees’ Operations is Essential     122 
Strengthening Internal Systems is Imperative     123 
 
 Annexures 
A:  Modifications to India’s FDI Policy since August 2014      125 
B:  A Distribution of the Reported Inflows According to the Make in 
India Thrust Sectors in Two Periods      128 
C:  Illustrative List of Inflows Reflecting the Gap between Reporting of  
Inflows and Allotment of Shares      131 
 
List of Select Studies Relating to Foreign Investments  
 by CSG/ISID Researchers 144 
  
iii 
Tables, Graphs, Diagrams, Exhibits & Box 
Tables 
 1:  Changes Effected in the FDI Policy Applicable to Different 
 Activities during June 2014 to December 2016 20 
 2:  India’s Gross FDI Inflows 30 
 3:  India’s FDI Flows during 2014-15 to 2016-17: A Comparison 31 
 4:  Repatriations/Disinvestments are increasingly Offsetting  
 the FDI Inflows 34 
 5:  Broad Sectoral Distribution of FDI Inflows during the Recent Years 36 
 6:  Top 15 Recipients of Reported FDI Inflows during October 2014  
to March 2017 36 
 7:  Inflows into the MII Thrust Sectors during Two Periods 37 
 8:  Distribution of Top FDI Inflows during October 2014 to March 2016 39 
 9:  Distribution of Top 1,188 FDI Recipients during October 2014 to  
March 2016 according to the Period of Incorporation and the Nature  
of Foreign Investor 45 
10:  Different Possibilities when Older Companies Receive Inflows 47 
11:  Illustrative Cases which could be Mistaken as New Operations 48 
12:  Apparent Long Gap between Allotment of Shares and Official  
 Reporting of Inflows: The Case of Suryadev Alloys & Power Pvt Ltd 51 
13:  The Case of United Biscuits Ltd which Illustrates Delayed as well as  
Possible Duplicate Reporting 52 
14:  Apparent Case of Reporting Inflows Long after the Foreign Investors  
had Divested: The Case of DV Travels Guru Pvt Ltd 53 
15:  Select Suspect Large Tranches of Inflows Reported during  
September 2014 to March 2016 54 
16:  Discrepancy between Share Allotments and Reported Inflows in Case  
of Ford India 57 
17:  Remittance-wise Details of Top 25 FDI Inflows Received from USA  
(through Indian companies, from April 2000 to March 2017) 58 
18:  A few Important Cases of Apparent Duplicate Reporting 61 
19:  Illustrative Non-reporting/Under-reporting of Inflows Relating to  
Acquisitions 66 
20:  Distribution of Very Large Remittances during April 2012 to March 2017 
According to the Time of Allotment and Time of Reporting (Nos.) 70 
21:  Distribution of Very Large Remittances during April 2012 to March 2017 
According to the Time of Allotment and Time of Reporting (Amount) 70 
22:  Distribution of Large Remittances during 2016-17 According to their  
 Type and Time of Allotment 70 
23:  An Analysis of the Top Inflows into the Automotive Sector  72 
24:  List of Major Foreign Investments in Computer Hardware  
& Software Sector 74 
25:  Inflows into Vodafone India since March 2015 80 
iv 
26:  Nature of the Reported Inflows into Companies that could have been  
Classified under Electrical Equipment Industry during 2016-17 85 
27:  Nature of the Reported Inflows into the Electrical Equipment Industry  
during 2016-17: Summary 88 
28:  Duplicate & Delayed Reporting in Case of Procter & Gamble Home  
Products Ltd which Completely Nullifies the Inflow of $515 million  
Reported for the MII Period 90 
29:  Some Large Notional (Almost) Inflows relating to Acquisitions 93 
30:  Select Cases of Long Gap between Reporting of Allotment of Shares  
to the AD Bank/RBI and Taking them on Record 98 
31:  Inflows Reported against Volkswagen Finance Pvt Ltd during the  
quarter Apr-Jun 2017 105 
32:  Key Elements of the Reporting of Inflows and Others to the RBI 110 
33:  Select List of Step-down Subsidiaries that would Possibly Remain  
outside the Purview of FLA/FATS 112 
 
Graphs 
A:  Quarterly Equity Inflows during 2011-12 to 2017-18 
 (till December 2017) 30 
B:  Month-wise FDI Inflows Reported during 2015-16 to 2017-18  
(till December 2017) 33 
C:  Rising Ratio of Repatriations/Disinvestments to the Reported Annual  
Inflows 34 
D:  Distribution of the Reported Inflows into Medical and Surgical  
Appliances during 2016-17 92 
E:  The Gap between Informing the RBI about the Issue of Shares  
by Kellogg India and their Reporting in the SIA Newsletter 104 
 
Diagrams 
A:  A Depiction of the Reported Inflows relating to Mylan Laboratories Ltd 48 
B:  Changing Group Structure of Some GE Group Companies in India 88 
C:  Problems and Possibilities when Analysing FDI Inflows during a Period 93 
D1:  Timelines for Reporting FC-GPR (prior to November 7, 2017) 96 
D2:  Timelines for Reporting FC-GPR (since November 7, 2017) 96 
 
Exhibits 
A:  An Alcoholic Beverages Company Topping the List of Inflows into 
the Oil & Gas Sector  82 
B:  Shares Issued to Foreign Investors without Payment in Cash 
Consequent to Amalgamation 88 
 
Box 
A:  Responses to Select Questions in the Parliament which Indicate Lack  
of Relevant Information on FDI 16 
v 
Abbreviations 
AD Bank Authorised Dealer Bank 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
ARF Advance Remittance Form 
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis (USA) 
BoP Balance of Payments 
BPM Business Process management 
CAD Current Account Deficit 
CCD Compulsorily Convertible Debentures 
CCPS Cumulative/Compulsorily Convertible Preference Share 
CIN Company Identification Number 
CSG Corporate Studies Group 
CSO Central Statistical Office 
DGCI&S Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence & Statistics 
DIPP Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 
DTH Direct to Home 
ECB External Commercial Borrowings 
ED Enforcement Directorate 
ESOP Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
FATS Foreign Affiliates Trade Statistics 
FC-GPR Foreign Collaboration- General Permission Route 
FC-TRS Foreign Currency- Transfer of Shares 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FEMA Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 
FERA Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
FFI Foreign Financial Investors 
FII Foreign Institutional Investor 
FIPB Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
FLA Foreign Liabilities and Assets 
FPI Foreign Portfolio Investor 
FVCI Foreign Venture Capital Investor 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDR Global Depository Receipt 
GF Greenfield 
GM  Genetically Modified 
GSK GlaxoSmithKline 
HILM  Holderind Investments Ltd. 
HUL Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
ICSSR Indian Council of Social Science Research 
IEM Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum 
IIPA Indian Institute of Public Administration 
ILPC Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
vi 
IPS 1991 Statement on Industrial Policy, 1991 
ISID Institute for Studies in Industrial Development 
JV Joint Venture 
KMB Kotak Mahindra Bank 
M&As Mergers and Amalgamations 
MBRT Multi-brand Retail Trade 
MCA Ministry of Corporate Affairs 
MII Make in India 
Mn Million 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MSIL  Maruti Suzuki India Ltd 
MTS Meters 
NBFC Non-banking Financial Company 
NCAER  National Council of Applied Economic Research  
NMCC National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council 
NRI Non-resident Indian 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PE Private Equity 
PIO Person of Indian Origin 
QFI Qualified Financial Investor 
RBI Reserve Bank of India 
RFDI Realistic Foreign Direct Investment 
SBRT Single Brand Retail Trade 
SEZ Special Economic Zone 
SIL  Signature India LLC 
SSL Signature Senior Living 
SSLP Serene Senior Living Pvt Ltd. 
TOR Terms of Reference 
UIN Unique Identification Number 
UN ISIC United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
VC Venture Capital 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 
Units 
1 Crore 10 million 
1 lakh 0.1 million 
vii 
 
Preface 
he Institute for Studies in Industrial Development (ISID) has been supporting 
a research programme on foreign direct investment (FDI), the origins of which 
can be traced back to the late ‘1970s. The studies under the programme 
examined the FDI inflows in the early years of liberalisation and suggested the need to 
critically examine the operational dimensions of FDI that are conceptually associated 
with advanced technologies, marketing expertise, modern managerial techniques, 
export possibilities, etc. An earlier study examined FDI inflows during 2004-14 and 
concluded that inflows potentiality having the above mentioned attributes form just 
about half of the reported inflows. The remaining inflows were on account of the 
involvement by financial investors and India-related investors. The study, sponsored 
by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), also analysed the ‘Mauritius 
phenomenon’ and provided estimates of the shares of different ‘ultimate home’ 
countries of foreign direct investors in India. It also identified some little highlighted 
operational aspects of FDI companies. The case studies dealing with the evolution of 
FDI policy towards multi-brand retail trade and the defence industries reflected upon 
the process of FDI policymaking in India.  
The present study updates the earlier one by providing recent evidence on the 
nature and sectoral involvement of FDI in India from the point of the nature of 
investors and their sectoral preferences. A critical issue alluded to in this study is that 
the government and its agencies have paid less than adequate attention to ensure that 
reporting of FDI is done in a manner that facilitates proper analysis of inflows and 
operations of FDI companies. This is in spite of the fact that a vast amount of 
literature underscores that benefits from FDI do not flow automatically to host 
countries. A strand of this thinking appears in the Discussion Paper on “Industrial 
Policy 2017” circulated by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion 
(DIPP). The Discussion Paper expressed dissatisfaction about FDI not delivering the 
expected benefits and further underlined the need to review the FDI policy. This was 
probably inevitable as over the years FDI is increasingly being seen to alleviate the 
current account deficit, and correspondingly its role as the provider of development 
finance and technology has diminished. Thus conceived, not all the FDI would be 
associated with technology infusion, let alone infusion of advanced technology. 
Further, for decades, many questions relating to FDI and MNCs have been answered 
in the Parliament, but the answers have often lacked the desired clarity. Given the 
absence of quality datasets for analysing the behaviour of FDI, there is little evidence 
that FDI policy changes have been ‘evidence-based’. 
The present exercise identified problems regarding the reported time of inflow, 
actual amount of inflow, mode of entry, route of entry and activity. There have also 
T 
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been some serious omissions and commissions. Delayed reporting and inclusion of 
notional inflows turned out to be some of the other major concerns. The distortions 
in official statistics show up prominently when the inflows are examined at the level of 
individual companies/industries. These limitations make the data unsuitable for 
drawing straightforward conclusions, especially when commenting on the 
effectiveness of specific policy changes. Even the annual aggregate inflows cannot be 
relied upon to provide guidance regarding year-to-year changes because of omissions 
and commissions involving very large remittances. Nor do they truly reflect the extent 
of capacity creation in the economy. It is not the distortions alone which the Indian 
policymakers should be concerned about as the annual inflows are simultaneously 
being balanced to a significant extent by repatriations and disinvestments.  
While the RBI, the main agency which puts together the data on inflows, is well 
aware of some of the critical problems, it does not seem to have done enough to 
sensitise the users. Consequently, the users, including official departments like the 
DIPP and the Ministry of Finance, use the data uncritically. When millions of 
transactions (including those by FIIs) on the stock exchanges are tracked on real time 
basis, it is difficult to understand how the much smaller number of remittances on 
account of FDI could not have been managed in a meaningful manner. Even while 
providing data as per international reporting requirements, the RBI should have kept 
India’s policy needs in focus. It is also puzzling why the RBI is not analysing a variety 
of information collected through different returns.  At another level, the study 
suggests that global FDI aggregates should not be relied upon blindly to provide 
guidance to developing countries like India. India should neither take comfort nor get 
concerned with uninformed compliments or comparisons. Undue attention should 
also not be paid to indices which purportedly reflect countries’ potential or their 
attractiveness for FDI.  Instead of benchmarking against FDI into other countries, 
India’s inflows should be assessed from the viewpoint of its sectoral needs. 
The attempt here has been to provide best approximations to the various 
dimensions of India’s FDI data during the recent past. We do hope that this study will 
convince the Indian authorities and caution the users nationally and internationally 
about the pitfalls in offering straightforward explanations for the reported 
developments and that it would help develop a template to analyse the inflows 
purposefully. We believe that the study will have additional relevance in the context of 
the government expressing the need to review India’s FDI policy to ensure greater 
technology transfer, promote strategic linkages and encourage innovation.  
Given the long history of FDI-related research at the Institute for Studies in 
Industrial Development (ISID) and its predecessor, the Corporate Studies Group 
(CSG) at the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), it is probably natural 
that this understanding of FDI data should also come from the ISID. Starting from an 
in-depth analysis of the pattern of transactions in foreign exchange by foreign 
ix 
subsidiaries by Prof. S.K. Goyal in the late 1970s, the CSG/ISID brought out a 
number of studies, some of those in association with international scholars, each 
attempting to provide a realistic picture of the foreign sector of the Indian economy 
using primary data.  
We are extremely grateful to the management of ISID, in particular to Shri T.N. 
Chaturvedi (Chairman), Prof. S.K. Goyal (Vice-Chairman) and Prof. M.R. Murthy 
(Director) for enabling us to pursue this work. Special thanks are due to our colleagues 
Prof. K.V.K. Ranganathan, Dr. Reji K. Joseph, Dr. Satyaki Roy and Dr. Santosh Das 
for helpful suggestions and support. A draft version of this study was discussed in a 
workshop organised by the Institute on January 12, 2018. It was widely represented 
and the participants included academics, representatives of official agencies, industry 
bodies and the media. We have revised and expanded the draft report keeping in view 
the comments and suggestions of the participants and the discussants.  
The cooperation and support extended by Shri P. Kameswara Rao and Shri Jeet 
Singh, in the ISID’s office, Shri Amitava Dey in the library, Shri Rakesh Gupta and 
Shri Sudhir Aggarwal in the Computer Centre, Shri B. Dhanunjai Kumar in the Media 
Centre and Ms. Puja Mehta in the editorial section are also gratefully acknowledged. 
The responsibility for the presentation and interpretation of data and the views 
expressed is, however, entirely ours. 
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Section I 
Introduction 
ver the past three decades, one of the key features of economic policymaking 
in many countries, particularly in the developing world, has been the 
increasingly favourable treatment given to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
This attraction towards FDI seems inexplicable for at least two reasons, given the 
experience gained during the intervening period. The first was that the policy 
framework that underlined the importance of FDI was proposed as a part of the so-
called “Washington Consensus”, whose questionable bases are now beyond doubt.1 
Second, the impact of FDI on host countries’ economic development remains 
ambiguous.2 The vagueness extends to the concepts used and the criteria followed. 
Emergence of new types of investors on the scene could have contributed to this 
uncertainty in no small measure. Ironically, these and high level of aggregation which 
treats FDI as homogenous (thus ignoring the investor characteristics) might 
themselves be contributing greatly to this uncertainty. Though sustained efforts are 
being made at the international level to improve the data on FDI and to generate 
additional data on its associated concepts, the stage has not been reached where one 
can interpret the available data confidently. Global focus, led by the international 
agencies, is heavily biased towards quantum of FDI rather than on its consequences. 
Compared to the developed ones, developing countries are probably the least 
equipped to assess FDI’s contribution to their respective economies. In spite of this 
                                                                 
1  Joseph Stiglitz has been questioning these policies for more than a decade, but more importantly, one 
of the principal architects of the framework, John Williamson, has argued later that the framework 
was not designed to be used in the way it was. See, Joseph E. Stiglitz, The state, the market, and 
development, WIDER Working Paper 2016/1, January 2016, accessed from: 
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/WIDER%20The%20state.pdf 
and John Williamson, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?”, November 6, 2002, accessed from: 
https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/did-washington-consensus-fail.  
2  For instance, Cohen surmised that: “[T]o describe the nature and impact of FDI/MNCs in all-
encompassing or immutable terms is to repeat the mistakes of the blind men separately touching 
individual parts of the elephant. … the best way to assess FDI and MNCs is to accept the thesis that 
the appropriate answer to most of the important questions about them is ‘‘it depends’’”. Stephen D. 
Cohen, Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding Simplicity and Embracing Complexity, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 362-363. 
On their part, Mo Yamin and Frederick Nixson inferred in their review paper that “the creation of 
an effective regulatory framework to deal with these problems [caused by MNCs’ behaviour] requires 
a state structure with the political will, political power and competence to bargain effectively with 
MNCs, a set of conditions long recognised as essential but rarely achieved in practice”. See: Mo Yamin 
and Frederick Nixson, “New Directions of Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development”, 
in John Weiss and Michael Tribe (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Industry and Development, London and 
New York, 2016, p. 180. 
O
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incapability3, most developing countries pursue FDI vigorously and the success of the 
policies is measured in terms of the quantities attracted.  
Open FDI policy, whether adopted voluntarily or enforced through international 
agreements, is an antithesis of the calibrated approach suggested by many studies4 and 
country experiences. Such a strategy has no place when there is a single-minded drive 
towards attracting larger amounts of FDI, year after year. India’s case is no exception. 
As a result, even after a quarter century of opening up, except offering some aggregate 
inflow figures and perfunctory analysis of FDI companies’ operations, the country is 
in no position to assess the efficacy of particular FDI-oriented policies or major 
initiatives such as Make in India (MII). The main objective of the present study is to 
demonstrate that India, while striving hard to provide an investor-friendly 
environment, failed to put together meaningful data even on inflows.  
The awareness that the essence of FDI is not capital per se but technology and 
other intangibles it brings along5 was evident even during the early years after 
independence. This was in spite of the prevailing adverse sentiment against foreign 
capital. Prime Minister Nehru had reasoned that “Indian capital needs to be 
supplemented by foreign capital not only because national savings will not be enough 
for the rapid development of the country on the scale we wish, but also because in 
many cases scientific, technical and industrial knowledge and capital equipment can 
                                                                 
3  For instance, UNCTAD has said not too long ago that “FDI data should ... be interpreted and used 
with... caveats in mind. More importantly, developing countries need to improve the quality of their 
FDI statistics – a major challenge for many of them. Moreover, FDI data alone are not enough to 
assess the importance and impact of FDI in host economies. They should be complemented with 
statistical information on the activities of TNCs and their foreign affiliates (e.g. sales, employment, 
trade, research and development (R&D))”. UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006, p. 13.  
Helleiner had noted earlier that FDI data are “highly imperfect and difficult to interpret. The 
definition of “direct foreign investment” is itself a source of great confusion and difficulty”. See G.K. 
Helleiner, “Transnational Corporations and Direct Foreign Investment”, in Hollis Chenery and T. 
Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 2, Elsevier, 1989, p. 1445. 
4  While there are a number of studies, one may refer to a more recent paper from the World Bank 
which underscored that “[I]nvestment policy formulation requires a framework sophisticated enough 
to differentiate between the various kinds of foreign direct investment, as well as potential challenges 
and benefits for development”. See: Roberto Echandi Jana Krajcovicova Christine Zhenwei Qiang, 
“The Impact of Investment Policy in a Changing Global Economy: A Review of the Literature”, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 7437, October 2015. 
5  Johnson said that the “essence of foreign direct investment is the transmission to the “host” country 
of a “package” of capital, managerial skill and technical knowledge”. See: Harry G. Johnson, “Survey 
of the Issues” in Peter Drysdale (ed.), Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific, Australian National 
University Press, 1972. Such intangibles are also central to Dunning’s OLI paradigm. Kojima also 
said that “… main role of foreign direct investment is to transplant superior production technology 
through training of labor, management and marketing, from the advanced industrial country to lesser 
developed countries, …. foreign direct investment is to be a starter and a tutor of industrialization in 
less developed countries…”. (Kiyoshi Kojima, “International Trade and Foreign Investment: 
Substitutes or Complements”, Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, Issue No. 1, 1975, pp: 6-7). 
Earlier, Nurkse had also noted that “[I]t [FDI] helps to promote the spread of modern technology 
and efficient management methods”. See: Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1972 p. 82. (First published in 1953 by Basil Blackwell). 
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best be secured along with foreign capital.”6 Notwithstanding the efforts to regulate 
it, this desire to benefit from foreign capital remained the basis for India’s approach 
towards it.7 Such expectation from foreign capital was also evident when at the time 
of opening up the economy in 1991 the policymakers of the day explained that India 
“will … welcome foreign investment which is in the interest of the country's industrial 
development” due to its attendant advantages of technology transfer, managerial 
techniques, marketing expertise and export potential.8  
Over the years after 1991, however, the scope for FDI has expanded gradually to 
cover not only the industrial sector, but also almost all services. Barring the attempt 
to protect the Indian entrepreneurs in 1998 through the requirement of obtaining no-
objection certificates from the existing Indian joint venture partners/technology 
licensees, which was subsequently reversed by the next government, the FDI policy 
has been relaxed by successive governments at the centre.9 By the early 2010s, the 
non-differentiated nature of FDI as generic foreign investment became explicit. As 
India failed to “pay for imports through [the country’s] own foreign exchange 
earnings”10 and facing a huge current account deficit (CAD), the then finance minister 
had said in the Budget Speech (2013-14) that: 
This year, and perhaps next year too, we have to find over USD 75 billion to 
finance the CAD. There are only three ways before us: FDI, FII or External 
Commercial Borrowing (ECB). That is why I have been at pains to state over 
and over again that India, at the present juncture, does not have the choice 
between welcoming and spurning foreign investment. If I may be frank, 
foreign investment is an imperative. What we can do is to encourage foreign 
investment that is consistent with our economic objectives.11 
 
The initial focused approach thus gave way to the generalised objective of attracting 
foreign investment irrespective of its specific attributes. Over the years, attracting 
                                                                 
6  “Prime Minister's Statement in Parliament on Participation of Foreign Capital in Industries”, April 6, 
1949. 
7  In fact, a review of India’s approach towards FDI since independence suggested that the country had 
been “caught in the web of dependence on foreign private capital”. See: Biswajit Dhar, “State 
Regulation of Foreign Capital in India”, ISID Working Paper No. 006, 1988. 
http://isid.org.in/pdf/statreg.PDF. 
8  Government of India, “Statement of Industrial Policy”, July 24, 1991, para 24. The Union Budget 
Speech delivered on the same day further underlined this objective when it stated that “[T]he thrust 
of the reform process would be to increase the efficiency and international competitiveness of 
industrial production, to utilise for this purpose foreign investment and foreign technology to a much 
greater degree than we have done in the past...”. para 9. The opening was thus limited to the erstwhile 
Appendix I industries which had already been open to companies registered under the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act, 1973. 
9  Another change was with regard to the pharmaceutical sector where brownfield investment beyond 
49 per cent was required to seek government approval. 
10  The IPS 1991 stated that greater emphasis would be placed on meeting the country’s import 
requirements through foreign exchange earnings. Specific mention was made of encouraging foreign 
investment, technology and foreign trading companies in this endeavour.  
11  Ministry of Finance, “Budget 2013-14”, Speech of the Minister of Finance, para 11. 
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large amount of FDI has captivated the psyche of the policymakers to such an extent 
that the earlier government even ignored the advice of the expert group constituted 
by the then Prime Minister. The expert group called for a relook at India’s FDI policy 
and reasoned that:  
Technology transfer is considered to be one of the most important benefits 
of permitting FDI into a country. In India, however, in attracting the FDI 
the emphasis appears to be substantially on the amount of FDI flows. All 
announcements of successive Governments have been on the quantum of 
FDI received rather than on the quality of FDI. The benefits that accrued to 
the economy in terms of transfer of Technology, if any, is rarely highlighted 
possibly because no such assessments have been made. 
 
…, there is clearly a need to have a relook at our FDI policy in terms of the 
technological benefits the country needs to derive.12 
  
Even earlier, contrary to the general belief that India placed excessive restrictions 
on foreign investments, the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (ILPIC) 
which made a painstaking empirical analysis of the operation of the Industrial 
Licensing System in its various dimensions, noted that industrial licensing approvals 
were influenced significantly by “[S]hort-term balance of payments mitigation rather 
than long-term import substitution or self-reliance.... This also led to an increasing 
emphasis on foreign collaborations.”13 
The ILPIC further noted that:  
[T]he craze for foreign collaborations resulting from Government's policy of 
favouring those applicants for licences who could secure foreign 
collaborations with equity participation and foreign credits made it difficult 
in some cases for genuine Indian parties to establish themselves”.14  
 
Keeping in view the unsatisfactory nature of some foreign collaboration agreements 
approved by the Government, the ILIPC suggested that:  
... Government should undertake a review of the existing policy and 
procedures relating to foreign collaboration including foreign equity 
participation and take steps to remove the defects.15 
 
During more than 25 years since 1991, only one official committee had looked into 
the formulation of FDI policy per se. The Steering Group on Foreign Direct 
                                                                 
12  India, National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council, Report of the Prime Minister’s Group: Measures 
for Ensuring Sustained Growth of the Indian Manufacturing Sector, September 2008 (Chairman: V. 
Krishnamurthy), hereafter the NMCC Report. 
13  Department of Industrial Development, Ministry of Industrial Development, Internal Trade and 
Company Affairs, Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (Main Report), July 1969, p. 123, 
para 6.75. 
14  Ibid., p. 138, para 6.95. 
15  Ibid., p. 138, para 6.96. 
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Investment constituted by the Planning Commission was set up with the specific 
mandate to suggest steps to achieve a “sharp step up in FDI” which was “necessary 
for achieving the growth targets of the Tenth Plan”. The review of the caps and bans 
on FDI by the Steering Group was thus guided by the following consideration. 
Given the imperative of attracting FDI for increasing India’s GDP growth 
rate, there should be a presumption in favour of permitting FDI. 
Accordingly, entry barriers to FDI (...) in any industry must be explicitly 
justified. 16  
 
Obviously, there was little scope for critically examining the pros and cons of 
FDI. The scope of another committee set up by the RBI was restricted to compilation 
and reporting of FDI flows with the objective of aligning the same with the 
international reporting system.17 To clear the ambiguity regarding the identification of 
FDI and FII, the then Finance Minister, in his Budget Speech (2013-14), proposed to 
follow the international practice and laid down the broad principle that, “where an 
investor has a stake of 10 per cent or less in a company, it will be treated as FII and, 
where an investor has a stake of more than 10 per cent, it will be treated as FDI”. A 
committee headed by Dr. Arvind Mayaram, the then Finance Secretary, was set up to 
further operationalise this proposition. The Committee was obviously not concerned 
with either the developmental impact of both types of investments or the desirability 
of adhering to the 10 per cent ownership criterion.18 
Identification and Classification of FDI  
At this point it would be relevant to describe in brief how FDI is defined and 
measured. This is because there is a wide gap between what is meant by FDI and what 
is measured (and reported) as FDI. While FDI is inalienably associated with the 
attributes of technology, managerial capabilities, marketing expertise, etc., in policy 
pronouncements and academic exercises, the definition adopted for identifying the 
same is merely based on “direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting 
power”.19 Thus, all investments from abroad meeting this lone criterion irrespective 
                                                                 
16  Planning Commission, Report of the Steering Group on Foreign Direct Investment (Chairman: N.K. Singh), 
August 2002, p. 35. 
17  The Committee on Compilation of Foreign Direct Investment in India was set up by the Reserve 
Bank of India. It was concerned with inclusion of items under FDI. The Committee’s report was 
submitted in October 2002. Following its suggestions, the reported FDI inflows started incorporating 
reinvested earnings, other capital (inter-company borrowings) and equity capital of branches of 
foreign companies operating in India. Neither the Committee on Rationalisation of Investment 
Routes and Monitoring of Foreign Portfolio Investments set up by SEBI under the Chairmanship of 
Shri K.M. Chandrasekhar (June 2013) nor the Committee on Rationalizing the FDI /FII Definition 
set up by the Ministry of Finance constituted by the Ministry of Finance (June 2014) dealt with the 
FDI policy dimension. 
18  Ministry of Finance, Report of the Dr Arvind Mayaram Committee on Rationalizing the FDI/FII Definition, 
June 2014. 
19  OECD, OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Fourth Edition, 2008.  
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of whether they are made by financial investors20 or national investors investing in the 
domestic economy through the foreign route, get counted as FDI.21 In India, 
however, all investments by persons/entities resident outside India in the capital of 
Indian companies other than those through the portfolio investment scheme are 
treated as FDI irrespective of the extent of shares held by them. This was made clear by the 
RBI when it had said that: 
… while as per the international definition, for an investment to qualify as 
FDI the foreign investor needs to have a 10 per cent or higher stake in a 
given company, in India this has not been strictly adhered to. Irrespective of 
the extent of holding in a particular company, it is considered as an FDI if 
the non-resident acquires shares in a company other than by way of 
acquisition from the stock market, i.e., through initial public offerings (IPO) 
or through private arrangements …22  
 
Thus, credit (inflows) under FDI ‘to India’ includes all types of investments 
in equities (investments made by non-residents in the shares/mandatorily 
convertible debentures/ preference shares of an Indian company), reinvested 
earnings of both incorporated and unincorporated bodies (mainly foreign 
bank branches operating in India) and other capital of FDI companies. 
“Other” under FDI includes inter-corporate loans given by parent companies 
to their affiliates.23  
 
In November last year, the RBI came out with a different way of identifying FDI 
when it issued the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by 
a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017. The revised regulations defined 
FDI as an “investment through capital instruments by a person resident outside India 
in an unlisted Indian company; or in 10 per cent or more of the post issue paid-up 
equity capital on a fully diluted basis of a listed Indian company.”24 It explained that 
even if the investment in a listed Indian company falls below 10 per cent of the post-
issue paid-up equity capital on a fully diluted basis subsequently, such investment will 
continue to be treated as FDI. This approach follows the recommendations of the 
Arvind Mayaram Committee. It may be noted that the 10 per cent criterion applies to 
listed companies only. In any case, the definition does not once again take into 
consideration the character of foreign investors. Additionally, with listed companies 
being far too few in number compared to the universe of companies in India, in an 
overwhelming number of cases the 10 per cent criterion mentioned by the RBI will 
be irrelevant. Further, there being a general ceiling of 10 per cent on individual foreign 
                                                                 
20  Private equity funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, property and real estate funds, etc., fall under this 
category. 
21  While this is the primary determinant, for reporting purposes, the associated reinvested earnings and 
debt instruments are also included under FDI flows. 
22  RBI, Balance of Payments Manual of India, September 2010, p. 83. 
23  Ibid., p. 85. 
24  Issued in supersession of Notification No. FEMA 20/2000-RB and Notification No. FEMA 
24/2000-RB both of May 3, 2000. 
Assessment of India’s Inward FDI 
7 
portfolio investors in a listed company, the possibility of such investments getting 
classified as FDI is quite small.25  
The relevance of classifying the investors can be understood from an earlier study 
of ours. The study sought to distinguish the inflows according to three major types 
of investors: (i) foreign investors investing in their respective lines of activities who 
can thus be expected to possess the attributes associated with FDI; (ii) financial 
investors; and (iii) India-related investors. It estimated that out of the reported FDI 
inflows during 2004-14, only about half could be termed as realistic FDI (RFDI). About 
15 per cent of the inflows were by India-related investors and the remaining were by 
various types of financial investors. Within RFDI, what was targeted at the 
manufacturing sector was a little less than half.26 Further, and obviously, the amounts 
targeted at new capacity creation were even smaller.  
Limitations of International Data on FDI Flows Impact Cross-country 
Comparisons 
There are many important but little highlighted aspects of global data on FDI flows 
(concepts used, methods of estimation, nature of investors, sectors of investment, 
mode of entry, etc.).27 Starting from the definition itself, most of the associated 
important concepts are prone to estimation problems, be it greenfield investments or 
M&As. The three main components of the reported FDI flows are: (i) equity capital 
representing the purchase of shares in the host country; (ii) earnings retained by the 
already existing foreign companies in the host country; and (iii) lending of funds 
between direct investors. Reinvested earnings, which are not actual cross-border 
flows, form a major component of the reported global FDI flows. For some 
countries, these could be quite substantial. Being un-repatriated profits, which are 
earned in the host economy, other countries cannot obviously expect to have a share 
of such FDI ‘flows’. In fact, in the balance of payments (BoP) data there will be 
simultaneous contra entries. On the other hand, not all individual countries’ report 
reinvested earnings. The World Investment Report 2017 informs that about half of the 
                                                                 
25  Even so, one finds some instances of SEBI-registered foreign portfolio investors holding more than 
10 per cent shares in certain companies. E.g.: Nalanda India Equity Fund (Just Dial Ltd), Nalanda 
India Fund (Vaibhav Global Ltd), Aspire Emerging Fund (Winsome Textile Industries Ltd), One 
Earth Capital (Sathavahana Ispat Ltd), WF Asian Reconnaissance Fund (Niyogin Fintech Ltd) and 
SAIF India IV FII (Pennar Industries Ltd). 
26  See: K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, “Analysis of India’s FDI Inflows during 2004-05 to 2013-
14”, in India’s Inward FDI Experience in the Post-liberalisation Period with Emphasis on the Manufacturing Sector, 
project report submitted to the ICSSR, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, January 2016 
(hereinafter ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016). 
 Some important problems with global FDI data were recently highlighted in Karl P. Sauvant, “Beware 
of FDI statistics!”, Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 215, December 18, 2017. 
27  This was discussed in some detail in K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, “Glimpses of the Global 
Situation”, in the ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016. 
 Additionally, India does not even follow the internationally adopted definition of 10 per cent foreign 
ownership. For a discussion see: K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, “Concept of FDI and how 
India has dealt with it”, in ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016. 
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FDI outflows from developed countries are of this nature – profits earned and 
retained in host countries by the already invested foreign companies. In case of 
developing countries, the corresponding share increased from 45 per cent in 2015 to 
66 per cent in 2016.28 Out of the $299 billion FDI outflow from the United States, as 
much as $280 billion were reinvested earnings (93.6 per cent).29  
The inflows could result in acquisitions (including buying out of the existing joint 
venture (JV) partners) or in retirement of debt or creation of new capacities by 
augmenting the already available resources. In the former type of cases there would 
be no addition to the resources available to the enterprise under consideration. As 
discussed above, foreign investors could also be financial investors or returning 
natives. In both these cases, the additional attributes associated with FDI would be 
missing. Further, corporate reconfigurations while effecting large movements in the 
BoP often will have no bearing on actual operations.30 An indication of their 
importance in 2015 can be seen from the fact that UNCTAD estimated that the rise 
in global FDI flows would have worked out to only about 15 per cent instead of 38 
per cent if the ‘flows’ on their account had been excluded. Then there are intra-
company loans which are counted as FDI. 
Global data on inflows, cross-border greenfield investments (GF) and M&As are 
not strictly comparable not just because they are compiled by different private 
agencies,31 but also because of conceptual issues. The reported GF includes not only 
fresh inflows, but also funding from all other sources (whether local or foreign) and 
within or outside the multinational group. At the extreme, the new investment could 
be entirely from domestic sources. Further investments could come from the already 
existing foreign enterprises using accumulated earnings and/or local resources. In 
case of M&As again, the acquisitions can be through fresh cross-border flows or by 
the already established host country arms of the MNC. If the acquisition is through 
an existing subsidiary in the host economy, it would not get reflected in inflows but 
will be counted when adding up the M&A values. One main question is how long 
after the initial investment should further investments be considered as M&A.  
Further, not all inflows can be strictly classified as GF (new facility creation) or 
M&A (takeover of unrelated enterprise/activity/business). The new inflows could be 
used to repay debt or to meet working capital needs or to revive struggling enterprises. 
These could also be used indirectly in M&As. The investments at the initial stage may 
not replace the existing shareholders completely or even partially because the inflows 
can give the foreign investor a majority stake even while the incumbents remain 
invested. Further, there being extensive data gaps, the private data providers either 
keep the figures blank or provide some estimated (using undisclosed criteria) figures 
                                                                 
28  UNCTAD, World Investment Report: 2017, p. 15. 
29  Ibid., p. 77. 
30  This phenomenon partly explains the huge jump in Hong Kong’s FDI inflows in 2015 over 2014 -- 
by 53 per cent to $175 billion. These are characterised by changes in legal or ownership structures 
including corporate inversions. 
31  See for instance, UNCTAD, Training Manual on Statistics for FDI and the Operations of TNCs, Volume I: 
FDI Flows and Stocks, 2009. 
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which make the data extremely tentative. Since GFs are based on announcements 
only, one is not sure how many get translated into actual investments. Again, at the 
international level, not all countries follow the same methodology/criteria for 
reporting the inflows/outflows, though efforts are being made to standardise the 
reporting of FDI. Another issue with international data is that even if the ultimate 
entities involved belong to the same country, it might be counted as cross-border 
acquisition.32 The fact that the different types of reported investments cannot be 
reconciled is evident from the case of India. According to UNCTAD, the value of 
GF announcements and M&A sales for the period 2010-16 were $293 billion and $43 
billion respectively whereas the inflows were much smaller at $239 billion. 
The case of investments by domestic entrepreneurs who use the foreign route 
not being associated with additional technological advantage is obvious. There could 
be a variety of motives for such investors: tax and fiscal advantages, property right 
protection, expectation on exchange control and exchange rate, accessing better 
financial services, money laundering, etc.33 The OECD Benchmark definition indeed 
recommended compilation of separate supplementary breakdowns of such 
investments when round-tripping is significant for any country.34  
The other important category of investors is of financial institutions, of which 
private equity funds is a major segment. Their case is best described by UNCTAD 
when it said that  
Unlike other kinds of FDI, private equity firms tend not to undertake long-
term investment, and exit their positions with a time horizon of 5 to 10 years 
(or an average of 5-6 years), long enough not to be regarded as typical 
portfolio investors. Thus host countries, and developing ones in particular, 
need to be aware of this difference in time horizon.35 
 
UNCTAD, however, suggested that such foreign ownership can bring market 
access and new technologies and help host-country enterprises to move to a new 
phase of development. Given the fact that such investors would not generally own 
proprietary technologies and marketing channels, their role could be mainly in 
facilitating them through providing finance. Such possibilities cannot, however, be 
ruled out when host country enterprises obtain finance from local sources or from 
foreign portfolio investors through the stock market. In fact, the OECD in the 
Benchmark Definition underlined the need for individual countries to compile data 
separately for sovereign wealth funds and collective investment institutions.36 It also 
discussed at length the problems associated with M&As and greenfield investments. 
                                                                 
32  For a relevant analysis of large M&A sales in case of India and China, see: ISID-ICSSR FDI Project 
Report, 2016. 
33  Supra note 19, p. 159. 
34  Ibid., p. 159. 
35  UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2006, p. xviii. 
36  E.g.: mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, distressed funds, and property and real estate 
funds. 
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Further, as we shall describe in detail in the case of India, there could be serious 
practical problems in reporting the inflows to the national authorities by the 
recipients. For instance, given the context of MII initiative of the new government at 
the centre in which India’s FDI inflows are being viewed, a critical dimension is the 
initial decision to invest in India. This is because decisions on long-term investments 
will not be made instantly. The investment decisions will be based on careful analysis 
of investors’ future requirements and the relative advantages offered by alternative 
locations globally. The same may not hold good for foreign financial investors, even 
though their investments might be counted as FDI. They invest either in greenfield 
or other enterprises which are at various stages (including distressed ones) with the 
prime objective of exiting with handsome gains. The promoters of such projects will 
be mainly local entrepreneurs. Round-tripped investments fall in a category of their 
own. Further, irrespective of their nature, foreign investors bring funds in multiple 
tranches depending upon the progress of a project or as follow-up of initial investments 
as the situation demands. There could be other situations also. Thus, the decision to 
invest initially and the nature of investors are important aspects which should be taken 
note of when analysing the inflows from a particular policy’s stand point. Yet another 
factor is the gap between actual inflows and the time of taking them on 
record/reporting by the authorities. This dimension of FDI data is hardly discussed. 
Concern about India’s Manufacturing Sector and FDI 
India has been striving hard to develop the manufacturing sector for many years. In 
particular, when opening up the economy in 1991 it was explained that foreign 
investment and foreign technology would help improve the efficiency and 
international competitiveness of India’s industrial sector. Two decades later, the 
National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC) was set up to provide 
inputs to enhance the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. In the context of 
a stagnant share of manufacturing sector in India’s GDP, the Council had estimated 
in 2005 that the sector had to grow by 12 per cent in order for its share in GDP to 
increase from about 17 per cent to 23 per cent by 2015.37 Subsequently, the National 
Manufacturing Policy, which was announced in 2011, aimed to achieve the share of 
25 per cent by 2022. Inadequate physical infrastructure, complex regulatory 
environment and lack of enough skilled manpower were identified as chief constraints 
to the growth of the sector. It proposed to leverage the large and expanding market 
for manufactured goods to benefit from foreign investments and technologies. It 
underlined the need to “ensure access for Indian companies to foreign technologies”. 
One of the instrumentalities identified was fostering “[J]oint ventures between foreign 
companies and Indian partners”. Instead of amending the FDI policy in line with this 
objective, the Indian policymakers, however, continued to dilute it. In fact, even by 
then, most branches of manufacturing were open for 100 per cent FDI through the 
automatic route. The policymakers failed to take note of the reality that in a liberalised 
FDI policy environment, there will be little incentive for forging JVs. From an analysis 
of the FDI received during the decade of 2004-2014, it emerged that very few of the 
                                                                 
37  “NMCC sets 12% growth target for industry”, Financial Express, September 26, 2005. 
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manufacturing companies, which received large amount of RFDI during 2004-14, 
were operating as JVs. The exercise also demonstrated that notwithstanding the 10 
per cent ownership criterion prescribed for identifying FDI, in practice, realistic FDI 
investors would go for far higher shares unless constrained by national legislations or 
for immediate strategic reasons.38  
When the new government was formed at the centre in May 2014, it had to deal 
with the fact that no perceptible improvement had taken place in the share of the 
sector in GDP. The MII initiative, the first major programme of the new government 
to transform India into a global manufacturing hub, was initiated in September 2014. 
In the new scheme of things, the earlier goal of reaching the 25 per cent share in GDP 
was pushed by three years to 2025. The initiative made specific reference to harnessing 
the potential of FDI. Twenty-five sectors, almost half of which were non-
manufacturing ones, were identified for special focus under the programme.39 
Although the statement of intent of MII speaks of encouraging both “multinational 
as well as domestic companies to manufacture their products within the country”, 
liberalisation of FDI policy pertaining to different sectors that was initiated earlier in 
August 2014, underlines the reliance placed on foreign companies to contribute to 
the “making of India”. This became more than evident from the following 
unequivocal statement: “FDI reforms reflect a decisive change in philosophy, from 
viewing FDI as a tolerable necessity to something to welcome”.40 
Operationally, the policy changes were intended to “put more and more FDI 
proposals on automatic route instead of government route where time and energy of 
the investors is wasted”.41 In keeping with the critical role that it had visualised for 
FDI in the implementation of MII, the government made a series of announcements 
for relaxing the FDI policies. These announcements were aimed at increasing the 
presence of “foreign direct investors” in the Indian economy -- treating investments 
by certain foreign investors as not FDI for policy purposes but considering the same 
as FDI for reporting purposes, further relaxing the limits on FDI and significantly 
expanding the scope for automatic entry. The Budget Speech 2017-18 declared the 
government’s intention to further liberalise the FDI policy and to abolish the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Board (FIPB). The Board was abolished finally in May 2017 
                                                                 
38  Out of the 602 manufacturing companies which received RFDI of at least $5 mn., as many as 468 
companies, or 78 per cent of the total, could be termed as solo ventures. Foreign companies held 
minority shares in case of only 49 companies or 8 per cent of the total. RFDI investor’s share was 
less than 10 per cent in only seven companies. A majority of the remaining were older companies 
which were transformed into JVs. Only a small fraction originated as JVs. Foreign companies were 
equal partners in 11 new companies and six older companies. 
39  The thirteen manufacturing ones are: automobiles, auto components, aviation, biotechnology, 
chemicals, defence manufacturing, electrical machinery, electronic system design and manufacturing, 
food processing, leather, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals and textiles. The remaining are in infrastructure 
and services: construction, IT and BPM, media and entertainment, mining, ports, aviation, railways, 
renewable energy, roads and highways, mining, space, thermal power, construction, tourism & 
hospitality and wellness. 
40  Ministry of Finance, The Economic Survey 2015-16, Volume 1, p. 2. 
41  Press Information Bureau, “Reforms in FDI”, November 10, 2015, accessed from 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=130371. 
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and in its place a Foreign Investment Facilitation Portal came into existence as a single 
point interface between foreign investors and the government.  
In an interesting turn of events, the Discussion Paper “Industrial Policy – 2017” 
released by the government on August 29, 2017, just a couple of days after the much 
delayed Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2017 was announced, expressed concern 
over difficulties in ensuring technology transfer though FDI. In specific, it said that: 
FDI policy has largely aimed at attracting investment. Benefits of retaining 
investment and accessing technology have not been harnessed to the extent 
possible. FDI policy requires a review to ensure that it facilitates greater 
technology transfer, leverages strategic linkages and innovation.42 
 
This realisation should be seen in conjunction with the observation of the Prime 
Minister’s group, which had said earlier in 2008 that: 
The Multinational Companies are also permitted to open 100 per cent owned 
subsidiaries in India. In other words, in those areas the technology would 
continue to remain with the Multinational Companies themselves.43 
 
If the official Discussion Paper on industrial policy found technology transfer to 
be a major problem, a right question should be whether all of the FDI that is coming 
to India has the potential to transfer technology. Only then, the next question whether 
those who possess technology are transferring it or not, will arise. India’s entry route-
based approach for distinguishing between direct and portfolio investments does not 
take into account the character of foreign investments and their potential 
contribution. In fact, even the international definition which follows the 10 per cent 
thumb rule will be of little use as it ignores the essential characteristics of FDI like 
technology, management and marketing techniques. Adopting a generalised 
characterisation of FDI and following a liberal FDI policy which removed the 
compulsion to form JVs or to share technologies with domestic companies and then 
finding fault with FDI for not delivering technology is obviously illogical.  
The issue with FDI, however, is not technology transfer alone. FDI, in general, 
is known to have both positive and negative impacts on the host economy. There is 
thus a need to acquire a deeper understanding of its functioning. As the government 
itself has admitted, the focus has been on the aggregates. But, do we know enough 
even about these aggregates?  
Post-MII FDI Inflows 
According to the government, strong positive responses were received 
spontaneously from foreign investors following the initiation of MII and the 
                                                                 
42  India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
“Industrial Policy – 2017: A Discussion Paper”, August 29, 2017, accessed from 
http://dipp.nic.in/whats-new/industrial-policy-2017-discussion-paper. 
43  Supra note 12, p. 98. 
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reforms made in the FDI policy. The Economic Survey 2015-16 stated that after “the 
launch of the initiatives in September 2014, there was nearly 40 per cent increase in 
FDI inflows during October 2014 to June 2015 over the corresponding period of 
the previous year”.44 Subsequently, it was reported that FDI equity inflows increased 
by 46 per cent during October 2014 to May 2016 over that received during the 20 
months prior to October 2014.45 Indeed, the reported inflows crossed $55 billion 
during 2015-16, the highest in any single financial year till then. National and 
international sources went a step further and started relating the rise to the new 
initiatives. Moody’s, the influential international rating agency, ascribed the rise in 
inflows to the liberalised FDI policy and the MII campaign.46 fDi Intelligence, a 
division of the Financial Times group that monitors global cross-border greenfield 
investments, reported in April 2016 that during 2015 India had surpassed China as 
regards capital investment in cross-border greenfield investment projects.47 Taking 
cue from this, the World Bank Chief underlined that “[O]ne of the ways to look at 
how the world is reacting is through foreign direct investment. Now, more FDI is 
coming into India than China.”48 UNCTAD also noted that the liberalisation steps 
taken by the Indian government since it took office contributed to attracting FDI 
from all quarters.49  
Interestingly, at one stage the Indian government was cautious in relating the 
inflows to the policy changes. It said that:  
FDI is largely a matter of private business decisions, global investors 
normally take time to assess a new policy and its implications in the context 
of a particular market before making investment.50  
 
In the budget speech 2017-18 it was, however, stated that despite a 5 per cent 
reduction in global FDI inflows, India’s FDI inflows increased during the first half of 
2016-17 by 36 per cent over the corresponding period of 2015-16. The further rise in 
inflows during 2016-17 seems to have convinced the government that the new 
approach was yielding results. 
If the FDI inflows of US Dollar 55.6 billion for the year ending March, 2016 
were an all-time high, the record was not meant to last long. The country 
registered FDI inflow of US Dollar 60.08 billion in 2016-17, thereby scaling 
an even higher peak. 
                                                                 
44  India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2015-16, Volume II, p. 24. 
45  Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 298, replied on July 20, 2016.  
46  “FDI inflow credit positive, 'Make in India' bearing fruit: Moody’s”, The Economic Times, April 8, 2016, 
accessed from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-04-08/news/72161358_1_ 
current-account-deficit-net-fdi-inflows-trade-deficit.  
47  “India knocks China from top of FDI league table”, The Financial Times, April 20, 2016, accessed from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/94351bda-0620-11e6-a70d-4e39ac32c284.html#axzz4AVpznBZL. 
48  “India came out of Brexit relatively well: World Bank chief”, The Times of India, July 1, 2016, accessed 
from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-came-out-of-Brexit-
relatively -well-World-Bank-chief/articleshow/53000823.cms. 
49  UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2016, p. 47. 
50  Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 101, answered on July 18, 2016. 
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... 
It has been the endeavor of the Government to put in place an enabling and 
investor friendly FDI policy. ... The steps taken in this direction during the 
last three years have borne fruit as is evident from the ever increasing 
volumes of FDI inflows being received into the country.51 
 
As noted above, commenting on global data and comparing individual country 
experiences by ignoring its finer aspects could lead to gross misinterpretations.  
India’s Ill-preparedness to Assess FDI 
Seen in the context of different factors at play, beyond releasing some broad 
aggregates of FDI, India is far from offering an analytical picture of what is happening 
on the FDI front. A study of India’s FDI statistics by the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) had earlier brought out that:  
... government ministries confront noticeable difficulties in answering Data 
and Impact Questions. This is largely because they do not have the requisite 
information, cannot access it in the detail or format being requested, or have 
not yet begun to study the economic contribution and impact of foreign 
firms. This is why ministries could completely answer just 58 per cent of the 
Data Questions and just 39 per cent of the Impact Questions. In contrast, 
they fully answered 81 per cent of the Policy Questions.  
 
Judging by ministries’ responses, the principal data gaps appear to be the 
lack of information on FDI inflows into individual states, on the universe 
of foreign firms in particular states and sectors, and their contribution in 
terms of employment, trade, and overall economic value-addition. 
Ministries were also unable to answer most of the queries about foreign 
firms’ share of total national investment or sales in particular sectors, and 
the urban-rural break-up of FDI inflows, saying that government data does 
not distinguish between foreign and domestic firms, or urban and rural 
investments.52 
 
On its part, when it was told that it was not feasible to arrive at an accurate assessment 
of the response to greenfield FDI in the pharmaceuticals sector because the data on 
FDI equity inflows, maintained by the Reserve Bank of India, do not distinguish 
between greenfield and brownfield investments, the Department Related 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce said that:  
The Committee finds this argument naive and desires that the government 
should stop behaving like an ostrich but instead take cognizance of the 
ground reality. Absence of such a mechanism is a handicap for the 
government while formulating policies for the sector. It is, therefore, high 
                                                                 
51  Press Information Bureau, “Foreign Direct Investment Inflows-A Success Story”, May 19, 2017, 
accessed from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=161955. 
52  NCAER, Enhancing the Scope and Quality of FDI Statistics, Report No. 2016-03-1, March 2016, p. xviii. 
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time that suitable mechanism be established to keep track of the nature of 
Foreign Direct Investments (brownfield and Greenfield investments) coming 
in the country. The Committee calls upon the Department to provide forth 
with the segregated data on greenfield and brownfield foreign direct 
investments made in the pharma sector.53 
 
Earlier the ILPIC (1969) had underlined that:  
It is surprising that on a vital problem like this, there has been no attempt in 
Government to put together essential data [on foreign collaborations] so as 
to draw proper conclusions. Government appointed a committee in 1965 to 
examine questions relating to foreign collaborations. This committee, which 
reported in may (sic), 1967 does not however seem to have attempted to 
collect facts about all the foreign collaborations that have been entered into 
during the last decade or more.54 
 
The above clearly underlines India’s continued lack of preparedness to assess 
not just the impact of FDI, but also to understand even its basic characteristics. A 
few of the replies in Parliament, given at various points of time, which provide 
further evidence to the state of affairs, are given in Box-A. It is obvious that, with 
very few exceptions, India has taken an axiomatic approach towards FDI and did 
not make a serious effort in assessing its developmental impact. Even when it 
exercised some caution in opening up, subsequent relaxations negated the initial 
rationale. 
The Present Study 
There has been a surfeit of literature on issues which relates FDI with economic 
development, including in India, to which we have also been contributing in a small 
way. A few years back we started examining the fundamental issue of what is FDI and 
based on our understanding tried to give a break-up of the reported FDI inflows 
according to the nature of foreign investors in the Indian case.55 We had also analysed 
some operational aspects of FDI companies, including a few large unlisted ones. Time 
of actual inflow was never felt to be an important factor, particularly when examining 
data over a considerable length of time. When we started analysing the inflows in the 
immediate context of MII,  we had to necessarily take that aspect into consideration. 
The process has gradually led us to discover more issues relating to FDI data which 
seriously undermine their suitability to policy analysis.  
                                                                 
53  Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha, One Hundred and Ninth Report on FDI in Pharmaceutical Sector, presented 
to the Rajya Sabha on August 13, 2013, pp. 8-9. 
54  Ibid., p. 138, para 6.96. The committee in question was Ministry of Industrial Development and 
Company Affairs, Committee on Foreign Collaboration, May 1967. (Chairman: Mr. A Ramaswami 
Mudaliar). 
55  K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, India’s FDI Inflows: Trends and Concepts, accessible from 
http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/FDI_2011.pdf. 
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Box-A: Responses to Select Questions in the Parliament which  
Indicate Lack of Relevant Information on FDI 
 
(b) the details of the domestic and multi-national companies which have invested or shown 
interest to invest in the country under the said programme along with the total domestic and 
foreign investment made so far, company-wise, sector-wise and the target fixed for the next three 
years. 
Data with regard to the domestic and multi-national companies which have invested or have 
shown interest to invest in the country under the MII initiative is not centrally maintained. ... 
However, after the launch of MII initiative in September, 2014, there has been unprecedented 
increase in the FDI in the country. During the period starting from October, 2014 to 
September, 2016, total FDI equity inflows of US$77.86 bn. was recorded as against US$48.57 
bn. received during the preceding 24 months with an increase of 60%. 
-- Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 910, November 21, 2016  
 
Whether the FDI has adversely affected the viability of domestic small scale industries in the 
country? 
No such assessment has been made. However, FDI complement and supplement domestic 
investment. Domestic companies are benefited through FDI by way of enhanced access to 
supplementary capital and state-of-art-technologies; exposure to global managerial practices 
resulting into employment generation and accelerated growth of the sector. 
-- Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 2922, March 20, 2017. 
 
Whether employment percentage has registered a growth as a result of increase in foreign direct 
investment and if so, the percentage increased in employment in the country, State-wise including 
Rajasthan; ... 
Data is not maintained centrally for assessing the impact of increased FDI on the employment 
generation. However, FDI directly supplements the domestic capital and brings technology and 
skill in the sectors of direct entry. It has indirect multiplier effects on other related sectors also 
thereby stimulating economic growth leading to increased production, exports and employment 
generation. 
-- Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 1371, December 7, 2015. 
 
(a) the number of companies in the country with foreign equity ownership 
 The Companies Act, 1956 does not distinguish between the local equity ownership and foreign 
equity. As such, statistics regarding number of companies with foreign equity ownership is not 
separately maintained. 
-- Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 1807, August 17, 1995. 
 
(c) whether Government has studied the impact of such a move [raising of FDI limit in various 
sectors] on domestic industries and consumers; (d) if so, the sector-wise details thereof; and (e) 
if not, the reasons therefor? 
The Government reviews the FDI policy on an ongoing basis, to ensure that India remains an 
attractive & investor friendly destination. .... FDI directly supplements the domestic capital, 
technology and skills in the sectors of direct entry. It has indirect multiplier effects on other 
related sectors also thereby stimulating economic growth.  
-- Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 335, August 7, 2013. 
 
Whether the growth in employment has been noticed by the Government after liberalisation of 
FDI policy in the country; if so, the details thereof along with the employment generated in the 
country as a result thereof; 
No such data is maintained centrally. 
-- Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 3300, March 18, 2013. 
 
(c) whether the indigenous and foreign companies have shown interest to set up industries under 
the said programme (MII) in the country, if so, the details thereof during each of the last three 
years, company-wise; 
Yes. Details of foreign companies who have shown interest to set up industries in India under 
Make in India initiative, is available on the web link - https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-
Tv7_upCKANWHBON1 VOQzZ2RDg/view. No such data is centrally maintained in respect 
of domestic companies. 
-- Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 3995, March 27, 2017.  
Contd… 
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The objective of this study is to analyse India’s reported FDI inflows during the 
recent past keeping the above factors in mind and to sensitise the users about the 
caveats with which the data has to be interpreted. It is also to impress on the 
authorities to take corrective steps urgently. Thus, it goes beyond the usual analysis 
of taking the official data as given and proceeding to identify the causative factors 
and the implications. We have generally avoided discussing the pros and cons of 
FDI as understanding FDI in India’s case and measuring it are equally important 
but grossly neglected aspects. This is particularly a matter of concern when more 
than theoretical understanding empirical evidence should have been guiding 
policymaking. 
In Section I, we have provided the background to the study and also tried to 
establish the need to interpret global FDI flows with caution. Section II briefly 
describes the FDI policy changes announced in 2016 and their implications. It 
provides the background to the subsequent sectoral analysis of inflows. In Section 
III, we try to identify the broad features of the officially reported aggregate FDI 
inflows during the recent past as also the reported tranche-wise actual inflows 
during the period October 2014 to March 2016. The initial sectoral and investor 
type-wise analysis made us acutely aware of certain aspects and deficiencies of the 
data. Hence, the detailed sectoral analysis was restricted to the period October 2014 
to March 2016 only as no useful purpose was expected to be served by extending it 
to cover 2016-17. 
Section IV presents various dimensions of the data-related issues. It will not be 
possible to provide reliable estimates of the extent of distortion these issues have 
caused as it would not only mean sifting through an enormous number of company 
documents, but also identifying the time of initial decision-making and the 
circumstances associated with individual cases. Section V, therefore, seeks to 
provide a broad indication of the extent of distortions through an analysis of large 
tranches of inflows. Inflows into different individual sectors, especially 
manufacturing, will be subjected to little closer scrutiny. The section makes use of 
Box-A: Continuation 
(a) the details of the proposals received and sanctioned by the Government from various foreign 
companies for establishment of industrial units in the country under new economic reforms and 
the Make in India programme during each of the last three years and the current year, State/UT-
wise; 
(b) … the amount of investment involved, number of companies that have started production out 
of the sanctioned ones and details of employment likely to be generated therefrom ..; 
(c) whether the Government has received any complaints from the foreign companies regarding 
difficulties being faced by them in land acquisition; and 
(d) if so, the details thereof along with the corrective steps taken by the Government in this 
regard? 
a): Scheme/Programme/Economic reform wise data on the proposals received and sanctioned 
by the Government from various foreign companies is not maintained centrally.  
(b): Data related to the details of the amount of investment involved, number of companies 
that have started production based on the programme/ initiative is not maintained.  
... No data related to Employment generation with respect to investments by such foreign 
companies is centrally maintained. 
(c) & (d): No such data is centrally maintained. 
-- Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No: 444 Answered on December 18, 2017.  
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the brochures on achievements in different sectors, released by the government. 
Section VI offers some explanation for the possible acceleration in the reporting of 
old cases after April 2014 when the powers to condone FEMA violations were 
delegated to the regional offices of the RBI. It also describes a few cases which 
highlight the problem of duplicate reporting prior to April 2014. Section VII 
summarises the observations and offers a few suggestions. Keeping in view the 
heavy emphasis on attracting FDI in policymaking circles and various national and 
international fora, this exercise is restricted to inflows only. Further investments in 
India by the already operating foreign companies using domestic resources 
(reinvested earnings and borrowings from local and foreign sources), though 
important, are beyond the scope of this study. 
19 
Section II 
Changes in FDI Policy in 2016 
tarting with the targeted relaxations in 1991, when the focus was on what were 
termed as high priority industries requiring ‘large investments and advanced 
technology’, the scope for foreign participation was expanded gradually by 
opening up more sectors, enhancing the limits and curtailing the scope for case-by-
case approval. In the process, by the early 2000s, FDI had unrestricted entry into most 
of the manufacturing industries.56 Since practically the entire manufacturing sector 
had already been opened for 100 per cent FDI by the previous governments, there 
was very little scope left for further relaxation by the new government coinciding with 
the Make in India initiative. In other words, possibilities of incremental FDI inflows 
into the manufacturing sector based on mere changes in FDI policies were limited. 
This perhaps also explains the emphasis on enhancing the presence of foreign 
investors in defence industries and services sectors. The twenty-five focus sectors 
under MII cover as many as 12 non-manufacturing sectors including tourism and 
hospitality, wellness, media and entertainment.57  
The present government initiated the process of further liberalising the FDI 
policy in August 2014 by raising the general cap on FDI in defence industries and by 
allowing foreign participation in the upgradation of railway infrastructure. While 
periodic announcements were made regarding the construction development, 
insurance, pension funds and white label ATMs, a major push came in November 
2015 which covered plantations, defence industries, broadcasting, air transport, 
construction development, single brand retail trade, credit information companies and 
establishment of satellites. Another round of major changes was announced on June 
20, 2016. These were made operational through the Press Note No. 5 issued by the 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) on June 24, 2016. 
Interestingly, these changes were unveiled just a fortnight after the Consolidated FDI 
Policy Circular (henceforth, “the Circular”) which was issued on June 6, 2016. As a 
result, the Circular, whose objective was to provide a one-shot view of India’s extant 
FDI policy, could no longer provide the latest position.  
While on the face of it no major developments took place in respect of the sectors 
concerned in the interregnum and some motives other than sectoral needs58 were 
                                                                 
56  This fact was noted by the Steering Group set up by the Planning Commission when it said that 
“[M]ost of the manufacturing sectors have been for many years on the 100 per cent automatic route. 
Foreign equity is limited only in production of defence equipment (26 per cent), oil marketing (74 per 
cent) and government owned petroleum refineries (26 per cent)”, supra note 16, p. 22. 
57  Supra note 39. 
58  See for instance, “Raghuram Rajan fiasco followed by 100% FDI: How Narendra Modi Government 
Efficiently Manages Headlines”, June 20, 2016, accessed from http://www.india.com/news/india/ 
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indeed attributed to the ‘radical’ changes announced within such a short period of 
issuing the Circular, it undoubtedly reflected the government’s resolve to accelerate 
the liberalisation of the FDI policy regime. In October 2016, 100 per cent FDI was 
permitted in ‘other financial services’, which are regulated by the respective regulators, 
through the automatic route. In February 2017 the conditions attached to FDI in 
stock exchanges, commodity exchanges, depositories, etc., were modified. The latest 
in this series of FDI policy reforms was made in January 2018. The important changes 
were: (i) permitting 100 per cent FDI through the automatic route in Single Brand 
Retail Trade (SBRT); (ii) allowing FDI up to 49 per cent in Air India, thereby paving 
the way for its privatisation; and (iii) dispensing with the requirement of prior 
government approval in respect of FDI in NBFCs. 
The year-wise changes in FDI policy, effected since the present government took 
over   and   until   December   2016,   are  summarised  in  Table-1.  The  sector-wise 
description of the changes is given in Annexure-A. As described above, it can be seen 
from the Table-1 that a number of changes occurred first during November 2015 and 
later in June 2016. Since most changes took place in November 2015, one may not 
expect them to have an immediate and major effect on the inflows  during 2015-16. 
Table-1: Changes Effected in the FDI Policy Applicable to Different Activities 
during June 2014 –December 2016 
Sector 2014 2015 2016 
May-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec Jan-Jun Jul-Dec 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Manufacturing Sector      
• Defence Industries (M)  Jun Jul, Aug  Jun  
• Medical Devices (M)   Jan   
• Pharmaceuticals (M)    Jun  
Services    
• Railway Infra (M)  Aug   
• Construction (M)  Dec Nov  
• Trading  Nov Mar, Jun  
• Civil Aviation, Ground 
Handling, Satellites, etc. (M)  
 Nov Jun  
• Broadcasting (M)   Nov Jun  
• Private Security Agencies   Jun  
Financial Sector    
• Insurance, Pension Fund, 
Financial Services 
 Mar, 
Apr 
 Mar Oct 
• ATMs  Oct  
• Credit Information Cos  Nov  
• Stock Exchanges   Feb  
• Asset Reconstruction Cos   May  
Agricultural Services    
• Plantations  Nov  
• Animal Husbandry   Jun  
Source: Based on the Press Notes and the Consolidated FDI Policy Circulars issued by the DIPP. 
(M) Indicates that it is either fully or partially covered in the Make in India thrust sectors. 
Note: Press Note 1 of February 20, 2017 while retaining the 49% cap on FDI through the automatic route in 
case of infrastructure companies in the securities market, reframed the associated conditions.  
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Similarly, the changes that were announced in June 2016 would not have had an 
immediate effect on the inflows during 2016-17. So, the FDI policies per se may not 
explain the reported rise in the inflows in 2015-16 or 2016-17. It can, however, be 
argued that the change in the overall approach towards FDI, the addressing of issues 
relating to the business environment and the change in the government in general 
might have been responsible for the sharp rise in the reported inflows. 
In the following discussion, we shall describe the “radical changes in FDI regime” 
introduced in June 2016,59 the most recent major attempt, and their implications. The 
changes introduced have noteworthy and far-reaching consequences for sectors such 
as agriculture and pharmaceuticals, especially from the point of view of the domestic 
producers and consumers.  
Defence Industries 
India first opened the defence industries sector to FDI in 2001 with a 26 per cent cap 
on foreign ownership. While in all other manufacturing activities, 100 per cent FDI 
was allowed, ownership caps were put in place in case of defence manufacturing. This 
was because (i) development of indigenous defence manufacturing base has both 
economic and strategic objectives and (ii) involving FDI has security implications also. 
The present government raised the cap on foreign investment to 49 per cent in August 
2014 with a sub-limit of 24 per cent for foreign portfolio investors. Within a few 
months (in November 2014) the sub-limit was done away with.  
The FDI policy relating to the defence sector, which is one of the thrust sectors 
identified under the MII, saw major changes being introduced as a part of the policy 
changes in June 2016. These were: (i) removing the cap of 49 per cent and explicitly 
stating that 100 per cent FDI will be allowed, (ii) allowing foreign shareholding 
beyond 49 per cent through the government route wherever it is likely to result in 
access to modern technology or “other reasons to be recorded”, and (iii) bringing 
small arms and ammunition under the ambit of the policy. In the extant policy, which 
had been in place since 2013, 100 per cent foreign ownership was allowed “on a case 
to case basis, which ensures access to modern and state of art technology in the 
country”60. However, in the June 2016 FDI policy amendments, the “condition of 
access to ‘state-of-art’ technology in the country [was] ... done away with”.61 
Dispensing with the critical term “state-of-art technology” and substituting it with the 
milder term “modern technology” seems to suggest that the policymakers were no 
longer hopeful that the country would get access to advanced military technologies 
by attracting FDI. What is more interesting is that while the term “modern 
                                                                 
59  Press Information Bureau, “Major Impetus to Job Creation and Infrastructure: Radical Changes in 
FDI Policy Regime; Most Sectors on Automatic Route for FDI”, June 20, 2016, accessed from 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=146338. For details of the policy changes, see 
India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, “Review 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy on various sectors”, Press Note No. 5 (2016 Series), June 
24, 2016. 
60  India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Press 
Note No. 6 (2013 Series), August 22, 2013, p. 2. 
61  Press Information Bureau, supra note 59.  
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technology” was not explained in the relevant Press Note, there was an exercise afoot 
before the June 2016 amendment to draw up guidelines to define ‘state-of-art’ 
technology.62 Given the eagerness shown by the Indian policymakers to attract more 
FDI, dilutions in policies appear to have been introduced in order to provide greater 
scope for 100 per cent FDI. However, as we have mentioned elsewhere63, FDI policy 
can at best be an enabling mechanism since access to advanced defence technologies 
is controlled by home governments but not by the investing companies themselves. 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices 
Foreign direct investment in the sector has been one of two most discussed topics 
because of the two related factors. One, takeovers of many domestic generic 
pharmaceutical companies by large global companies, a phenomenon that is better 
known as “brownfield FDI”, and two, the consequences of this development on 
public health, not only for India, but also many other countries which benefit from 
the cheap medicines produced by the generic Indian producers. Following the 
concern expressed by many, the earlier government was obliged to restrict the 
automatic approval facility to 49 per cent foreign ownership in case of brownfield 
investment. Acquisitions beyond this share were subject to government approval and 
to conditions like restricting the use of non-compete clauses and maintaining a 
minimum level of R&D. 
The June 2016 changes in FDI policy regime raised the limit for brownfield FDI 
through the automatic route to 74 per cent. The stated objective of this change was 
“promoting the development of this sector”. If takeovers by foreign companies will 
necessarily promote and develop the sector, a question arises as to why the automatic 
route was limited to 74 per cent? Why not 100 per cent? What role are the Indian 
shareholders owning the remaining 26 per cent share expected to play? Will they have 
any say in deciding the product mix, technology transfer/local R&D, pricing, markets 
to be served, etc.? The policymakers might be taking comfort from the fact that the 
holders of the remaining 26 per cent equity can exercise veto powers in cases where 
special resolutions are mandatory. However, shareholder agreements and articles of 
association define the control relationship among the parties. If the idea was that the 
Indian party would have a chance to learn from the foreign partner, that would be 
better served when the foreign shareholder is in minority. The foreign acquirer can 
suffocate the residual Indian shareholder so that he would be forced to seek an exit 
instead of engaging in confrontation with the dominant foreign investor. On the other 
hand, if he remains and agrees not to compete, how would the policy objective be 
met?  
In any case, the 74 per cent threshold does not pose any limitation when listed 
pharma companies are the targets because listing guidelines stipulate that there should 
be at least 25 per cent public shareholding. Theoretically, the new FDI regulations 
facilitate takeover of any listed pharma company without specific government 
                                                                 
62  “Government defining 'state-of-the-art' technology to draw defence FDI”, Economic Times, May 28, 
2016, accessed from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/government-defining-
state-of-the-art-technology-to-draw-defence-fdi/articleshow/52473504.cms.  
63  See: “India’s Defence FDI Policy: Issues and Prospects”, in ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016. 
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approval, e.g. Sun Pharma, Aurobindo, Lupin, Wockhard, Cadila, Torrent and 
Biocon. The general public as shareholders can never be an effective force to direct 
the way the foreign acquirer steers the future of the acquired company.  
In January 2015, up to 100 per cent brownfield investment was allowed through 
the automatic route in medical devices. It was stated that “[D]omestic capital market 
is not able to provide much needed investment in the sector. Easing of norms for 
medical devices industry by creating special carve out in the extant FDI policy on 
pharma sector will encourage FDI inflows in this area”.64  The fact, however, is that 
greenfield FDI was already allowed through the automatic route without any cap and 
acquisition up to 49 per cent was also allowed.  The new policy would thus only 
encourages sell-offs by Indian companies rather than ‘providing them with capital’.  
In other words, the latest relaxation of FDI policy applicable to the 
pharmaceuticals sector, coupled with the complete freedom allowed to foreign 
investors to acquire existing medical devices manufacturing facilities, implies that 
practically there is no hindrance and progressively both pharmaceutical and medical 
devices industries would be dominated by large global players, raising the spectre of 
higher prices of health services. Interestingly, it has been reported that the Indian 
government, in the context of the strained relations with China, was thinking of 
blocking the acquisition of Gland Pharma by Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceuticals Group 
of China. The reason stated was that the Chinese company would gain proprietary 
technology developed by the Indian company.65 The deal finally went through and 
the Fosun Pharmaceuticals Group acquired 74 per cent shares of the KKR-backed 
Gland Pharma in October 2017.66 In fact, India should be concerned with many other 
takeovers also as the leadership of Indian industry including some promising start-
ups is passing on to foreign companies irrespective of their nationality. As in the case 
of Gland Pharma, the sell-offs by many Indian companies have been associated with 
the involvement of private equity investors (e.g. Mylan Laboratories, Paras Pharma 
and International Tractors). This experience should serve as yet another reminder of 
the risks associated with PE/VC investors when promoting start-ups.  
Civil Aviation 
In case of airports, the requirement that mandates government approval for taking a 
stake beyond 74 per cent in existing projects was done away with. Further, according 
to the revised policy, an airline company can be entirely foreign-owned but the share 
of a ‘foreign airline’ cannot exceed 49 per cent! The FDI policy applicable to the civil 
aviation sector over the years makes quite an interesting reading. While initially no 
foreign investment was allowed in the sector, foreign investment in Jet Airways was 
                                                                 
64  Press Information Bureau, “Review of the policy on Foreign Direct Investment in Pharmaceutical 
Sector – Carve out for Medical Devices”, accessed from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx? 
relid=114030. 
65  See: http://www.businesstoday.in/current/corporate/citing-genuine-concerns-modi-govt-stops-
13bn-chinese-firm-fosuns-bid-for-gland-pharma-report/story/257530.html and 
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/1ZEJKUzAMIXS0Cw6CGxNlM/Gland-Pharma-investors-
weighing-74-stake-sale-to-Fosun-in-a.html. 
66  R. Ranjani. “Fosun completes revised deal for 74% stake in Gland Pharma“, October 3, 2017, accessed 
from https://www.vccircle.com/fosun-completes-revised-deal-for-74-stake-in-gland-pharma/. 
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permitted on the ground that it was made by NRIs. It was a different matter that the 
ownership of the foreign investor in the company was shrouded in controversy. Till 
September 2012, FDI up to 49 per cent was allowed in Scheduled Air Transport 
Service/Domestic Scheduled Passenger Airlines but “[N]o foreign airlines [was] 
allowed to participate directly or indirectly”. Full ownership by NRIs was permitted. 
Obviously, the very essence of FDI, implying long-term investment and domain 
knowledge, was missing in India’s FDI policy applicable to the sector as the 49 per 
cent investment could only be by foreign portfolio investors.  
Earlier, due to the restriction on the entry of foreign airlines in the airline industry, 
the Tata Group could not form a JV with Singapore Airlines. In September 2012, this 
restriction was withdrawn but it was stated that the “49 per cent limit will subsume 
FDI and FII investment”. The new policy while permitting up to 49 per cent FDI 
through the automatic route (earlier through the approval route), opened FDI up to 
100 per cent through the approval route. NRIs will continue to have the freedom to 
invest up to 100 per cent. Interestingly, the Press Note did not annul the other 
conditions mentioned in the Circular, namely (i) Chairman and two-thirds of the 
Board members should be Indian citizens and (ii) substantial ownership and effective 
control of the company is vested in Indian nationals. One is not sure whether it was 
due to oversight or was a deliberate decision. Continuance of the second condition 
would prevent majority ownership by a foreign airline unless ‘effective control’ is 
redefined to mean a majority of Indians in the Board. Another clause of the ‘Other 
Conditions’ clearly stated that foreign airlines are allowed to invest up to 49 per cent. 
It appears that the government might be aiming at more portfolio investment in the 
sector other than that by NRIs. The new policy may not have much practical value 
because portfolio investors already invest in listed airline companies. Since the 
promoters would have some controlling stakes, foreign portfolio investors can never 
reach the 100 per cent mark. The Circular categorically stated that the provisions are 
not applicable to Air India. The latest FDI Policy Circular issued in January 2018, 
however, allowed FDI up to 49 per cent in Air India as a prelude to its privatisation.  
The sector offers an interesting insight into the government’s approach -- on the 
one hand, it considers certain types of foreign investments as not “direct investment” 
(portfolio investors neither have lasting interest nor possess other attributes which 
are associated with FDI) and on the other these investments are considered as FDI 
for reporting purposes. It is difficult to understand why such awareness of the 
distinction between direct and portfolio investment has not been applied uniformly 
(e.g., e-commerce).  
Single Brand Retail Trade 
The changes in FDI policy applicable to this sector are proceeding on the expected 
pattern of gradual relaxations. The June 2016 decision followed up the proposal made 
in November 2015 to relax sourcing norms for products having ‘state-of-art’ and 
‘cutting edge’ technology. The new policy relaxed local sourcing norms up to three 
years for entities undertaking Single Brand Retail Trading of such products. Reports 
suggest that Apple has started getting its low-end iPhone SE assembled in India on a 
trial basis through its Taiwan-based contract manufacturer Wistron. The government 
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seemed to have stood its ground against the demand for further relaxation.67 
However, since the company has three years to meet the local sourcing requirements, 
it is too early to say anything. On the other hand, the government imposed 10 per 
cent customs duty on mobile phones and certain parts w.e.f. July 1, 2017 which should 
make foreign sellers think of some indigenisation. The FDI policy applicable to SBRT 
was relaxed further in January 2018 when 100 per cent FDI was allowed in the sector 
through the automatic route. 
In this context, a comment on FDI in the trading sector would be in order in view 
of hopes being still nursed by India to develop critical infrastructure for marketing 
agricultural produce with the help of foreign retail majors notwithstanding their 
lukewarm response even to watered down conditions. The Economic Survey 2014-15 
underlined the need to liberalise the FDI policy with regard to retail trade and said that: 
In view of the difficulties in attracting domestic capital for setting up 
marketing infrastructure, particularly, warehousing, cold storages, reefer 
vans, laboratories, grading facilities etc. liberalisation of FDI in retail could 
create the possibilities for filling in the massive investment and infrastructure 
deficit which results in supply-chain inefficiencies.68 
 
The Budget Speech 2016-17 followed by announcing that: 
Our FDI policy has to address the requirements of farmers and food processing 
industry. A lot of fruits and vegetables grown by our farmers either do not fetch 
the right prices or fail to reach the markets. Food processing industry and trade 
should be more efficient. 100% FDI will be allowed through FIPB route in 
marketing of food products produced and manufactured in India. This will 
benefit farmers, give impetus to food processing industry and create vast 
employment opportunities.69 
 
As a follow-up, Press Note 5 of June 2016 stated that “[N]otwithstanding the 
FDI policy provisions on trading sector, 100 per cent FDI under government 
approval route is allowed for trading, including through e-commerce, in respect of 
food products manufactured and/or produced in India”. That means they can sell 
dals and rice, as also Kellogg’s Cornflakes, Pepsi’s Tropicana, Cadbury chocolates, 
General Mills’ wheat flour, Cargill’s vegetable oils and Coke’s Maaza. In this context, 
it is relevant to reiterate that foreign retail majors resisted the safeguards especially 
with regard to the minimum investment in backend infrastructure and how it will be 
                                                                 
67  See: “Give me more, demands Apple but Government Declines”, February 7, 2017, accessed from 
https://yourstory.com/2017/02/apple-iphone-manufacture-india/ and Muntazir Abbas, “MeitY 
optimistic about Apple's production plan”, February 12, 2017, 
https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/consumer-durables-and-information-
technology/mobiles/meity-optimistic-about-apples-production-plan/57091957. 
68  India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2014-15, Volume 1, pp. 120-121. 
69  India, Ministry of Finance, “Budget Speech 2016-17”, para 87. 
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reckoned with and sourcing from MSMEs which forced the government to dilute the 
conditions.70 
The policy change of June 2016 once again illustrated how the government, after 
seeing the writing on the wall, withdrew the obligations of investing in backend 
infrastructure (for agriculture), an important consideration for opening up retail trade. 
The relaxations come in the face of FDI in wholesale trade being misused to facilitate 
retail trade. It is likely that foreign retailers will force Indian suppliers of agricultural 
produce to invest in such infrastructure. Investment is being poured in both by private 
equity investors and global players in India’s e-commerce. E-commerce can hardly 
make a dent in the ‘massive’ market failures which have severely undermined the 
interests of the Indian farmers.  
Amazon was allowed in June 2017 to open ‘food only’ retail outlets. The company 
was reported to have proposed an investment of $515 million over the next five years. 
This follows the opening up of retail trading of locally procured food items. In the 
meanwhile other original entrants in MBRT are keeping quiet. The government has 
so far not conceded the demand to expand further by allowing personal care products 
by the ‘food retailers’.71 Gradually, however, the distinction between online and brick 
and mortar trading is getting blurred both due to changes in the FDI policy and also 
due to the business models followed by the online traders. One can only expect the 
process of opening up to progress further in due course. Given the diversity of Indian 
consumers with their varied needs, abilities to use technology and financial status, the 
local shopkeepers may still keep their place for sometime. It should, however, be 
noted that the online sellers give unfair competition to them as they offer extensive 
discounts backed by credit card companies and financial investors for whom top line 
happens to be more important than the bottom line. 
Agriculture & Animal Husbandry 
Several sub-sectors of agriculture and animal husbandry were long opened up for 100 
per cent foreign participation. Until 2010, floriculture, horticulture, development of 
seeds and cultivation of vegetables and mushrooms72 were all fully opened up for 
foreign participation, with a condition that such production in these sub-sectors 
would have to be undertaken “under controlled conditions”, which in essence were 
conditions for production of agricultural products, for rearing animals and for raising 
fish in artificial conditions. A separate set of conditions was imposed on foreign 
companies dealing with development of transgenic seeds/vegetables.  
A major change in the above-mentioned conditions imposed on foreign investors 
was seen in the Consolidated FDI Policy of June 2016. The conditions on companies 
developing genetically modified (GM) seeds were removed. This should be seen as a 
major step towards encouraging foreign companies to introduce genetically modified 
seeds, overruling the slew of concerns that have been raised by both farmers’ 
                                                                 
70  Discussed in detail in K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, “Evolution of India’s MBRT FDI 
Policy”, in ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016. 
71  Amazon is using local shops as neighbourhood delivery points from where the buyers can personally 
collect items. It is also providing platform for selling groceries in a big way. 
72  In 2011, apiculture was added to this list. 
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organizations and environmental groups. The June 2016 policy announcement went 
even further when it removed the conditions for all sub-sectors of agriculture and 
animal husbandry, except floriculture, horticulture and cultivation of vegetables and 
mushrooms. This development could be a precursor to opening up of the agricultural 
sector to foreign companies. If this move does take place, millions of small farmers 
would find themselves struggling for survival.  
Security Agencies  
Almost the same logic in respect of foreign control as in the case of pharmaceutical 
industry applies to the relaxation of FDI policy in this sector wherein 74 per cent FDI 
was permitted in private security agencies: 49 per cent foreign share through the 
automatic route (earlier through approval route), and higher equity up to 74 per cent 
through the approval route. It is pertinent to note that the government expressed its 
distinct dislike for the FIPB route as it ‘wastes time and energy’ of the investors.  
Broadcasting Carriage Services 
Earlier FDI up to 49 per cent was allowed through the automatic route and 
participation by foreign investors above 49 per cent required government’s approval. 
Now the need for seeking government approval has been done away with. This is 
once again in line with the government’s desire to minimise the role of FIPB. 
Government approval would, however, be needed by companies which do not seek 
licence/permission from the sectoral ministry. 
A Round-up 
It is perhaps apt that the government chose to label the June 2016 amendments in 
FDI policy regime as “radical changes”, for these changes could have far reaching 
implications on at least two key sectors of the economy, namely agriculture and health. 
FDI policy changes could drastically alter the country’s agriculture and health systems 
that could result in adverse impact on the domestic constituencies. The raising of the 
cap on foreign investment in brownfield investments in the pharmaceutical sector 
would provide added incentive for the takeovers of producers of generic medicines, 
who have been supplying affordable medicines not only to the Indian market, but also 
to several parts of the world. Medicines are the most important component of 
healthcare costs in India, and therefore the consequences of this affront on the 
producers of generic medicines on the citizens’ health can easily be understood.  
The amendments in the FDI policy applicable to agriculture and animal 
husbandry would facilitate the operations of the producers of genetically modified 
seeds. Despite the concerted opposition by farmers’ organizations to genetically 
modified seeds, strong advocacy for the use of these seeds has come from within the 
government.73 While the official report has backed the use of genetically modified 
seeds, arguing that it promises “high productivity and lower use of fertilizers, 
                                                                 
73  Niti Aayog, “Raising Agricultural Productivity and Making Farming Remunerative for Farmers: An 
Occasional Paper”, December 2015. 
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weedicides and pesticides”74, the scientific assessment of this technology does not 
share the optimism expressed by the official report.75  
There are implications for several other sectors as well. In defence, foreign 
companies seem to be not so keen to manufacture in India. They might be 
encouraged to take up some manufacture to meet defence offset obligations with 
the inevitable caveats on technology transfer. In civil aviation, the policy change 
was relevant for portfolio investors. The latest change was clearly aimed at 
privatising Air India. In retail, the door for foreign investors is now opened wider. 
On the other hand, the moves to push e-commerce into the WTO would have 
implications for the trading sector in general. The policy changes, as has often been 
the case in India, are not preceded by public consultations or are based on any 
study.76 These were based on expectations and have the objective of attracting large 
amount of FDI. Otherwise, one would not have come across replies like the one 
listed in Box-A wherein the government listed the expected benefits even while 
admitting that it had no relevant data. 
                                                                 
74  Ibid., section 3.3.1. 
75  A major assessment of genetically modified crops was undertaken by the Committee on Genetically 
Engineered Crops: Past Experience and Future Prospects of the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine of the United States. The Committee made “detailed surveys and 
experiments comparing GE (genetically engineered) with non-GE crop yields” and “examined 
changes over time in overall yield per hectare of maize, soybean, and cotton reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) before, during, and after the switch from conventionally bred to 
GE varieties of these crops”. The Committee could discern “no significant change in the rate at which 
crop yields increase” and concluded that “there is no evidence from USDA data that they have 
substantially increased the rate at which U.S. agriculture is increasing yields”. For details, see: National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects, 
The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2016. 
76  The stock response one finds in the replies to questions in the Parliament runs like the following. 
The Government reviews the FDI policy on an ongoing basis, to ensure that India remains an 
attractive & investor friendly destination. ... Government takes into consideration the concerns of 
all stakeholders including domestic industry and consumers while formulating FDI policy. (Rajya 
Sabha Unstarred Question No. 335, answered on 7-8-2013). 
Government reviews FDI policy on an ongoing basis. With a view to liberalise and simplify the 
FDI policy and to provide ease of doing business in the country leading to larger FDI inflows, 
significant changes are made in the FDI policy regime, from time to time. ... The Government 
receives suggestions/ grievances on various issues in different sectors. The same are considered by 
the Government in consultations with stakeholders including Ministries/ Departments, State 
Governments, apex industry chambers and other organizations and necessary amendments, if 
required, are made in the policy. (Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2568 answered on 9-8-2017). 
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Section III 
Trends in and Characteristics of  
the Reported FDI Inflows 
ndia’s reported total FDI inflows increased from $36 billion in 2013-14 to $45.1 
billion during 2014-15, the first year covering the new regime. The year 2015-16 
witnessed a further rise to $55.6 billion. In terms of total FDI inflows or the subset 
of equity inflows,77 till then this was the highest ever level of this form of investment. 
While the total inflows increased by 23.1 per cent, equity inflows rose much higher 
relatively – by 28.8 per cent (Table-2). The increase, however, does not appear that 
spectacular when seen in relation to the inflows recorded in 2014-15, a year in which 
FDI policy changes could not have made much impact. Total inflows increased by an 
impressive 25.3 per cent in 2014-15 over those reported in 2013-14; in fact, a little higher 
than that during 2015-16. On the other hand, increase in equity inflows though was a 
little lower in 2014-15, at 26.1 per cent it cannot be said to be quite low. It is possible 
that the recovery in inflows which started in 2013-14, continued into 2015-16. From 
Graph-A, which is based on quarterly data on equity inflows, it appears that the recovery 
started in the last quarter of 2013-14. The increase in 2015-16 thus may not be entirely 
related to the policy and procedural changes and other initiatives. Further, the peaks of 
2011-12 could not be bettered till 2015-16. As noted earlier, 2016-17 witnessed further 
peaks both in total inflows and equity inflows which, as noted earlier, convinced the 
government of the success of the initiatives taken by it. It should, however, be noted 
that growth in inflows during the year was substantially lower than that in the previous 
two years. 
Equally importantly, there was considerable decline in inflows during the first two 
quarters of 2016. Both the total equity inflows and the inflows through the automatic 
route slid back significantly. In fact, inflows through the automatic route almost 
returned to the level of Apr-Jun 2014, i.e. the pre-MII period. The third quarter, 
however, witnessed sharp recovery. Jan-Mar 2017 again witnessed a steep fall in inflows 
through the automatic and the approval routes while those through the acquisition route 
maintained their earlier position. The recovery in inflows through the automatic route 
in Apr-Jun 2017 was short-lived as the Jul-Sep 2017 quarter witnessed a considerable slide 
back. However, a sharp jump in the inflows through the approval route lifted the total 
inflows to a point which is higher than any of the preceding 25 quarters. But, inflows again 
fell in the subsequent quarter. The approval route witnessed the sharpest fall. While 
inflows through the automatic route also fell, those through the acquisition route more 
than doubled over the previous quarter thereby cushioning the fall to some extent. 
                                                                 
77  Equity inflows refer to inflows through government, acquisition and automatic routes and equity 
capital of unincorporated bodies. In addition to these, total FDI inflows include reinvested earnings 
and ‘other capital’ (which are essentially inter-company loans). 
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Table-2: India’s Gross FDI Inflows ($ billion) 
Year Total FDI Inflows Of which, Change over the Previous Year (%) 
Equity Inflows# Reinvested Earnings Others Total Inflows Equity Inflows 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2016-17 60.1 44.7 12.2 3.2 8.3 8.8 
2015-16 55.6 41.1 10.4 4.0 23.1 28.8 
2014-15 45.1 31.9 10.0 3.2 25.3 26.1 
2013-14 36.0 25.3 9.0 1.8 5.0 10.5 
2012-13 34.3 22.9 9.9 1.5 -26.4 -36.2 
2011-12 46.6 35.9 8.2 2.5 33.9 61.0 
2010-11 34.8 22.3 11.9 0.7 -7.7 -17.7 
2009-10 37.7 27.1 8.7 1.9 -10.0 -15.6 
2008-09 41.9 32.1 9.0 0.8 20.4 19.3 
2007-08 34.8 26.9 7.7 0.3
Source: (i) Based on data provided by DIPP in the Quarterly Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 
April 2000 to March 2016 and (ii) by RBI on its website for 2016-17. 
#: Inflows through government, acquisition and automatic routes & equity capital of unincorporated bodies.  
Graph-A: Quarterly Equity Inflows during 2011-12 to 2017-18 (till December 2017) 
 
Source: Based on the data provided by the RBI on its website. 
 
It is apparent from Table-3 that during Jan-May 2016, inflows under the head 
‘FDI Equity Inflows’ fell by 7.5 per cent over the corresponding five months of 2015. 
At the same time, there was considerable divergence in the behaviour of its different 
components. Inflows through the approval route and the equity capital of 
unincorporated bodies rose by 16.8 per cent and 25.4 per cent respectively, but 
inflows under the automatic route, the main component of the inflows, declined by 
nearly 30 per cent. The overall decline would have been sharper but for the 222 per  
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Table-3: India’s FDI Flows during 2014-15 to 2016-17: A Comparison 
SN. Item 2014-15
($ mn.)
2015-16
($ mn.)
2016-17
($ mn.)
Increase /Decrease (%) 
Jan-May 
2016 over 
Jan-May 
2015 
Change: 
2016-17 
over 2015-
16 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
A. Inward FDI   
1 FDI Equity Inflows (2+3+4+5) 31,911  41,112  44,701 -7.5 8.7 
2  Automatic Route (RBI)  22,530  32,494  30,417 -29.6 -6.4 
3  Acquisition of existing shares   6,185  3,933  7,161 222.4 81.8 
4  Approval Route (SIA/FIPB)  2,219  3,574  5,900 16.8 65.1 
5  Equity Capital of unincorporated bodies  978  1,111  1,223 25.4 10.1 
6 Other Capital  3,249  4,034  3,176 -53.3 -21.3 
7 Reinvested Earnings  9,988  10,413  12,343 21.8 18.5 
8 Total FDI Inflows (1+6+7)  45,148  55,559  60,220 -7.3 8.4 
9 Repatriations/Disinvestments  9,864  10,652  18,005 33.8 69.0 
10 Of which, Equity  9,612  10,524  17,318 35.3 64.6 
11 Direct Investment to India (8-9)  35,284  44,907  42,215 -18.9 -6.0 
B. Outward FDI   
12 Outward Investment by India  10,680  13,205  17,167 47.6 30.0 
13 Repatriation/Disinvestment  6,649  4,320  10,564 14.7 144.5 
14 Net Outward FDI from India (12-13)  4,031  8,885  6,603 87.5 -25.7 
C. Net FDI Inflows   
15 Net FDI Inflows (11-14)  31,252  36,021  35,612 -33.2 -1.1 
D. Ratios  
 16 Ratio of Equity Disinvestment to Total 
Equity -- (10/1)x100 
30.1 25.6 38.7   
 17 Share of Acquisitions in Equity other than 
unincorporated entities - (3/(2+3+4)/))x100 
20.0 9.8 16.5   
Source: Based on the data provided by the RBI on its website. 
 
cent jump in the inflows through the acquisition route. Other capital, which essentially 
comprises of loans, fell by 53.3 per cent. The reinvested earnings (which cannot be 
termed as inflows in the strict sense since their origin lies in the profits earned by 
foreign firms in India and there is no cross-border flow of capital) increased by 21.8 
per cent. On the other hand, capital outflows on account of repatriations/ 
disinvestments rose by 33.8 per cent and net outward investment by India rose by 
87.5 per cent. Consequently, net FDI flows into India fell by as much as 33.2 per cent.  
A few things stand out from the above: (i) inflows under the automatic route, 
where there are no constraints, fell significantly initially; (ii) the equity inflows were 
sustained mainly by a substantial increase in acquisitions of Indian 
companies/displacing the existing shareholders; and (iii) a significant part of the 
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inflows were neutralised by large outflows on account of repatriations/ 
disinvestments. Obviously, relaxations in policies cannot by themselves ensure 
substantial inflows of FDI. Since disinvestments drain out resources and acquisitions 
replace existing investors without adding to the equity base of the investee companies, 
the net contribution of the inflows to new capacity creation would have been quite 
small relatively. Had the foreign investors responded enthusiastically to the new 
initiatives, there was no scope for such steep fall during the first five months of 2016. 
Thus, the inflows scenario till May 2016 was not in line with the optimism exuded by 
many, including the influential international organisations.  
In the context of the record inflows during 2016-17, a quick look at the individual 
component-wise inflows during the year, however, suggests that acquisitions accounted 
for practically the entire increase in equity inflows over the previous year. While total 
equity inflows increased by $3,589 million, inflows on account of acquisitions increased 
by $3,228 million (nearly 90 per cent). It is relevant to note that inflows through the 
automatic route fell by 6.4 per cent. It was due to a substantial rise in inflows through 
the government route, non-acquisition related inflows could show a marginal increase 
of 1 per cent. While the overall increase in FDI Equity Inflows was 8.7 per cent, direct 
investment into India net of repatriations fell by 6.0 per cent due to a sharp rise in 
repatriations/disinvestments. It was only because Indian companies who were invested 
abroad also withdrew their investments substantially, net FDI inflows fell by only 1.1 
per cent. There could be certain amount of ambiguity in classifying inflows through the 
approval and acquisition routes. This is in addition to the problem of the inflows 
through the automatic route being used indirectly for acquisition purposes. Since the 
inflows are classified into only one of the three routes, how companies report when 
they receive approval for acquiring existing shares is not clear. 
Some of the major cases of acquisition were from the insurance industry. It may 
be noted that in March 2015 the government had raised the limit of foreign share in 
insurance companies from 26 to 49 per cent, though investments exceeding 26 per 
cent would have to follow the approval route. This condition was removed in March 
2016 and investing up to 49 per cent was permitted through the automatic route. By 
that time many companies had sought and received approval to increase the foreign 
share. The immediate response of the foreign investors to the relaxation was to 
partially buyout the Indian investors.78 The new measure thus resulted in the 
displacement of existing investors rather than expanding the equity base of the target 
insurance companies. The share of insurance sector was nearly 29 per cent in the 
reported acquisition-related inflows during the year. 
Going by the month-wise inflows, there was major recovery in the inflows 
through the automatic route during October 2016 followed by a sharp fall. January 
2017 again registered a minor recovery. On its part, inflows through the approval 
                                                                 
78  The prominent ones are: Sun Life in Birla Sun Life ($250 million); Mitsui Sumitomo in 
Cholamandalam MS General Insurance ($132 million); FAL Corp in ICICI Lombard General 
Insurance ($232 million); Compassvale investments in ICICI Prudential Life ($97 million) ; Macritchie 
Investments and Value Line in SBI Life Insurance (264 million); Standard Life in HDFC Standard 
Life ($257 million); Ergo International in HDFC Ergo General Insurance ($167 million); and, AIA 
International in Tata AIA Life. 
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route witnessed a spurt in August 2016 and a particularly sharp rise in November 2016 
(See Graph-B). These sudden jumps may be indicative of the influence of a few large 
tranches of inflows. In the context of getting a proper picture of the increase in 
inflows during 2016-17, it should be useful to examine the characteristics of such 
tranches. We shall address this aspect in Sections IV & V. 
Graph-B: Month-wise FDI Inflows Reported during 2015-16 to 2017-18 (till December 2017) 
 
Source: Based on the data provided by the RBI on its website. 
 
Another important aspect of India’s FDI flows is the substantial amount of 
repatriations/disinvestments. While their share in equity inflows varied from year to 
year, they reached as high as 35.8 per cent in 2016-17. That means a little more than 
one-third of the inflows were balanced by sell-offs. This is in addition to outward 
remittances on account of dividends and payments towards technology, other 
services, etc. It appears that sell-offs are gaining momentum (Table-4). The already 
high ratio of equity disinvestments at almost 30 per cent during 2010-11 to 2013-14 
jumped further to nearly 35 per cent in the next four years. In fact, the estimate for 
2017-18 (up to January) turns out to be close to half at 47 per cent (Graph-C). Such 
withdrawal of investments would be more prominent when foreign financial investors 
are involved and M&As happen to be their exit options. The initial jump during 2010-
11 to 2013-14 could be in part due to the exit options exercised by private equity 
players who entered during the mid-2000s. 
The focus being firmly on the quantum of inflows, such huge amount of outflows 
has failed to attract the attention it deserved. Interestingly, the RBI, however, has 
expressed concern about the servicing burden when it said that: 
... robust FDI inflows which were at the forefront in financing CAD in the 
previous three years, entail servicing through higher income payments which 
could have implications for CAD.79 
                                                                 
79  Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report: 2016-17, p. 62. 
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Table-4: Repatriations/Disinvestments are increasingly Offsetting the FDI Inflows 
 Year/Period Equity Inflows 
($ mn.)
Equity Repatriations/ 
Disinvestments 
($ mn.)
Net Equity Inflows 
(2)-(3) ($ mn.)
Ratio of 
Disinvestments to 
Inflows (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2005-06  6,711 61 6,650 0.9 
2006-07  16,481 87 16,394 0.5 
2007-08  26,864 108 26,756 0.4 
2008-09  32,066 166 31,900 0.5 
2009-10  27,146 4,241 22,905 15.6 
2010-11  22,250 6,514 15,736 29.3 
2011-12  35,856 13,019 22,837 36.3 
2012-13  22,884 6,853 16,031 29.9 
2013-14  25,274 4,786 20,488 18.9 
2014-15  31,911 9,612 22,299 30.1 
2015-16  41,112 10,524 30,588 25.6 
2016-17  44,705 16,002 28,703 35.8 
2017-18 (up to Jan) 38,953 18,307 20,646 47.0 
Memorandum Items  
2006-07 to 2009-10 102,557 4,602 97,955 4.5 
2010-11 to 2013-14 106,265 31,171 75,094 29.3 
2014-15 to 2017-18* 156,681 54,445 102,236 34.8 
Source: Based on the data provided by the RBI on its website https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=statistics. 
* Up to January 2018. 
Graph-C: Rising Ratio of Repatriations/Disinvestments to the Reported Annual Inflows 
 
Source: See Table-4. 
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Obviously, disinvestments of such large magnitude undermine the effectiveness of 
inflows in addressing the CAD. There is a possibility of direct investment into India in 
2017-18 being lower than that in 2016-17, which itself was lower than that in 2015-16.  
On their part, withdrawal of investments by Indian companies from their 
overseas operations cannot be equated with disinvestments by foreign investors in 
India as Indian companies generally do not make PE investments abroad. While one 
could be tempted to view this as an indication of Indian investors’ liquidating their 
overseas investments to invest in India following the improved domestic investment 
climate, the simultaneous increase in outward investment does not go well with such 
an impression. In their case, withdrawals may indicate failure of the overseas ventures. 
This phenomenon indeed needs a very close look.  
Reported Sectoral Classification of Inflows 
The prevailing perception in general has been that the initiatives taken by the present 
government since September 2014 started yielding results quickly. Most comparisons, 
especially those by the government, take October 2014 as the reference point. Hence, 
we have also decided to follow the same practice. A tabulation based on the reported 
sectoral distribution of the FDI equity inflows shows that for the entire period 
October 2014 to March 2017, the share of manufacturing sector was 30.3 per cent. It 
should be noted that during the two years prior to October 2014, the share of 
manufacturing sector was substantially higher at 47.8 per cent. In the face of 
increasing inflows, it seems that the share of manufacturing sector fell drastically while 
that of services increased sharply (Table-5). The manufacturing sector’s share, 
however, looked up substantially during 2016-17 as it jumped from 25.4 per cent in 
2015-16 to 32.6 per cent in 2016-17.  
A comparison of the sectoral distribution of non-acquisition related inflows 
reported by the RBI with that of all the inflows reported by the DIPP, suggests that 
the share of acquisition related inflows into the manufacturing sector was substantially 
higher at 39.3 per cent during 2010-11 to 2013-14 compared to the 18.1 per cent share 
during 2014-15 to 2016-17. During 2007-08 to 2010-11, the corresponding share was 
26.4 per cent. Thus, acquisitions might have contributed substantially to the increased 
share of manufacturing sector in the inflows during 2010-11 to 2013-14. 
Going by the officially reported aggregates one finds that during October 2014 
to March 2017, the omnibus Services sector stood at the top followed by computer 
software and hardware (Table-6). This was followed by trading, construction 
(including townships and housing) activities and telecommunications in that order. 
The automobile industry topped the manufacturing activities with a share of 5.8 per 
cent in the total. Its share within the manufacturing sector was quite substantial at 
19.3 per cent. Incidentally, official data suggest that the addition to inflows on account 
of defence industries during October 2014 to March 2017 was a mere $0.17 million.  
Three things stand out from the sectoral distribution of FDI equity inflows when 
data for 2016-17 are examined separately. While there are inter se changes in the 
sectoral rankings, the share of the omnibus services turn out to be slightly higher at 
20.0 per cent. Telecommunications stood at the second place with a substantially 
higher share of 12.8 per cent. Out of the total $7.3 billion FDI into the telecom sector 
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Table-5: Broad Sectoral Distribution of FDI Inflows during the Recent Years 
(Percentages) 
Sector Oct 2012 – 
Sep 2014
Oct 2014 – 
Mar 2017
2015-16 2016-17 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Services 44.1 64.3 68.7 62.3 
Manufacturing 47.8 30.3 25.4 32.6 
Energy (incl. Petroleum & Natural Gas) 6.5 4.4 4.4 4.8 
Primary 1.6 1.0 1.5 0.3 
All Sectors 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Inflows ($ billion) 48.4 99.7 40.0 43.5 
Source: Based on the data provided by the DIPP on its website. 
Table-6: Top 15 Recipients of Reported FDI Inflows during October 2014 to March 2017 
Sector/Industry Oct 2014-Mar 2017 2016-17 
Rank# Inflows
($ mn.)
Share in 
Total (%)
Rank# Inflows 
($ mn.) 
Share in 
Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Services Sector* 1 18,775.2 18.8 1 8,684.1 20.0 
Computer Software & Hardware 2 11,430.3 11.5 3 3,651.7 8.4 
Trading (incl. retail) 3 8,650.0 8.7 4 2,789.3 6.4 
Construction (Infrastructure 
activities, townships, etc. 
4 7,522.9 7.5 7 1,965.9 4.5 
Telecommunications 5 7,312.2 7.3 2 5,563.7 12.8 
Automobile Industry 6 5,826.1 5.8 8 1,609.3 3.7 
Chemicals (Other than fertilizers) 7 3,211.4 3.2 11 1,392.8 3.2 
Electrical Equipment 8 2,840.6 2.8 5 2,230.7 5.1 
Information & Broadcasting 
(Including Print Media) 
9 2,731.2 2.7 9 1,516.7 3.5 
Hotel & Tourism 10 2,608.9 2.6 13 916.1 2.1 
Cement and Gypsum Products 11 2,254.9 2.3 6 2,130.1 4.9 
Power 12 2,240.1 2.2 12 1,113.0 2.6 
Metallurgical Industries 13 2,059.1 2.1 10 1,440.2 3.3 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 14 2,016.8 2.0 14 857.4 2.0 
Hospital & Diagnostic Centres 15 1,844.5 1.8   
Non-Conventional Energy 15 783.6 1.8 
Sub-total 81,324.0 81.6 36,644.6 84.3 
Total (incl. Others) 99,718.4 100.0 43,478.3 100.0 
Source: Based on data provided by the DIPP on its website. 
* Includes finance, banking, insurance, non-financial/business, outsourcing, R&D, courier, tech. testing and analysis, etc. 
# Ranks based on Col. (3) and (6) respectively. 
Note: Percentage shares for sub-totals do not add up because of rounding-off 
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during Oct 2014 – Mar 2017, inflows of as much as $5.6 billion were reported in 2016-
17. Shares of computer software & hardware, trading, construction, etc. were much 
lower. Among the manufacturing industries, the share of automobile industry was 
much lower in 2016-17 compared to the overall period. Electrical equipment, cement 
& gypsum products and metallurgical industries had much higher shares. Share of the 
three together was higher by 6.1 per cent compared to their share in the overall period. 
This appears to be the main reason for the substantial increase in the share of 
manufacturing sector during 2016-17. (Table-5) In fact, electrical equipment and 
cement & gypsum products replaced the automobile industry to secure top two 
positions within the manufacturing sector. Keeping in view this significant 
development, we shall discuss in Section V the nature of reported inflows into the 
three industries which contributed to the increase in the share of manufacturing sector 
in 2016-17. 
A broad categorisation of the inflows during the two years prior to the 
announcement of MII and subsequently till March 2017 based on their relationship 
with the 25 focus sectors of MII also suggests that the rise had a weak association, if 
at all, with MII (Table-7). First of all, the share of MII thrust sectors fell marginally 
from 62 per cent to nearly 60 per cent. While the share of MII manufacturing 
industries within the total manufacturing sector remained stable at 62.2 per cent 
during the two periods, their share in the overall as well as within the MII thrust 
sectors fell substantially. This is in line with the earlier observation that the FDI policy 
changes (November 2015 and June 2016) could not have made an immediate impact 
on the respective year’s inflows. Classification of the inflows according to their status 
under MII is given in Annexure-B. 
Table-7: Inflows into the MII Thrust Sectors during Two Periods 
 Equity Inflows ($ mn.) 
 
2012 & 
2013 
Oct 2014 to 
Mar 2017 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1 Reported FDI Equity Inflows 44,826.9 99,892.4 
 Of which,   
1A Total Manufacturing Sector 20,268.5 30,552.6 
1B MII Thrust Sectors 27,773.1 59,687.3 
1C MII Manufacturing Industries 12,614.9 19,021.2 
1D MII Other Sectors 15,158.3 40,666.1 
2 Shares (%)    
2A MII Thrust Sectors in Total (1B/1)x100 62.0 59.8 
2B MII Manufacturing Industries in Manufacturing Sector (1C/1A)x100 62.2 62.2 
2C Manufacturing Sector in Total Inflows (1A/1)x100 45.2 30.6 
2D MII Manufacturing Industries in Total (1C/1)x100 28.1 19.0 
2E MII Manufacturing Industries in MII Thrust Sectors (1C/1B)x100 45.4 31.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided in the SIA Newsletter, various issues.  
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Analysis of Individual Tranches of Inflows (October 2014-March 2016) 
In view of the highly aggregated character of the reported inflows,80 which in any case 
do not say anything about the types of the investors, at the initial stage of this exercise, 
we made an attempt to understand the nature of inflows based on the classification 
of companies which received at least $5 million81 during October 2014 to March 2016 
and the entities investing in such companies. The inflows data were collected from 
the SIA Newsletter published online by the Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion (DIPP).82 These cover equity inflows through the approval, acquisition 
and the automatic routes. We could identify 1,188 recipients with total equity inflow 
of $51,772 million. The corresponding number of individual tranches83 of inflows was 
6,349. This works out to 92.0 per cent of the reported FDI equity inflow of $56,238 
million for the period. We have broadly followed the UN ISIC Rev 3.1 for classifying 
the activities of the recipients. Instead of solely relying on the officially reported 
product/activity description we have referred to the description given in company 
websites, annual reports, news reports and other websites giving corporate 
information. In case of intermediates and components, a secondary classification 
based on their dominant use was also made to a limited extent. 
Further, to the extent publicly available information helped, the foreign investors 
were classified as realistic FDI (RFDI), portfolio and India-related ones. Foreign 
investors investing in their respective lines of businesses have been classified as RFDI 
investors by us. For instance, Suzuki Japan’s investment in Suzuki Motor Gujarat is 
treated as RFDI as it is likely to possess the theoretically expected attributes. 
Investment of a foreign bank in a bank in India is treated as RFDI while its investment 
in a non-banking non-financial company was treated as portfolio investment. 
Investments by Vedanta group, Essar, Videocon, Hinduja, etc., were classified as 
India-related investments. In some cases, where the investing entity was having equity 
participation by portfolio investors together with Indians, such cases were marked 
separately.84 The main points emanating from this exercise are described below. 
Overall, the share of RFDI was about 58 per cent while foreign portfolio 
investors accounted for nearly 27 per cent. The remaining was by India-related 
investors directly or together with foreign private equity investors. Thus, the relative 
share of RFDI was slightly higher than what was noticed for the period September 
2004 to March 2014 when it was estimated at 53.5 per cent.85 It is relevant to note 
that a single company was reported to have invested as much as $2.25 billion during 
Oct-Dec 2015 to create living facilities for senior citizens (retirement homes). Even 
though we have serious reservations about the veracity of the size of this investment, 
                                                                 
80  In fact, the Economic Survey 2014-15 expressed reservations about the sectoral classification of inflows. 
81  The choice is based on the need to keep the exercise within manageable limits even while covering a 
substantial part of the inflows. 
82  The periodicity of the SIA Newsletter changed from monthly to quarterly from the October 2015 issue. 
The SIA Newsletter has since been renamed as FDI Newsletter. 
83  The SIA Newsletter refers to the data as ‘remittances’.  
84  For an elaboration of the classification, see: Rao and Dhar (2011), supra note 55. 
85  K.S. Chalapati Rao and Biswajit Dhar, “Analysis of India’s FDI Inflows During 2004-05 to 2013-14”, 
in the ISID-ICSSR FDI Project Report, 2016. 
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(discussed in detail in Section IV) it is unlikely that such huge investments flow in 
regularly. Excluding this investment, the shares of different types of investors turn 
out to be similar to the pattern observed for the decade 2004-05 to 2013-14. Thus, in 
a broad sense, there is not much of a change in the character of inflows (implying 
continuity from the earlier period) except that within services there is a quantum jump 
led by trading (especially e-commerce) and its associated activities.  
Out of the 1,188 recipients, 442 belong to the manufacturing sector and 746 to 
other activities (Table-8). The share of manufacturing sector in the inflows was 26.2 
per cent. Within the manufacturing sector, transport equipment, expectedly, turned 
out to be the most important segment followed by chemicals (pharmaceuticals 
contributing a little more than half), machinery & equipment, food products and 
beverages, coke and refinery products, electrical machinery and apparatus, and rubber 
and plastic products. It should be underlined that radio, television & communication 
equipment, medical, precision & optical instruments, etc., and office accounting & 
computing machinery together accounted for less than 1 per cent of the total inflows 
during the period. What we have categorised as RFDI accounted for a substantial part 
(81.6 per cent) of the inflows into the manufacturing sector. The remaining was by 
foreign portfolio investors and India-related investors. In case of pharmaceuticals, 
most of the RFDI went into the already taken over companies (e.g., Abbot 
Healthcare, Hospira Healthcare and Shantha Bio), thus probably indicating 
consolidation of the acquisitions.  
Table-8: Distribution of Top FDI Inflows during October 2014 to March 2016 
 ($ million) 
Sector/Industry/Activity No. of Cos. RFDI Non-
RFDI
Total Share of 
RFDI (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I. Manufacturing (26.2%) 442 11,070.0 2,492.3 13,562.4 81.6 
 Transport Equipment (incl. parts, etc.) 
(7.9%) 
75 3,890.4 182.0 4,072.4 95.5 
- Parts & Components  1,150.1 170.1 1,320.2 87.1 
- Aircrafts & Railways  60.7  60.7 100.0 
 Chemicals (4.5%) 73 1,693.4 623.9 2,317.3 73.1 
- Pharmaceuticals  909.4 269.9 1,179.2 77.1 
- FMCG  221.7 26.6 248.3 89.3 
 Machinery & Equipment (2.7%) 70 1,109.3 269.8 1,379.1 80.4 
 Food Products & Beverages (2.2%) 46 897.7 247.3 1,145.0 78.4 
- Bakery, Confectionery items & Beverages  282.0 137.2 419.2 67.3 
- Spirits, Wines, etc.  297.0 11.8 308.7 96.2 
- Grain milling, vegetable oils, etc.  164.2 36.9 201.1 81.7 
 Coke & Refined Petroleum Products 
(1.8%) 
3 929.5 6.1 935.6 99.3 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Metals & Metal Products (1.4%) 42 504.7 196.8 701.5 71.9 
 Electrical Machinery & Apparatus (1.4%) 30 503.2 196.6 699.8 71.9 
 Rubber & Plastic Products (1.3%) 20 477.9 193.3 671.3 71.2 
- Automotive Tyres & Components  375.5 17.9 393.3 95.5 
 Non-metallic Mineral Products (0.5%) 19 195.5 88.7 284.2 68.8 
- Glass & Ceramics  70.3 76.1 146.4 48.0 
- Cement & Lime  125.2 12.7 137.8 90.9 
 Paper & Paper Products (0.4%) 7 185.6 20.8 206.5 89.9 
 Radio, Television & Communication 
Equipment (0.3%) 
8 100.9 78.9 179.8 56.1 
 Medical, precision & optical instruments, 
etc. (0.3%) 
10 117.3 26.1 143.5 81.7 
 Office, Accounting & Computing 
machinery (0.2%) 
5 112.6 7.9 120.6 93.4 
 Miscellaneous & Others (1.4%) 34 352.0 354.1 705.8 49.9 
Memo: Automotive & Allied Industries# 4473.5 200.5 4674.0 95.7 
Share of Automotive & Allied in Total Mfg. 
(%) 
40.4 8.0 34.5 
II. Non-Manufacturing (73.8%) 746 19,251.3 18,958.3 38,209.6 50.4 
 Trade (15.7%) 119 3,106.0 5,038.6 8,144.6 38.1 
Retail Trade (incl. E-commerce) 1,847.5 4,459.4 6,306.8 29.3 
Wholesale Trade 1,054.5 292.0 1,346.7 78.3 
 Transport & Storage & Communications 
(11.9%) 
72 2,975.8 3,208.4 6,184.3 48.1 
Tele-communications 1,869.5 853.3 2,722.8 68.7 
Online travel ticketing & hotel booking 456.4 31.5 487.9 93.5 
Ports, Container Terminals, Harbour Services 102.6 382.9 485.4 21.1 
Couriers, Logistics, etc. 95.3 428.8 524.1 18.2 
Cab Aggregators 20.0 1,300.4 1,320.4 1.5 
Air Transport 379.4 379.4 100.0 
 Construction (11.5%) 135 3,314.0 2,642.8 5,956.8 55.6 
Housing, Commercial Complexes, Malls, etc. 2,390.2 1,688.1 4,078.4 58.6 
SEZs, Technology Parks, etc. 10.5 834.7 845.3 1.2 
Engineering, Turnkey Contractors, etc. 805.8 105.6 911.4 88.4 
Roads, Bridges, etc. 107.5 14.3 121.8 88.3 
 Business Services (8.8%) 129 3,161.8 1,374.8 4,536.7 69.7 
Computer & Related Activities 2,026.0 1,183.2 3,209.2 63.1 
- Online Payment Facilities 773.7 143.4 917.1 84.4 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
- Online Data Dissemination 347.8 456.8 804.6 43.2 
- Software Development 334.4 420.9 755.3 44.3 
- BPO and Data Processing 474.0 162.1 636.1 74.5 
Other Business Activities  1,064.9 117.0 1,181.9 90.1 
Research & Development 70.9 74.7 145.6 48.7 
 Financial Intermediation (8.2%) 101 2,609.2 1,647.4 4256.6 61.3 
Credit, Investment, etc. 1,266.0 1,246.0 2,512.0 50.4 
- Finance for Auto/Equipment Purchase 644.7 7.6 652.3 98.8 
- Microfinance 29.7 350.8 380.5 7.8 
- Other Finance 591.6 887.6 1,479.2 40.0 
Stock markets, investment, research, etc. 478.7 384.4 863.1 55.5 
Insurance & Pension Funding 864.6 17.1 881.6 98.1 
 Hotels & Restaurants (5.5%) 51 1,891.4 979.8 2,871.2 65.9 
Hotels 1,777.0 773.6 2,550.6 69.7 
Restaurants, Eating Places, etc. 114.5 206.1 320.6 35.7 
 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply (4.4%) 58 1,131.4 1,143.2 2,274.5 49.7 
Electric Power (excl. Solar & other renewable) 689.1 552.0 1,241.0 55.5 
Solar Power 193.1 209.3 402.4 48.0 
Other Renewable Energy 249.2 381.9 631.1 39.5 
 Other Services (3.8%) 18 645.1 1,322.1 1,967.2 32.8 
Entertainment 638.4 1,322.1 1,960.5 32.6 
 Healthcare (1.8%) 36 306.2 650.0 955.8 32.0 
 Mining & Quarrying (1.6%) 9 89.5 732.8 822.3 10.9 
 Education (0.4%) 14 6.5 200.4 206.9 3.1 
 Agriculture, Hunting & Forestry (0.1%) 4 14.3 18.5 32.9 43.5 
Grand Total (I + II) 1,188 30,321.3 21,450.7 51,772.0 58.6 
Source: Based on the analysis of individual tranches of inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Note: Companies which received at least $5 million during October 2014 to March 2016 are considered. The 
classification broadly follows ISIC Rev 3.1.  
 
While transport equipment alone accounted for 30.0 per cent of the inflows into 
the manufacturing sector, together with other closely associated industries (e.g.: 
automotive tyres) its share reached 34.5 per cent. It should be underlined that the 
emergence of the automobile sector is a case of classic industrial policy. It is 
interesting to note that China is seeking entry into India by buying into General 
Motors’ India. It should also be noted that the sector is known to pay heavy royalties 
and make other payments to foreign parents and affiliates in multiple forms.86 If such 
                                                                 
86  See for instance, Biswajit Dhar and K.S. Chalapati Rao, “Some Key Aspects of Functioning of FDI 
and Domestic Companies in India” and Swati Verma and K.V.K. Ranganathan, “FDI, Technology 
Transfer and Payments for Know-How: A Case Study of Automobile Sector”, in ISID-ICSSR FDI 
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payments are taken into account, the net inflow may be much smaller than what the 
reported inflow figures suggest. For instance, Maruti Suzuki India Ltd (MSIL) paid 
out $3,565 million toward royalty/technical know-how during 2009-10 to 2016-17.87 
On its part, Suzuki invested back $477 million till March 2016 and a further $393 
million subsequently in its Gujarat facility which has been set up under the ownership 
of a new wholly-owned company instead of the publicly traded MSIL. If one adds the 
payments made by Suzuki Powertrain India (till its amalgamation in MSIL) in the 
form of royalties and professional fees, what India got as FDI into the Gujarat facility 
from Suzuki works out to be even relatively smaller. Another relevant case, though it 
belongs to the subsequent period, is that of Bosch Ltd. The company transferred its 
Starter Motors and Generators business to a newly set up company Robert Bosch 
Starter Motors Generators India Pvt Ltd with effect from August 1, 2016. An amount 
of Rs. 486 crore was brought as FDI by the German parent company into the new 
company later in the year. This was the exact amount that was to be paid to Bosch 
Ltd for transferring its business. Incidentally, Bosch Ltd. declared a special dividend 
of Rs. 276 crore “on account of consideration received from sale of the Starter Motors 
and Generators business”.88 Being a 70.49 per cent shareholder, the foreign parent’s 
share in this would be Rs. 194 crore. Since FIIs (owning 7.37 per cent at the end of 
March 2017) would also be entitled to the Special Dividend, they would have received 
about Rs. 20 crore. That is, while Rs. 486 crore came in as FDI due to this 
restructuring, Rs. 214 crore went out of the country as Special Dividend. If such 
associated facts are not taken into account, the addition to investible resources would 
turn out to be artificially high. 
On the other hand, RFDI accounted for only half of the inflows into the non-
manufacturing activities. Trading has the highest share in this segment with retail trade 
accounting for bulk of the inflows. Non-RFDI was the mainstay of retail trade. On 
the other hand, RFDI contributed relatively far more to wholesale trade. The retail 
sector was dominated by e-commerce companies. While telecommunications has the 
highest share of inflows (44.0 per cent) in the transport, storage and communications 
sector, cab aggregators accounted for a little more than one-fifth of the inflows into 
this group. Interestingly, most of the investment into this activity is by non-RFDI 
investors. Ports and port-based infrastructure, courier and other logistics companies 
(some of which are expanding on the back of retail e-commerce) were the other 
important recipients of inflows but in their case also the share of RFDI was quite low. 
Inflows into travel portals were dominated by RFDI. Like in trade, the influence of 
e-commerce (car/auto aggregators, couriers, travel portals) cannot be missed in this 
infrastructure segment. Ports, other port-based infrastructure and air transport 
received far less RFDI than e-commerce related activities. 
The construction sector received almost equal amount as that of the transport, 
storage and communications group – a little more than one-tenth of the total inflows 
                                                                 
Project Report, 2016. 
87  We are not making any distinction between “public limited” and “private limited” in this study as a 
company’s status may change over time. There are many cases in the reported inflows where in some 
instances the same company was referred to as public and in some others as private. 
88  Bosch Ltd., Annual Report 2016-17, p. 38. 
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for the period. The sector has a fairly large share of non-RFDI type inflows. Housing, 
commercial complexes, etc. is the dominant group within this sector, accounting for 
over two-thirds of the inflows. Next in importance is engineering turnkey contractors 
which received $911 million. This was followed by SEZs, technology parks, etc. 
However, practically the entire investment into this group was of the non-RFDI type. 
It is relevant to note that this segment has experienced relatively high share of 
acquisitions (26.0 per cent). The non-RFDI investors may be either bailing out the 
promoters and/or are providing an exit for the existing portfolio investors (secondary 
investments). Companies engaged in construction of roads and bridges received the 
least -- just about $122 million. 
The diversified business activities group followed with 8.8 per cent share in total. 
While computer related activities accounted for bulk of the inflows, a significant 
portion of it was on account of online payment services and local and other services 
listing portals. At 6.2 per cent of the total inflows, share of computer related services, 
however, works out to far less than what the official data suggests. Some of the e-
commerce related companies might have been clubbed together under computer 
software and hardware category by the official agencies. Another category of 
companies which could have been classified as IT-related ones were cab aggregators.89 
Thus, investment into those engaged in software development for export purposes 
would be less than one-fourth of what even our classification suggests.  
In this context, it is relevant to note that leading information technology 
companies made little additional investment during this period either for manufacture 
or for software development. Very small amounts were invested by (i) CISCO in 
IL&FS Technologies, One Mobikwik Systems and Videonetics Technology; (ii) 
Google Capital in commonfloor.com; (iii) Microsoft for acquiring InMage Systems 
Ltd and (iv) Facebook towards acquisition of a start-up. However, CISCO also 
invested $144 million in a company that provides loans/leases to its customers. On 
the other hand, Hewlett Packard invested $174 million in reorganising existing 
operations into two newly incorporated companies.90 The small-sized investments 
into Oracle by individuals (possibly ESOPs) cannot be called RFDI. Uber invested a 
little less than $20 million in its Indian operations during this period. In the backdrop 
of the above, Computer Software & Hardware, of which the former a net earner of 
foreign exchange, being placed at the second position by the official agencies (Table-
6) is quite untenable. 
Next in importance is financial intermediation with a share of 8.2 per cent in the 
inflows under study. While $1,479 million was invested in general financing activities, 
notable amounts were also invested in financing of purchases of group companies’ 
products and microfinance companies – $652 million and $380 million respectively. 
                                                                 
89  Ministry of Commerce and Industry, DIPP, Electronics and IT Sector: Achievements Report, November 8, 
2016, confirms such a classification. Snapdeal, Paytm and Ola figure at the very top of the list of 
recipients. See Table-24 in Section V. 
90  The business of desktop computers, personal systems, inkjet printers, 3D printing, etc., was 
transferred from Hewlett Packard (India) Software Operations Pvt Ltd to HP PPS Services India 
Operations Pvt Ltd. The technology Services, consulting, enterprise storage, servers and networks 
and software business units were transferred from HewlettPackard India Sales Pvt Ltd to Hewlett 
Packard Enterprise India Pvt Ltd. 
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Stock market related activities attracted $863 million. Insurance and pension funds 
received $882 million. Seventy per cent of the investment in the insurance sector, 
however, was in the form of replacing the existing investors, thus, resulting in changed 
ownership pattern following the hike in the cap on foreign share from 26 per cent to 
49 per cent. Thus, net addition to the investment in the sector would have been quite 
small. For example, practically the entire investment in Bharti Axa Life Insurance Co 
Ltd by Axa India holdings was of the acquisition type. Another case which boosted 
inflows into the sector was the acquisition of shares by Nippon Life in Reliance Life 
Insurance Co Ltd. 
Hotels and restaurants activity also received substantial amounts -- $2,871 million 
or 5.5 per cent of the total inflows. The hotels segment which accounted for bulk of 
the investment also received relatively higher amount of RFDI. On the other hand, 
the restaurant segment received more of non-RFDI investment. About half of the 
inflows into Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, which has an overall share of 4.4 per 
cent, is accounted for by what appears to be generation/distribution of electricity 
through thermal and hydel means. Solar and other renewable power 
generation/distribution together was close behind. Overall, about half of the inflows 
are of the non-RFDI type. The entertainment sector followed closely with inflows of 
$1,961 million -- a share of 3.8 per cent in total (an important case will be explained 
in Section IV). Bulk of the investment into mining and quarrying, healthcare and 
education was of the non-RFDI variety. 
Inflows According to the Period of Incorporation of the Top Investee 
Companies 
As noted earlier, foreign investors often bring funds in multiple tranches. Also, there 
can be many reasons for older companies to attract investment from abroad. Given 
the prevailing view that the high quantum of inflows was due to the foreign investors’ 
response to the new initiatives, it may be worthwhile to distinguish the recipients 
according to their period of incorporation and the type of investments received. We 
have, therefore, grouped the recipients into different periods based on their year of 
incorporation. In a few cases where it was clearly known that a new company was set 
up to reorganise an existing business of the same foreign investor, the period of 
incorporation of the original divesting company was assigned (e.g., reorganisation of 
the Indian business of Hewlett Packard following its global restructuring). Data on 
actual inflows at the level of individual tranches are being reported since September 
2004. Hence those incorporated prior to 2005 were placed together. The groupings 
are: (i) up to 2004, (ii) 2005-2009, (iii) 2010 and until September 2014 and (iv) October 
2014 onwards. An attempt was also made to check whether these companies received 
inflows during September 2004 to September 2014.  
Out of the 1,188 companies, only 44 fell in the last category, i.e. the period during 
which the inflows are perceived to have reached unprecedented levels (Table-9). Their 
share in total inflows was a mere 2.7 per cent. Out of the 44 companies, 21 received 
RFDI and their share in total RFDI was 2.0 per cent. RFDI is a better indicator of 
the efficacy of FDI policy because the motives of portfolio investors and returning 
Indians are quite different from those of RFDI investors. Further, decisions on long-  
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Table-9: Distribution of Top 1,188 FDI Recipients during October 2014 to March 2016 
according to the Period of Incorporation and the Nature of Foreign Investor 
Period of  
Incorporation 
of the Investee 
Co. 
  
All Companies Companies which already received 
inflows during Sep 2004 – Sep 2014
Other Companies 
All Sectors (Number of companies) 
RFDI Non-
RFDI 
Total RFDI Non-
RFDI
Total RFDI Non-
RFDI 
Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
All Sectors (Number of companies) 
Up to 2004 218 181 384 148 122 257 70 59 127 
2005-2009 242 175 401 211 120 321 31 55 80 
2010-2014S 206 159 359 150 65 212 56 94 147 
2014O-2015 21 23 44 21 23 44 
Total 687 538 1,188 509 307 790 178 231 398 
All Sectors (Inflows $ million) 
Up to 2004 10,663 7,527 18,190 8,870 5,015 13,885 1,793 2,512 4,305 
2005-2009 10,093 6,431 16,524 9,331 4,879 14,209 762 1,552 2,314 
2010-2014S 8,950 6,694 15,644 7,746 4,693 12,439 1,204 2,001 3,205 
2014O-2015 616 798 1,414 616 798 1,414 
Total 30,321 21,451 51,772 25,947 14,586 40,533 4,375 6,864 11,239 
Manufacturing (Number of companies) 
Up to 2004 125 59 180 81 30 108 44 29 72 
2005-2009 117 21 137 106 12 117 11 9 20 
2010-2014S 94 23 117 69 9 78 25 14 39 
2014O-2015 8 8 8 8 
Total 344 103 442 256 51 303 88 52 139 
Manufacturing (Inflows $ million) 
Up to 2004 5,585 1,337 6,922 4,789 839 5,627 796 498 1295 
2005-2009 3,192 741 3,933 3,039 467 3,506 152 274 427 
2010-2014S 2,076 414 2,490 1,679 103 1,782 397 311 708 
2014O-2015 217 217 217 217 
Total 11,070 2,492 13,562 9,507 1,408 10,915 1,563 1,084 2,647 
Source: Based on a classification of the inflows reported in SIA Newsletter, various issues.  
Notes: (i) Companies which received at least $5 million during October 2014 to March 2016 are considered. 
Due to rounding off, totals may not match exactly. 
(ii) Since some RFDI receiving companies also received other type of investments, total number of 
companies in some cases will be less than those given under the two categories. 
2014S: Until September 2014; 2014O: October 2014 onwards. 
  
term investments will not be taken instantly and will be based on careful analysis of 
RFDI investors’ future requirements and the relative advantages offered by 
alternative locations globally. For unequivocally crediting the increased inflows to the 
new regime, logically there should have been far larger number of new companies and 
much higher share in total RFDI than those that have been observed here. Out of the 
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1,188, as many as 790 received inflows at least once during September 2004 to 
September 2014. For some of them it can be additional capital infusion and for some 
others it could be replacement of the existing investors. Majority of the remaining 398 
companies did not receive RFDI during this period. Out of the 178 companies which 
received RFDI, 70 belong to the first period of incorporation. Among the 70 
companies definitely there are cases which already had foreign equity (e.g., Becton 
Dickinson, GE Money Financial, SKF Technologies, Panasonic Appliances and 
Piaggio Vehicles). Further, in case of as many as 25 of the 70 companies, inflows 
followed the acquisition route.  
Further, compared to the overall share of acquisition-related inflows in total 
RFDI, the set of 157 companies (incorporated prior to October 2014) have a far 
higher share of acquisition-related inflows – 21.9 per cent against 8.9 per cent. The 
companies involved include: Sembcorp Green Infra; Prism TV; Hyderabad Chemical; 
SJS Enterprises; ABEC Exhibitions; and Yoboho New Media. It should be underlined 
that buying into a company by taking up additional capital can lead to change in 
control even when the existing shareholders remain invested. For instance, DLF 
Midtown Pvt Ltd and DLF Urban Ltd formed 50:50 JVs with GIC of Singapore by 
issuing new shares. At the next stage, the Indian promoters might exit by selling their 
shares to the foreign investor. These cases illustrate the difficulties in distinguishing 
between greenfield projects and M&As. Such investments are not treated as 
acquisition-related by the official agencies.  
It is thus possible that in most of the remaining 87 cases either the investment 
was on account of replacing the existing shareholders or fresh entry as 
JV/strategic/dominant partner. In some cases, the initial entry could have been made 
by an Indian affiliate of the foreign investor or some of the affiliate’s operations have 
been transferred to a newly set up company. Examples of business acquisitions 
include: Vai Metals Technologies; FCC Clutch; Archroma India; Middleby Cellfrost 
Innovations; SMAS Auto Leasing; and Shriram Axiall. It is also possible that in a few 
cases we might not have been able to relate with the earlier investments due to name 
changes. Though this possibility was minimised by the use of CIN numbers assigned 
by the MCA, one cannot rule it out altogether because we were focusing on relatively 
large remittances. In general, out of the different possibilities when older companies 
receive foreign investment, buying-in and/or takeovers seem to dominate (Table-10). 
Yet another possibility, which casts serious doubts on the reporting system, as we will 
be describing in Section IV, is that the inflows reported during this period might have 
come in the earlier years. Delayed reporting is not uncommon. 
Even when one examines the period after March 2016, there is no significant 
change in terms of the relative importance of newly set up manufacturing companies 
receiving RFDI. Out of the 701 companies which received a minimum of $5 million 
inflows during Apr-Dec 2016 and which accounted for 92.5 per cent of the total 
inflows for the period, there were possibly 227 manufacturing companies. Out of the 
227, the ones incorporated after September 2014 and which were not meant to carry 
on the already existing businesses were only 9 companies with a total inflow of $160 
million. Even among the nine there was one company which may not be taking up 
manufacturing directly but is likely to hold the shares of an already existing company.  
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Table-10: Different Possibilities when Older Companies Receive Inflows 
The Investee is 
Wholly Indian-Owned Indian Company having 
foreign Financial Investment 
Joint Venture/ Listed 
Partly Foreign Owned Co. 
Wholly Foreign-Owned 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
• Seeks additional capital 
from financial investors 
• The financial investor 
exits by selling off to a 
foreign investor who is 
either financial or other 
• Buys out the Indian JV 
Partner wholly or 
partially (JV breakup) 
• Acquires businesses 
• Sells off to another 
Foreign Investor (either 
financial or other) 
• Issues shares (non-cash) 
to foreign investors 
following group internal 
reconfiguration (no real 
cash flow)  
• Seeks additional capital 
from strategic investors 
(JV formation) 
• Sells off partly to 
strategic investors (JV 
formation) 
• Buys out partially or 
fully public shareholders 
(delisting process) 
• Retires Debt 
• Converts foreign debt 
into equity 
• Recapitalises a loss 
making entity 
• Local investor sells off 
completely to foreign 
financial Investors  
• Local investor sells off 
completely to other 
foreign Investors 
• Implements projects 
which were planned in 
the earlier period 
• Expands existing 
facilities 
• Sets up greenfield 
projects 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
 
If inflows into that company are excluded, the inflows into the remaining 8 would be 
only about $64 million, or 1.7 per cent of the inflows into the manufacturing 
companies. Again, in case of the Jan-Mar 2017 quarter, there was not much of a 
change in the situation. Out of the 42 companies which received a minimum of $5 
million realistic FDI and which were identified as belonging to the manufacturing 
sector, only four were registered after September 2014. These four accounted for a 
mere $32 million out of the $1,556 million reported by the 42 companies. Thus, 
even in 2016-17, the surge in inflows was essentially due to older companies. There 
is very little representation of newly incorporated companies in the manufacturing 
sector.  
A few of the manufacturing companies incorporated in the new period to 
takeover existing businesses are shown in Table-11. The corresponding inflows would 
not be classified under the ‘Acquisition Route’ in the official data, thereby 
underestimating the role of acquisitions in the inflows. Underestimation also occurs 
when the inflows into existing companies are utilised for acquisition of other 
businesses. The case of Mylan Laboratories (earlier Matrix Laboratories) illustrates 
this possibility quite well (Diagram-A). Earlier in 2006, the inflows on account of this 
company were utilised to buy the shares from existing shareholders some of whom 
were again foreign financial investors. An investment of $373 million in the company 
was reported during the quarter Apr-Jun 2016. This amount was, however, utilised  
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Table-11: Illustrative Cases which could be Mistaken as New Operations 
Name of the Company Incorporation Remarks
(1) (2) (3)
Anik Milk Products Pvt Ltd May 2016 The dairy business of Anik Industries Ltd was transferred 
to this newly incorporated company. Lactalis of France is 
the foreign acquirer.
Avanti Frozen Foods Pvt 
Ltd 
April 2015 Avanti Feeds Ltd transferred its shrimp processing 
facilities to the company.
Baxalta Bioscience India Pvt 
Ltd 
April 2015 Baxter India’s bioscience business was transferred to this 
new company. This was consequent to the global 
restructuring of Baxter of USA.
Cavendish Industries Ltd  January 2015 Formed to acquire three units of Birla Tyres. Acquirer is 
JK group’s Mexican subsidiary and a trading arm in 
UAE.
Cipla Health Ltd August 2015 Consumer healthcare business of Cipla Ltd was transferred 
to this new company. Foreign Investors are financial  
Crompton Greaves 
Consumer Electricals Ltd 
February 2015 Resultant company following the demerger of consumer 
electricals business of Crompton Greaves Ltd. Acquirers 
are financial investors led by Temasek of Singapore. 
Elanco India Pvt Ltd November 
2014
Novartis India transferred its animal health business to 
the company.
Modern Food Enterprises 
Pvt Ltd 
December 
2014 
Acquired the Hindustan Unilever Ltd.’s (HUL) bread and 
bakery business which itself was acquired by HUL when 
Modern Food Industries was privatised in 2000. 
Acquired by India-based PE investors through their 
Singapore arm.
Robert Bosch Starter Motors 
Generators India Pvt Ltd 
February 2016 Bosch ltd transferred its operations of starter motors and 
generators business to this newly set up company.  
Source: Compiled by the authors.  
Diagram-A: A Depiction of the Reported Inflows Relating to Mylan Laboratories Ltd 
 
Source: Based on various sources including inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter, filings with the stock 
exchanges, press reports. 
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entirely for taking over Jai Pharma.91 Obviously, Mylan Laboratories did not benefit 
directly from these inflows.  
Portfolio investment was highly concentrated. More than half of it went into retail 
trading, web portals, cab aggregators and construction. Most of the it came through 
just two countries: Mauritius (46.9 per cent) and Singapore (40.8 per cent). Cyprus 
and Cayman Islands contributed another 2.6 per cent. The combined share of these 
four countries works out to 90.3 per cent. India-related investors other than those 
covered under the portfolio investment category preferred Mauritius, Singapore, 
UAE and Cyprus. The combined share of these countries was 91.9 per cent. On the 
other hand, the share of Singapore and Mauritius in RFDI was 30.5 per cent and 5.5 
per cent respectively. While RFDI investors sparingly use the Mauritius route, 
Singapore offers a mixed bag of RFDI and portfolio investors. This will partially 
address the following concern expressed by the government. 
[T]hese inflows [from Singapore and Mauritius] need perhaps to be 
examined more closely to determine whether they constitute actual 
investment or are diversions from other sources to avail of tax benefits 
under the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement that these countries have with 
India.92 
 
A more fundamental question is that whether the policymakers who have been 
observing the phenomenon of Mauritius for such a long time and about which a lot 
of discussion has taken place should have expressed such lack of awareness of the 
nature of investments through Mauritius.  
In any case, are comparisons of the above type regarding period-wise inflows and 
their sectoral classification, often made by many, valid? Infirmities in the reported 
data, described in the following sections in detail, strongly suggest otherwise. The 
sectoral and incorporation period-wise distribution presented above will only suggest 
the manner in which one could examine the inflows instead of bringing out broad 
aggregates only which, at times, are not only inappropriate, but also misleading. It also 
offers a template for presenting sectoral distribution of inflows. One will appreciate 
after going through Sections IV and V, why this exercise was not extended to cover 
2016-17.  
                                                                 
91  Formerly a division of Famy Care. 
92  India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2015-16, p. 133. 
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Section IV 
Some Serious Issues with the Reported Inflows 
he issue of definition of FDI notwithstanding, one has come to place a lot of 
reliance on the reported data on inflows, especially because the source is the 
Reserve Bank of India. This data also go into the international data on BoP, 
International Investment Position and FDI statistics. In an earlier study of ours, we 
came across a few cases where there was some gap between the time of reporting and 
remittance of funds/issue of shares. When looking closely at the case of the largest 
investment during the period of reference for the current study, we realised that the 
reported figures may not always match with the amounts reported by the companies 
to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and there could be problems of 
interpretation as well. In the following, we dwell deep into this aspect because of its 
implications for the relationship between the policy/procedural changes and foreign 
investors’ response as also the sectoral distribution of inflows. First we will describe 
certain individual cases to illustrate the nature of problems encountered. This will be 
followed in Section V by an examination of the top inflows listed as part of the 
sectoral report cards of MII issued by the DIPP, and the character of inflows into the 
manufacturing industries that received maximum amounts during 2016-17.  
Serene Senior Living: Improbable Inflow of $2.25 billion 
Serene Senior Living Pvt Ltd. (SSLP) is reported to have received $2.25 billion in a 
single tranche from Signature India LLC, USA (SIL) during Oct-Dec 2015. In fact, 
this is the single largest amount received by a company figuring in the list of 1,188 
companies referred to in the previous section. Earlier, the same foreign investor 
brought in a total of $1.91 million in five tranches into the company. The first tranche 
was reported to have been received in February 2014. The name of the investee 
company was changed from Covai Senior Care Constructions Pvt Ltd. to Serene 
Senior Living Pvt Ltd. in September 2014. A search of the internet did not throw up 
evidence to show the financial strength of the foreign investor to be able to bring in 
such large investment. Based on the claim that during 2014-15 the company entered 
into a “Technical Know-How Licence Agreement” with Signature Senior Living USA 
(SSL), the presence of SSL and SIL’s directors93 on the board of the Indian company 
and the share of foreign investor being 21 per cent as on March 31, 2015, we have 
treated this as a case of RFDI.  
The filings with the MCA, however, did not reflect the receipt of such a large 
amount (Rs. 15,000 crore). The company’s authorised capital of Rs. 5 crore would 
have been grossly insufficient to absorb such huge inflow unless a very huge premium 
was assigned to the equity shares or the amount came in the form of convertible 
                                                                 
93  See: https://www.corporationwiki.com/Texas/Irving/senior-signature-living-llc/60086095.aspx#. 
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debentures. In fact, the company’s paid-up capital as on March 31, 2016, was Rs. 1.48 
crore. Forty eight thousand seven hundred and eighty six shares having face value of 
Rs. 10 were allotted to the foreign investor on June 4, 2015 at a premium of Rs. 307.46 
per share– total consideration was Rs. 1.55 crore. Earlier on September 4, 2014, 
39,756 shares were issued on the same terms – valued at Rs. 1.26 crore. Reserves as 
on that date were Rs. 29.57 crore. Share application money was Rs. 5,000. Short term 
borrowings were Rs. 28 crore. Total liabilities including advances received from 
customers (Rs. 97.6 crore) were Rs. 160.6 crore. Further, SSL’s website did not refer 
to its projects in India.94 It is thus obvious that somewhere along the line a serious 
mistake was committed and information was entered/interpreted incorrectly. In 
March 2017, it was reported that the company was taken over by Columbia Pacific 
Management for an undisclosed sum.95  
Suryadev Alloys & Power: Eight-year Lag in Reporting 
Table-12 shows the sequence of allotment of shares by Suryadev Alloys & Power Pvt 
Ltd. and the time of reporting of the inflows. The SIA Newsletter reported all the 
inflows into the  company  against  the  month  of  June  2015. However,  from  the 
filings of the company with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs it is apparent that shares 
were issued to foreign investors in June 2007, April 2011, March 2013 and March 
2015. It seems that shares issued as far back as June 2007 were reported eight years  
Table-12: Apparent Long Gap between Allotment of Shares and Official Reporting of Inflows: 
The Case of Suryadev Alloys & Power Pvt Ltd 
Name of the Foreign Investor Shares Allotted Shares held 
as on 16-
07-2013 
(No.) 
Inflow reported: 
June 2015 
(Rs. Million) 
In June 
2007
In April 
2011
On 
30-03-2013
In March 
2015
No. No. No. Amount 
(Rs. mn.)
No.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Paper Chase International INC, UAE 264,082 264,082 13.20 
Gulf Recycling F.Z.C 264,207 264,207 13.21 
Buoysail TR. EST, UAE 44,132 44,132 2.21 
Buoy Charting & Trading Ltd, UAE 132,464 132,464 6.62 
Terentula Holdings Ltd, Cyprus 343,560 2,548,147 137.42 
Terentula Holdings Ltd, Cyprus 2,204,587 881.83 881.83 
Greta Metal Pte Ltd, Singapore 341,539 136.62 341,539 136.62 
Greta Metals DMCC, UAE 183,769 73.51 183,769 73.51 
Surendra Jhunjhunwala  142,210 56.88 142,210 56.88 
Globusstar Trading Co LLC, UAE 50,231 20.09 50,231 20.09 
Al Saham Al Fadhi Metal Tdg Ltd, UAE 3,12,433 665,583 15.62 
Al Saham Al Fadhi Metal Tdg Ltd, UAE 353,150 141.26  141.26 
Globusstar Trading Pte, Singapore 294,493  NR 
Greta Industries Pte Ltd, Singapore 414,430  NR 
Source: Based on the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter and filings with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.  
NR: Not reported. 
                                                                 
94  See: http://www.signatureseniorliving.com/communities_find.html. 
95  See: http://www.seattletimes.com/business/columbia-pacific-expands-into-india-senior-care-market/. 
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later in June 2015together with those received in 2011 and 2013, in one go. The fact that 
the amounts corresponding to the shares issued in April 2011 and March 2013 exactly 
match with the amounts reported in June 2015 lends further credence to this possibility.  
United Biscuits: Clearing the Backlog and Duplicate Reporting 
It appears as if companies have started clearing the backlog. For instance, United 
Biscuits India also informed the RBI about the recent as well those past tranches 
which it had failed to report earlier (Table-13). Further, it also illustrates the possibility 
of duplicate entries. 
Table-13: The Case of United Biscuits Ltd which Illustrates Delayed  
as well as Possible Duplicate Reporting 
SN Foreign Investor Country Amount
(Rs. 
mn.)
Period of 
Reporting the 
Inflow 
Date of 
Allotment of 
Shares 
Lag between 
Allotment and 
Reporting 
(months) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 23.21 2009 Jul 2009 Jul 08 0 
 United Biscuits Cyprus 23.21 2015 Jul-Sep Duplicate Reporting# 
2 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 212.06 2015 Jul-Sep 2009 Oct 16 70 
3 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 125.17 2010 Jun 2010 Mar 11 3 
 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 125.17 2015 Jun Duplicate Reporting# 
4 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 149.42 2011 Sep 2010 Jul 02 14 
5 United Biscuits Ltd British Isles 148.09 2011 Jan 2010 Oct 29 3 
 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 148.09 2015 Jun Duplicate Reporting# 
6 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 234.02 2011 Aug 2011 May 16 3 
7 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 263.09 2012 Jan 2011 Oct 24 3 
8 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 200.66 2012 May 2012 Mar 12 2 
9 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 289.78 2012 Nov 2012 Sep 06 2 
10 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 350.14 2015 Jul-Sep 2013 Mar 15 29 
11 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 271.91 2015 Jul-Sep 2013 Oct 22 22 
12 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 203.74 2015 Jul-Sep 2014 Mar 13 17 
13 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 50.58 2014 Oct 2014 Jun 12 4 
14 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 152.74 2014 Nov 2014 Aug 14 3 
15 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 100.01 2014 Dec 2014 Oct 22 2 
16 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 97.50 2015 Feb 2015 Jan 02 1 
17 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 189.10 2015 Apr 2015 Mar 31 1 
18 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 197.00 2015 Jul-Sep 2015 Aug 25 0 
19 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 1.62 2015 Jul-Sep 2015 Sep 07 0 
20 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 190.80 2016 Apr-Jun 2016 Mar 30 0 
21 United Biscuits Cyprus Ltd Cyprus 193.82 2016 Apr-Jun 2016 May 18 0 
Source: Same as Table-12. 
Notes: Two small tranches each equal to Rs. 0.01 million have been left out. 
# Excluding these three cases and taking into account the transfers from domestic investors, the number of 
shares referred to in the ‘List of Allottees’ tally with the shares outstanding as on March 31, 2015. 
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DV Travels Guru: Reported Inflows had been Already Divested 
In case of DV Travels Guru Pvt Ltd, the SIA Newsletter reported inflows into the 
company by Travelguru Mauritius and TG India Holdings Co, also of Mauritius, in 
September 2014 through the automatic route. A perusal of the company’s filings with 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and press/web reports clearly indicate that the start-
up company initially attracted investment from an India-based private equity fund and 
subsequently it was taken over by Travelocity (USA) in 2009. Yatra Online Pvt Ltd., 
which itself is private equity backed, subsequently acquired the company in 2012 from 
Travelocity. The much delayed reporting to the RBI by the company gives the 
impression that both the private equity investor and Travelocity invested in the 
company in September 2014 while the fact is that both have exited and at one stage 
it involved acquisition of existing shares by one foreign investor from another foreign 
investor (Table-14).  
It is also relevant to note that while DV Travels Guru reported that TG India 
Holdings Company belonged to Cayman Islands, the SIA Newsletter showed the 
country of investment as Mauritius. Incidentally, the parent company of TG India 
Holdings in its filings with the SEC also showed it to be a Cayman Islands company. 
On its part, the official Mauritius company registry did not show any such entity 
‘LIVE’ or ‘DEFUNCT’. This is another dimension of the reporting of data on 
inflows.  
Table-14: Apparent Case of Reporting Inflows Long after the Foreign Investors had Divested: 
The Case of DV Travels Guru Pvt Ltd 
 (Number of Shares) 
Date of Annual 
Return 
Mr. 
Ashwin 
Damera 
Venkata 
Mrs. 
Asha 
Devi
Travelguru, 
Mauritius
Bennett, 
Coleman & 
Co Ltd., 
India
TraveloCity.c
om Pvt Ltd., 
India
TG India 
Holdings Co. 
Cayman 
Islands 
Yatra Online 
Pvt Ltd., India 
& nominee 
India India Mauritius India India Cayman 
Islands 
India 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Nov. 2, 2006 5,000 5,000 990,000     
Nov. 2, 2007 5,000 5,000 990,000     
Sep. 30, 2008 5,000 5,000 1,026,623 1,20,711   
Sep. 30, 2009  @10,000 *1,195,310  
Sep. 30, 2010  10,000 1,271,306  
Sep. 30, 2011  10,000 1,474,788  
Sep. 28, 2012   16,53,787 
Source: Same as Table-12. 
@ Acquired from Mr. Ashwin Damera Venkata and Mrs. Asha Devi on July 11, 2009 
* Acquired 1,074,599 shares from Travelguru and 120,711 shares from Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd. on July 11, 2009. 
Some Large and Important Cases 
The following Table-15 which gives some of the largest tranches of inflows provides 
further indication of the dimension of the problem. There is something seriously 
wrong if the largest four tranches during October 2014 to March 2016 which together  
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Table-15: Select Suspect Large Tranches of Inflows Reported during September 2014 to March 2016 
Indian Company Foreign Investor SIA Newsletter 
Reference 
Reported Inflow Observation 
Rs. Mn. US $ mn. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Top Four Tranches 
Serene Senior Living 
Pvt Ltd 
Signature India LLC, USA R2015/10-
12(2561)  
149,998.07 2,252.38 Doubtful 
Keyman Financial 
Services Pvt Ltd 
BK Media Mauritius Pvt 
Ltd., Mauritius 
R2015/01(315) 75,000.00 1,205.29 Rs. 750 mn. 
was invested 
in 2007. 
Triguna Hospitality 
Ventures (I) Pvt Ltd 
APHV India Investco Pte 
Ltd., Singapore 
F2015/10-
12(70) 
56,702.10 871.56 Doubtful 
Triguna Hospitality 
Ventures (I) Pvt Ltd 
AAPC (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd., Singapore 
F2015/10-
12(69) 
50,405.86 774.78 Doubtful 
2. Some Other Large Tranches 
Ford India Pvt Ltd 
 
Ford Motor Co., USA R2014/09(426) 26,665.41 438.11 Doubtful. 
Ford International 
Services LLC, USA 
R2014/09(425) 14,434.59 237.16 
The amount invested after March 2014 and till March 2015 was only Rs. 18,180 
million Thus there seems to be excess reporting of Rs. 22,920 million for the period.  
Jet Airways India 
Ltd 
Etihad Airways, UAE R2016/01-
03(2673) 
20,576.65 305.96 Not of this 
period. 
 The shares were allotted in November 2013 but were reported in March 2016. 
Renault Nissan 
Automotive India 
Pvt Ltd 
Nissan Motor Co Ltd R2014/11(289) 10,440.31 169.20 ECBs of 2011 
converted 
Renault Group BV R2014/11(470) 4,474.42 *72.51 
* Includes fresh investment of $24.65 million. 
Wal-Mart India Pvt 
Ltd (earlier Bharti 
Wal-Mart Pvt Ltd) 
 
Wal-mart Mauritius (1) 
Holdings Co Ltd 
R2013/02(121) 272.00 5.06 11-Dec-12 
Wal-mart Mauritius (1) 
Holdings Co Ltd 
R2014/03(270) 269.09 4.41 27-Feb-13 
 Wal-mart Investments 
Cooperatie UA 
R2014/09(222) 13,279.20 281.18 27-Mar-14 
Wal-mart Investments 
Cooperatie UA 
R2014/09(229) 6,235.43 102.45 24-Jun-14 
 
Wal-mart Mauritius (1) 
Holdings Co Ltd 
R2015/01(319) 272.00 4.37 * 
Wal-mart Mauritius (1) 
Holdings Co Ltd 
R2015/01(323) 269.09 4.32 * 
Wal-mart Investments 
Cooperatie UA 
R2015/01(471) 13,279.20 213.40 * 
Wal-mart Investments 
Cooperatie UA 
R2015/01(472) 6,235.43 100.21 * 
There are no filings with the MCA regarding allotment of shares corresponding to 
the above four tranches. Excluding them, the outstanding shares at the end of  
Contd… 
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 March 2015 match exactly with the shares allotted (and for which details are 
available at the MCA website) till January 2015. 
The JV was dissolved w.e.f. December 31, 2013 and Bharti group’s shares were 
transferred to Wal-Mart Mauritius (1) Holdings Co. Ltd. 
Essel Mining & 
Industries Ltd 
Surya Abha Investments 
Pte Ltd 
R2015/07-
09(2020) 
16,065.00 242.61 allotted in 
2013-14 
 Surya Abha Investments 
Pte Ltd 
R2015/07-
09(1850) 
10,001.00 157.16 existed on 24 
Sep 2012 
 Surya Abha Investments 
Pte Ltd 
R2015/07-
09(2021) 
5,499.67 83.05 21-Mar-12# 
GMR Infrastructure 
Ltd 
Dunearn Investments 
(Mauritius) Pte Ltd 
R2015/03(480) 7,888.17 126.31 CCPS were 
issued on 26-
03-2014 
GKFF Ventures R2015/03(511) 544.83 8.72 
ICRA Ltd Moody’s Singapore Pte 
Ltd 
A2014/10(34) 5,171.33 84.30 Shares were 
acquired in 
June 2014 
Moody’s increased its stake to majority through an open offer. 
Idea Cellular Ltd Axiata Investments 2 
(India) Ltd 
F2014/09(10) 7,500.00 123.22 Shares were 
issued in July 
2014 
Fulford India Ltd Dashtag A2015/10-
12(187) 
1,502.23 23.09 Open offer 
was made in 
June 2014 
Sesa Sterlite Ltd 
(Now Vedanta Ltd) 
Twinstar Holdings A2014/10(30) 9,741.79 158.81 Most of the 
inflow likely 
to belongs to 
the earlier 
period. 
 Twinstar Holdings A2014/12(50) 2,502.78 39.88 
The number of shares held by Twinstar Holdings, which is part of the promoter 
group, increased by 917,315,594 shares during Jul-Aug 2013 probably following the 
merger of Sesa Goa and Sterlite Industries. Subsequently, its holdings increased by 
62,342,706 shares during Apr-Jun 2104, by 62,423,849 shares during July-Sep 2104 
and by 10,657,160 shares during Oct-Dec 2014.  
 Sesa Sterlite made two disclosures under SEBI takeover regulations on June 23, 2014 
and September 26, 2014 for 59,432,485 and 64,730,399 shares respectively. The 
shares were acquired by Twinstar Holdings through open market purchases on 
various dates starting from May 20, 2014 to September 25, 2014. 
Thus most of the increase appears to belong to the pre-Sep. 2014 period. In any case 
the process of creeping acquisition began in May 2014. 
Adani Estates Pvt 
Ltd 
Vakoder Investments Ltd R2014/09(30) 6,094.57 100.13 Debentures 
were issued 
during 2013-
14 
Bharti Infratel Ltd QIB Class (Total 33 
Investors) 
R2015/10-
12(746) 
15,638.19 240.37 No change in 
the number 
of shares 
since the IPO 
in 2012. The 
Anchor Investors (Total 6 
Investors) 
R2015/10-
12(706) 
2,120.12 32.59 
Contd… 
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 Retail (Total 325 
Investors) 
R2015/10-
12(1778) 
19.56 0.30 reported 
inflows may 
thus relate to 
2012. 
 HNI (Total 6 Investors) R2015/10-
12(1777) 
3.20 0.05  
Apart from the problem of the inflows not falling within the study period, this case 
highlights the extent to which the inflows could be far removed from the concept of 
FDI. 
Source: Based on the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter, various issues. 
Notes: Column 3 gives the route, year of inflow, month(s) and serial number in the newsletter. R stands for 
automatic route, F stands for approval route and A stands for acquisition of existing shares. 
# The date on which shares were allotted. 
  
amount to more than Rs. 33,000 crore ($.5.1 billion) are associated with one kind of 
problem or the other. The case of SSLP has already been discussed at length at the 
beginning of this section. While Rs. 7,500 crore was reported to have been invested 
in Keyman Financial Services in January 2015, we came across evidence to the effect 
that the foreign investor was issued shares worth Rs. 75 crore on October 1, 2007. 
The premium component of this was Rs. 67.50 crore. The paid-up capital of the 
company as on March 31, 2015 was Rs. 9.2 crore with an additional Rs. 64.5 crore 
reported under the reserves and surplus head. Total liabilities were Rs. 73.76 crore. It 
is thus obvious that the Rs. 75 crore investment of 2007 was reported in 2015 and it 
seems to have been incorrectly entered as Rs. 7,500 crore. Based on the investee 
company’s profile it was classified by us in the entertainment sector (Table-8). 
In the face of the paid-up equity share capital and reserves & surplus of Triguna 
Hospitality Ventures as on March 31, 2016 being Rs. 355.46 crore and Rs. 198.17 
crore respectively, and the changes during the year being quite small, the reported 
inflow of Rs. 10,710.80 crore (Rs. 5,670.21 crore + Rs. 5,040.59 crore) into the 
company could only be termed as an error. In case of Walmart India there seems to 
be repetitive reporting which amounts to about Rs. 2,006 crore. This being the most 
likely possibility, all the other four remittances listed in the table must have been 
received prior to October 2014. The joint venture agreement of Walmart with the 
Bharti group was dissolved at the end of December 2013. We are not sure whether 
this duplicate reporting happened in the process of transition from a JV to a wholly 
foreign owned subsidiary. Bharti Infratel is another interesting case. The reported 
inflows into the company are not only old, but they also illustrate how the reported 
investments could be far from the theoretical position of FDI.  
The case of Ford India is somewhat more complicated compared to the others 
in this category. While many inflows matched with the allotment of shares to foreign 
investors, a few did not exactly match. A comparison of year-wise inflows (all through 
the automatic route) and allotments show that there was an excess reporting of Rs. 
471 crore. In any case, in respect of a better part of the unmatched inflows, shares 
were allotted before 2013-14. Table-16 provides the details. 
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Table-16: Discrepancy between Share Allotments and Reported Inflows in Case of Ford India 
Financial Year ending/ 
Date of Allotment 
Shares As on Date No. of Shares Allotted 
Matched with Inflows Not matched with Inflows 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
31/03/2008 109,700,000
November 2008 65,000,000
30/03/2009 22,500,000
31/03/2009 197,200,000
24/03/2010 15,000,000 
31/03/2010 212,200,000
31/03/2011 212,200,000
22/11/2011 11,200,000 
27/03/2012 65,500,000 
31/03/2012 288,900,000
27/11/2012 14,000,000 
26/03/2013 173,800,000 
31/03/2013 476,700,000
12/09/2013 21,000,000 
20/12/2013 16,500,000 
29/01/2014 18,600,000 
25/03/2014 37,200,000 
31/03/2014 570,000,000
09/01/2015 24,600,000
09/01/2015 18,900,000
20/03/2015 138,300,000
31/03/2015 751,800,000
Total 269,300,000 372,800,000 
Value of the Allotted Shares (Rs. mn.) 26,930.00 37,280.00 
Matching with Inflows (Rs. mn.) 26,930.00 41,986.22 
Excess Inflows Reported (Rs. mn.) 4,706.22 
Source: Same as Table-12. 
 
A long list of relevant cases is given in Annexure-C. In most cases, we relied upon 
the documents downloaded from the MCA website in connection with an earlier study 
which had a special emphasis on RFDI in India’s manufacturing sector. Hence, the 
list predominantly contains cases belonging to this category. Since this paper 
underwent multiple revisions with the availability of more recent data each time,  we 
included a few problem cases that came up after March 2016. In putting together the 
cases, we tried to match the reported inflows and the amounts reported to the MCA 
in terms of millions of rupees to the second decimal point. While we do not rule out 
some mismatches, we believe that the chances of wrong association are quite low.  
The list includes many large companies like Amazon, Cargill, Carrefour, Daikin, 
Daimler, General Motors, Shell and Valeo. In most cases which are reported after 
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September 2014, the shares were issued prior to that.  In fact, some duplicate 
reporting cannot be ruled out. While some of the cases cited by us may not technically 
fall in the category of delayed reporting as some delay is built into the reporting 
requirements, for the purpose of assessing the impact of the new policies and 
programmes even a month’s delay could alter the conclusions. If inflows into leading 
companies in different industries are either suspect or they do not belong to the 
corresponding period, activity-wise analysis in different years would be grossly 
misleading.96 We referred to the aforementioned cases to emphasise the point that 
data limitations can seriously undermine meaningful analysis of the inflows in terms 
of their character and period of investment and why straightforward comparisons 
should be avoided. 
India is known to promote the country as an investment destination in multiple 
ways including the foreign visits of national leaders. There is, however, no mechanism 
to assess the outcome. The statistics routinely issued by official agencies are of little 
help not just because of foreign investors routing investments through third countries, 
especially the tax havens. How different types of problems affect country-wise inflow 
figures can be seen in case of USA from Table-17. Out of the top 25 remittances 
reported officially as many as 10 are portfolio investments. One is by an India-related 
investor. Two others are by RFDI investors from other countries. Though USA-
based RFDI investors accounted for 62.5 per cent of the inflows covered by the top 
25 remittances (41.9 per cent if the doubtful one is excluded), their number at 12 is 
less than half. Other categories of investors account for more than a third of the 
inflows. On the other hand, the list fails to include some large investments by 
American companies which invested through other countries. A few of the important 
tranches are: Abbott ($2,397 million in May 2017); Pioneer Overseas Corp ($1,206 
million in July 2009); Oracle (1,084 million in January 2007); Genpact ($664 million in 
March 2016; and ATC Tower ($459 million in June 2016) – all much higher in ranking 
compared to the $408 million investment listed at the second place in Table-17. The 
irrelevance of the routinely issued official list of top inflows from the USA is obvious. 
Table-17: Remittance-wise Details of Top 25 FDI Inflows Received from USA# 
(through Indian companies, from April 2000 to March 2017) 
SN Name of Indian 
Company 
Name of Foreign 
Collaborator 
Item of Manufacture Amount  
(In US$ 
million) 
Comment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Serene Senior Living 
(Covai Sr Care Cons 
Signature India LLC Other specialized 
construction activities 
2,252.38 RFDI – 
USA (highly 
improbable) 
2 Indusind Bank Ltd. Various Monetary intermediation 
of commercial banks, … 
408.29 Portfolio 
3 Ford India Limited Ford Motor 
Company 
Manufacture of motor cars 
& other motor vehicles … 
438.11 RFDI – 
USA  
Contd… 
                                                                 
96  E.g.: Ford, Daimler, Renault and General Motors in case of automobiles; Walmart and Carrefour in 
case of wholesale trade; Serene Senior Living in case of housing; Triguna Hospitality in case of hotels, 
Keyman Financial in case of entertainment. 
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4 Essar Steel Ltd Essar Logistics 
Holdings Ltd 
Steel mfr.. 451.97 India Related 
5 Ford India Limited Ford International 
Services Ltd 
Manufacture of motor 
cars & other motor 
vehicles … 
237.16 RFDI – 
USA  
6 Cairn India Ltd Petronas Intl Corp. 
Ltd 
Business services not 
elsewhere classified 
297.21 RFDI - 
Other 
7 Amazon Data 
Services India Private 
Limit 
A 100 Row, Inc Data processing 
activities including report 
writing 
206.43 RFDI - USA 
8 GMR Infrastructure 
Ltd 
26 Various FIIs Miscellaneous 256.28 Portfolio 
9 Ford India Private 
Limited 
Ford Motor 
Company 
Manufacture of 
passenger cars 
185.39 RFDI - USA 
10 Cairn India Ltd Orient Global 
Tamarind Fund Pvt 
Ltd 
Business services not 
elsewhere classified 
233.36 Portfolio 
11 Anant Raj Industries 
Ltd. 
Deutsche Bank 
Trust Co. 
Miscellaneous 132.30 Portfolio 
12 Adani Power Limited Various Investors Electric power 
generation by coal based 
thermal power plants 
86.41 Portfolio 
13 Ford India Ltd Ford Motor 
Company 
Manufacture of motor cars 
& other motor vehicles 
111.96 RFDI - USA 
14 Fedex Express 
Transportation & 
Supply 
Federal Express 
Europe Inc 
Storage and warehousing 
services not elsewhere 
classified  
105.43 RFDI - USA 
15 E-Serve International 
Ltd 
Citibank Overseas 
Investment Corp. 
Leasing hire purchase 112.81 RFDI - USA 
16 PTC India Ltd. As Per Annexure Electricity generation, 
transmission & 
distribution 
103.22 Portfolio 
17 Reebok India 
Company 
Reebok 
International Ltd 
Wholesale of textiles, 
fabrics, yarn, household 
linen, … 
69.89 RFDI - 
Other 
18 Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Ltd. 
BK of New York Banking activities 
including financial services
102.21 RFDI - USA 
19 Veritas Software 
Technologies India 
Pvt 
Veritas Operating 
Corporation 
Providing software 
support and maintenance 
to the clients 
64.30 RFDI - USA 
20 JSW Energy Ltd Various Investors Generation and 
transmission of electric 
energy produced in 
hydro-electric power 
plants 
97.14 Portfolio 
21 Vardhman Yarns & 
Threads Limited 
American & Efird 
Global Llc 
Manufacture of thread, 
including thread ball 
making 
61.88 RFDI - USA 
Contd… 
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22 Religare Enterprises 
Ltd 
Industrial Finance 
Corp 
Other financial services 
n.e.c. 
67.41 Portfolio 
23 Citicorp Finance (I) 
Ltd 
* Mgt consultancy/call 
centres 
87.15 RFDI - USA 
24 GMR Infrastructure 
Ltd 
FII Miscellaneous 88.48 Portfolio 
25 W.S. Electric Ltd Schroder Credit 
Renaissance Fund 
Ltd 
Construction and 
maintenance not 
elsewhere classified. 
86.22 Portfolio 
 Total   6,343.37  
 Memorandum:     
 Investor Category Number of 
Remittances 
 Amount Share in 
Total (%) 
 RFDI -USA 12  3,965.21 62.5 
 RFDI - Other Countries 2  367.10 5.8 
 Portfolio 10  1,559.11 24.6 
 India-Related 1  451.97 7.1 
 Total 25  6,343.37 100.0 
Source: Based on: http://dipp.nic.in/sites/default/files/fdi_Synopsis_USA_1.pdf 
# The original list was based on rupee value of the inflows. 
* Presumed to be by a Citi group company. 
Duplicate Reporting 
There is yet another problem which further reflects adversely and seriously on the 
quality of inflows data. We have indicated above that there were duplicate entries in 
respect of Walmart India and United Biscuits. Such double counting could have 
serious implications when examining the inflows during a certain period, especially at 
the sectoral level. A few major cases are listed in Table-18. The list contains some 
large and well-known companies. The most important one from the point of the value 
involved is JSW Steel in which JFE Steel Corp of Japan invested. Against this strategic 
investment of Rs. 48,007.20 million ($1,060.26 million), fully and compulsorily 
convertible debentures were issued by the company on July 27, 2010. The same were 
converted into equity shares on October 7, 2010. The inflow corresponding to this 
investment was reported against the month of August 2011. JFE was also allotted 
equity shares priced at (including premium) Rs. 147.66 crore and Rs. 3.08 crore worth 
GDRs having underlying 3,085,814 equity shares to the foreign investor through the 
local custodian of Citibank on December 14, 2010. The issue of equity shares was 
reported earlier against the month of January 2011. By the end of 2012-13 all GDRs 
were surrendered.  
Exactly the same amount of Rs. 48,007.20 million was again reported for the 
quarter Oct-Dec 2016. The equivalent foreign currency was reported as $719.23 
million, obviously based  on  the  then  prevailing  exchange  rate.  It may be noted 
that during June 2012, the shareholding/GDRs held by JFE Steel were transferred to 
JFE Steel International Europe BV. The European wholly-owned subsidiary of JFE 
Steel was set up in September 2011.  The parent company’s equity shares and GDRs  
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Table-18: A few Important Cases of Apparent Duplicate Reporting 
Name of the Indian Company Name of the Foreign Investor Amount in 
Rs. Cr. 
Reported 
Recent Earlier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
JSW Steel Ltd JFE Steel Corp., Japan 4,800.7 2016 Dec 2011 Aug 
Walmart India Ltd Walmart Investments Cooperatie 1,327.9 2015 Jan 2014 Sep 
623.5 2015 Jan 2014 Sep 
BNP Paribas India Holding Pvt 
Ltd 
BNP Paribas SA 85.8 2016 Jun 2013 Jan 
140.6 2016 Jun 2013 Jan 
34.5 2016 Jun 2013 Jan 
Bridgestone India Pvt Ltd Bridgestone Asia Pacific Pte Ltd 221.2 2016 Sep 2013 Aug 
DB (BKC) Realtors Pvt Ltd IL& FS Realty Fund LLC 52.1 2016 Jun 2007 Oct 
 Trinity Capital (Ten) Ltd 50.0 2016 Jun 2008 Jun 
 In case of both the investors there appears to be duplicate reporting as 
well. No change in the number of different categories of shares till March 
2016. Further, no shares have been issued after January 2008.  
Showa India Showa Corp 175.2 2015 Sep 2014 Feb 
Showa Corp 38.8 2015 Sep 2010 Sep 
Getit Infoservices Pvt Ltd  Astro Entertainment Networks 
Ltd 
294.5 2015 Jun 2015 May 
 Astro Entertainment Networks 
Ltd 
11.6 2016 Mar 2011 Apr 
Goldman Sachs India Capital 
Markets Pvt Ltd 
Goldman Sachs Mauritius NBFC 172.1 2016 Sep 2011 May 
126.6 2016 Sep  2014 Jan 
Hewlett Packard Fin Serv (India) HPFS Venture Holdings Ltd 217.9 2016 Jun 2009 Feb 
Hershey India Pvt Ltd Hershey Intl Ltd 81.4 2016 Sep 2013 May 
Hindustan Coca-Cola Holdings Pvt 
Ltd 
Hindustan Coca Cola Overseas 312.6 2016 Dec 2011 Nov 
Bharat Coca Cola Overseas HPL 562.0 2016 Dec 2011 Apr 
Hindustan Coca Cola Overseas 1,281.2 2016 Dec 2011 Apr 
HSBC Securities & Capital Mkts HSBC Investment Bank Hldgs  946.5 2016 Sep 2009 Mar 
Huawei Telecommunications (I) 
Co Pvt Ltd 
Huawei Technologies Coopertief 
UA 
83.6 2009 Sep 2009 Aug 
Bureau Veritas India Pvt Ltd Bureau Veritas SA 74.5 2016 Dec 2013 Jan 
Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd MIH India Ecommerce Pvt Ltd 307.6 2015 Jun 2015 Apr 
 MIH India Ecommerce Pvt Ltd 307.6 2015 Jun 2015 Apr 
IKEA India Pvt Ltd INGKA Holding Overseas BV 889.1 2016 Sep 2016 Jun 
Caparo Engg (India) Pvt Ltd Blue Elephant Finance Ltd 158.0 2015 Sep 2011 May 
Varsity Education Management Pvt 
Ltd 
NSR PE Mauritius 125.0 2015 Apr 2012 Apr 
NSR PE Mauritius 175.0 2015 Apr 2012 Apr 
Contd… 
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Showa India Pvt Ltd Showa Corp 175.2 2015 Sep 2014 Feb 
Amazon Seller Services Ltd Amazon Asia-Pacific Resources 410.2 2015 Apr 2014 Nov 
Baxter India Pvt Ltd Baxter Pacific Investments Pte 
Ltd 
150.5 2011 Jun 2009 May 
 
Though there were two filings showing allotment of 150,500,000 shares 
of Rs. 10 each in Dec. 2009 and Feb. 2009, the actual increase in the 
number of shares during the year indicate that there was only one such 
allotment.  
Brainbees Solutions Pvt Ltd  Valiant Mauritius Partners FDI 
Ltd 
123.5 2016 Mar 2015 Mar 
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd Heliconia Pte Ltd (now Caladium 
Invest) 
1296.0 2016 Sep 2013 Jun 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 1366.1 2016 Jun 2010 Nov 
Mahindra & Mahindra Financial 
Services Ltd 
TPG-Axon (Mauritius) II Ltd 266.0 2009 Apr 2008 Aug 
Standard Chartered Private Equity 148.2 2009 Apr 2008 Aug 
Hitachi Consulting Software 
Services Pvt Ltd 
Hitachi Consulting Software 
Services Inc. 
88.2 2016 Dec 2016 Jun 
There was only one allotment (made on March 30, 2016) corresponding 
to this amount after 2014.  
JP Morgan Securities (India) Pvt 
Ltd 
JP Morgan International Finance 
Ltd 
324.0 2008 Aug 2008 Aug 
The first entry gives the recipient as “JP Morgan Securities Pvt Ltd”. 
Since there has been no such company, it is taken as JP Morgan Securities 
India Pvt Ltd. 
Asianet Communications Ltd SVJ Holdings Ltd 425.0 2010 Aug 2010 Aug 
While one amount is shown as through the acquisition route and the 
other was shown as through the automatic route. Comparison of the 
annual returns corresponding to the AGMs dated 29-9-2009 and 29-9-
2010 suggest that the amount could have come through the acquisition 
route only as the number of shares held by the foreign investor matched 
exactly with the shares transferred during the intervening period (on 30-6-
2010). There was no specific share allotment to the foreign investor. 
Hence, the entry corresponding to the automatic route is identified as a 
duplicate one. 
Ackruti City Ltd (now Hubtown) Various/Various FIIs 233.3 2016 Dec 2009 Nov 
Gilbarco Veeder Root India Pvt 
Ltd 
Kollmorgen India Investment Co 194.9 2016 Jun 2014 Dec 
Shell India Markets Pvt Ltd Shell Gas BV 538.7 2015 Dec 2015 Jan 
Shell Gas BV 474.2 2015 Dec 2015 May 
Agile Real Estate Pvt Ltd Vostok Ltd 1.8 2014 May 2012 Feb 
 Stillwind Holdings Ltd 382.8 2014 May 2012 Feb 
Azure Power India Pvt Ltd Helion Venture Partners II LLC 12.4 2015 Dec 2015 Feb 
 FC VI India Venture (M) Ltd 15.0 2015 Feb 2013 Dec 
 Helion Venture Partners II LLC 15.0 2015 Mar 2013 Dec 
 International Finance Corp 20.4 2015 Mar 2013 Dec 
Contd… 
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 FC VI India Venture (M) Ltd 30.9 2015 Dec 2015 Feb 
 DEG Deutsche Investitions 68.0 2015 Feb 2014 Jan 
 Though there were two allotments corresponding 
Decathlon Sports India Pvt Ltd Decathlon SA 216.3 2015 Sep 2016 Mar 
Shreshta Conbuild Pvt Ltd Emaar Holding II 215.4 2016 Mar 2009 Jun 
DLF Homes Rajpura Pvt Ltd Ridgewood Holdings 40.1 2014 Apr 2009 Apr 
 Ridgewood Holdings 20.0 2014 Apr 2009 Apr 
Soma Tollways Pvt Ltd AIRRO Mauritius Holdings VI 270.0 2016 Jun 2012 Oct 
Valeo Lighting Systems India Ltd Valeo Bayen SAS 5.8 2017 Mar 2015 Apr 
 Valeo Bayen SAS 6.6 2017 Mar 2015 Apr 
 Valeo Bayen SAS 20.6 201703 201509 
 Valeo Bayen SAS 70.0 201703 201504 
 Valeo Bayen SAS 70.0 201703 201504 
 Equipment 11 0.4 201703 201504 
 Equipment 11 1.1 201703 201509 
 All of these except for Rs. 70 crore for which shares were allotted in 
October 2014, were related to the shares allotted during August 2008 to July 
2013. In fact, acquisition of shares of Asia Investments Pvt Ltd by 
Equipment 11 on February 1, 2009 was not found in the reported inflows.  
Naiknavare Constructions Pvt Ltd AMIF Re Investments V Ltd 77.2 201410 201011 
Tata Bluescope Steel Ltd Bluescope Steel Asia Holdings 
Pvt  
75.0 201603 201305 
Unitech Wireless (Delhi) Pvt Ltd Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 67.0 201505 201004 
 Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 99.1 201505 201004 
Unitech Wireless (East) Pvt Ltd Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 15.3 201505 201005 
 Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 217.9 201505 201005 
Unitech Wireless (Kolkata) Pvt Ltd Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 29.1 201505 201005 
 Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 99.1 201505 201005 
Unitech Wireless (North) Pvt Ltd Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 88.3 201505 201004 
 Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 257.6 201505 201004 
Unitech Wireless (West) Pvt Ltd Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 124.4 201505 201005 
 Telenor Asia Pte Ltd 247.7 201505 201005 
All these companies were amalgamated with Unitech Wireless (Tamil Nadu) Pvt Ltd. in 2010 following the 
order of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi on September 27, 2010. Hence there was no question of 
investments being made in them subsequently.  
HSBC Securites & Capital Markets 
(I) Pvt Ltd 
HSBC Investment Bank 
Holdings 
946.5 201609 200903 
 HSBC Investment Bank Holdings 21.7 201609 201307 
Carlsberg India Pvt Ltd South Asian Breweries Pte Ltd 201.4 201410 201408 
IKEA India Pvt Ltd INGKA Holdings Overseas BV 889.11 201609 201606 
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 INGKA Proholding BV 0.89 201609 201606 
Procter & Gamble Home Products 
Ltd 
Procter & Gamble Overseas 
India BV (7-11-2012) 
167.7 201612 201303 
 (Apr 2010-Mar 2011) 270.0 201612 201109 
 (2-2-2012) 290.0 201609 201203 
 (13-10-2011) 360.0 201612 201112 
 (26-9-2012) 447.3 201609 201301 
Robert Bosch Automotive Steering 
Pvt Ltd. 
ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 2.22 201612 201204 
 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 6.66 201612 201204 
 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 17.54 201612 201404 
 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 29.60 201612 201403 
 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 50.99 201612 201305 
 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH 50.99 201612 201305 
Source: Source: Same as Table-12. 
Note: From September 2015 onwards, the month represents the quarter ending in that month. 
 
in JSW Steel were to be transferred to it.97 Obviously, there was no fresh flow of funds 
into JSW Steel from abroad during 2016. Did JSW Steel feel that it should inform RBI 
about the change in the ownership of foreign-held shares? Has it disclosed the 
investment in original rupee terms and adjusted it to the exchange rate applicable at 
that time or has RBI converted the same automatically based on the prevailing 
exchange rate? Even so why was JFE Steel, Japan, reported in 2016 as the foreign 
investor instead of JFE Steel International, Netherlands? Whatever are the reasons 
for such repeated reporting, the fact remains that a very large sum ($719 million) was 
credited inappropriately to the metallurgical industries for the year 2016-17. That this 
amount accounted for quite a substantial part of the inflows into the metallurgical 
industries during 2016-17 is elaborated in the next Section.  
Inflows were reported against a number of Unitech group companies during May 
2015 by Telenor Asia Pvt Ltd. Exactly the same amounts were reported earlier in 
Apr/May 2010. It should be noted that all recipient companies were amalgamated 
with Unitech Wireless (Tamil Nadu) Pvt Ltd in 2010 itself. Those companies could 
not have received FDI in 2015. Duplicate reporting appears to be the only possible 
explanation. An investment of Rs. 1,296 million in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd (KMB) 
by Heliconia Pte Ltd, an affiliate of GIC, Singapore, was reported against the month 
of June 2013. It may be noted that the name of Heliconia Pte Ltd was changed to 
Caladium Investment Pte Ltd and the shareholding pattern of KMB has been showing 
Caladium Investment as a shareholder for many years. In fact, the director’s report of 
KMB for the year 2013-14 referred to allotment of “2,00,00,000 equity shares of ₹5 
each to Caladium Investment Pte Ltd. (earlier known as Heliconia Pte Ltd.)“.98 
                                                                 
97  Information released to the stock exchanges by JSW Steel on May 31, 2012, accessed from 
https://www.nseindia.com/corporate/JSWSteel_disc_01062012.zip. 
98  Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd, Annual Report: 2013-14, p. 75. 
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Subsequently Caladium offloaded a part of its holding through market sales and at the 
end of June 2015, it held 1,50,00,000 shares. Following the bonus issue in July 2015, 
the number of shares held by Caladium increased to 2,91,66,992. Again, through 
market sales the number reduced to 2,59,66,992 by the end of March 2016. There has 
been no change till the end of June 2017. Seen in this background, an inflow of exactly 
the same amount (Rs. 1,296 million) from Heliconia being reported for the quarter 
Jul-Sep 2016 is untenable. Had there been fresh inflow (given the number of shares 
held by the foreign investors it is impossible), the investor’s name should have been 
reported as Caladium instead of Heliconia.  
Another interesting case is that of Ackruti City Ltd. The name of this listed 
company was changed to Hubtown Ltd with effect from October 31, 2011. Initially 
an amount of Rs. 2,333.37 million from “VARIOUS FIIS” was reported against the 
month of November 2009. Again the same amount from “Various” was reported 
against the quarter Oct-Dec 2016. The investee company’s name, however, remained 
the same, i.e. Ackruti City Ltd. Had there been a fresh inflow during 2016, the 
investee’s name would have been reported as Hubtown Ltd.  
These cases, which are not merely based on the equivalence of the amounts, 
establish the existence of duplicate reporting. The reasons might vary from case to 
case. It is not possible for us to identify all duplicate cases and the possible causes. 
Apparently there is no incentive for such duplicate reporting by the companies. The 
cases do underline the need to develop systems to prevent such occurrences in future. 
It is pertinent to note that many of these belong to 2016-17, the year in which the 
inflows reached unprecedented levels. 
Non-reporting: A Facet of Delayed Reporting 
Another dimension which we wish to underline is regarding the non-reporting of 
inflows which is obviously related to delayed reporting. While going through 
individual company filings we did come across a few cases. It should be understood 
that while it is relatively easy to crosscheck the reported inflows under 
automatic/approval routes with the filings with the MCA to find out about the date 
of allotment, it is not the case with discovering the unreported ones. It is also difficult 
to properly match the investments made through the acquisition route not only 
because share transfers are reported by companies at the end of the accounting period 
(unlike new issues which are reported as and when they happen), but also the filings 
do not have the provision to report the amounts involved. Non-reporting is a long 
standing problem. In a more recent case, Rising Stars Mobile India Pvt Ltd issued 
shares in four tranches during September 2015 to April 2016 to Wonderful Stars Pte 
Ltd of Singapore, a part of the Foxconn group. This company, set up in Sri City, 
Andhra Pradesh, has started contract manufacturing for a number of leading mobile 
companies. The total amount invested was about Rs. 472 crore. None of these 
tranches appeared in the SIA Newsletter till December 2017, i.e. a delay of more than 
a year. Obviously, to that extent inflows into the electronics sector are underreported. 
The issue of $5.5 billion worth of shares by Vodafone India Ltd during September 
2016 did not find a mention in the inflows reported till June 2017 (discussed in detail 
in Section V). 
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While inflows against which shares are issued in the last couple of months will 
understandably take some time to be reported in the SIA Newsletter, such long gap, 
especially in case of large investors, should be a matter of concern. But some cases of 
acquisitions are yet to be reported even after many years have passed and even if some 
are reported the amounts happen to be much lower than the reported value of 
acquisition, thereby suggesting that some tranches could have been left out (Table-
19). Problems with reporting of acquisition-related inflows found a special mention 
by the RBI. This aspect is elaborated in Section VI. 
Table-19: Illustrative Non-reporting/Under-reporting of Inflows Relating to Acquisitions 
Investee Indian Company Foreign Investor Remarks 
(1) (2) (3) 
A: Non-reporting   
Apollo Health Street 
Ltd (now Sutherland 
Healthcare Solutions 
Pvt Ltd) 
Sutherland 
Global Services 
(Mauritius) 
Holding Ltd 
The foreign investor acquired shares during June and August 
2013 from a number of other incumbent foreign 
shareholders. These transactions were not reported in the 
SIA Newsletter. 
Asianet 
Communications Ltd 
SVJ Holding Ltd 4,857,113 shares were transferred to the foreign investor on 
June 30, 2010. No corresponding entry in the SIA Newsletter. 
BOC India Ltd (now 
Linde India) 
Linde Group Foreign promoter acquired public shareholding during Jan 
2008 to increase its share from 54.8% to 89.48% by the end 
of Sep 2008. No reflection of this in the reported inflows. 
Bosch Chassis Systems 
(I) Ltd (earlier Kalyani 
Brakes Ltd) 
Bosch Group Kalyani group sold its 40% stake in the company to the 
foreign promoters in July 2005 for Rs. 285 crore. The SIA 
Newsletter reports $3.93 mn. (Rs.26.4 crore) in Jul-Sep 2016. 
This could be related to the buyout of the public 
shareholders. There is, however, no entry relating to 285 
crore. 
Capital First Ltd Cloverdell 
(Warburg Pincus 
group) 
The total consideration in June 2012, according to Prowess, 
for buying the promoters’ stake, was Rs. 338 crore. The SIA 
Newsletter reported an amount of Rs. 270 crore which matches 
with the amount spent by the acquirer in open offer. That 
means there is no entry corresponding to the acquisition of 
promoters’ stake.  
Chiron Behring 
Vaccines Pvt Ltd 
Novartis AG On September 23, 2010, the foreign investor acquired the 
4,900,000 shares previously held by Aventis Pharma Ltd. This 
has not been reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Fresenius Kabi 
Oncology (earlier 
Dabur Pharma) 
Fresenius Acquired 73.3% at a cost of Rs. 8,782 million in April 2008.  
Kamaz Motors Ltd 
(formerly Kamaz 
Vectra Motors Ltd) 
CJSC KAMAZ 
Foreign Trade 
Co. 
OJSC Kamaz 
While there were a series of share transfers, the major ones 
were: (i) CJSC KAMAZ Foreign Trade Co. buying from 
Vectra Investments Pvt Ltd, Mikam Holdings Ltd, Cyprus 
buying from Vectra Ltd (UK), and Vectra Ltd (HK) in (Dec. 
2013) and (ii) OJSC Kamaz buying from Mikam Holdings 
Ltd (June 2014). None of these acquisitions figure among the 
tranches reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Lintas India Pvt Ltd IPG Mauritius In June 2007, IPG Mauritius acquired shares of six Lintas 
Employee Trusts. The deal is not reported in the SIA 
Newsletter. 
Contd… 
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Millipore India Pvt 
Ltd (now Merck Life 
Science Pvt Ltd) 
Millipore 
Mauritius Ltd 
Foreign investor acquired shares held by Chemsworth Pvt 
Ltd and Bioworth India Pvt Ltd during November 2009 
making Millipore India a wholly foreign-owned company. 
These acquisitions were not reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Novateur Electrical & 
Digital Systems Pvt 
Ltd (earlier Indo Asian 
Electric Pvt Ltd) 
Legrand France 
SA 
Acquired 9,999 shares on September 1, 2010. The total 
amount invested by Legrand to buy the Indian business was 
reported to be Rs. 600 crore. The acquisition-related inflows 
were not reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Tecnimont ICB Pvt 
Ltd 
Tecnimont SPA 694,335 shares held by 48 individuals were transferred to the 
foreign acquirer on September 29, 2008. These were not 
reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Timesof Money Ltd Network 
International 
Investment Pte 
Ltd 
Times Internet Ltd sold its remaining stake to the foreign 
acquirer in January 2016. Not reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Transcend 
Infrastructure Ltd 
Insight 
Infrastructure Pte 
Ltd 
Insight acquired shares held by Indian shareholders on April 
29, 2009. These were not reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Trelleborg 
Vibracoustic (I) Pvt 
Ltd 
Freudenberg SE Shares of Indian shareholders were acquired in December 
2013. Not reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Yazaki India Ltd Yazaki Corp 44,999,437 shares were transferred by Tata Autocomp 
Systems Ltd to during January 2013. Not reported in the SIA 
Newsletter. 
B: Under-reporting   
Celio Future Fashion 
Ltd 
Celio 
International 
According to the Annual Report of Future Lifestyle Fashions 
Ltd the company divested its 31.5% stake in the JV for Rs. 75 
crore. However, the SIA Newsletter reported only one tranche 
of acquisition related inflow Rs. 35 crore during the month of 
June 2015. 
Edict Pharmaceuticals 
Pvt Ltd 
Par 
Pharmaceutical 
Cos. Inc 
$37.6 mn. according to the investing company’s filing with 
the SEC. Total inflows reported by DIPP: $12.43 mn. 
Matrix Laboratories Mylan The Indian company was acquired by Mylan first in 2006 by 
buying the stakes of the Indian promoter as well as foreign 
financial investors. The latter entered the company in 2004 
through the acquisition route. The Indian promoter alone was 
expected to receive Rs. 550 crore for transferring his 12% 
stake. From the inflows data one however finds that 
acquisition-related inflows amounted o Rs. 199.7 crore in 
2009. By September 2010, Mylan group’s shareholding 
reached 96.88%. As on March 31, 2017 practically all the 
equity shares are held by the Mylan group. Obviously, the 
amount reported under the acquisition by the Mylan group 
falls far short of the amount reported to have been received 
by the Indian promoter. 
Shatha Bio Sanofi Pasteur 
Merieux Sas 
The reported inflows under the acquisition route amount to 
Rs. 287 crore, mainly during 2009 and 2010. A tabulation 
based on the share transfers reported for the period April 
2009 to September 2010 and the consideration shown 
suggests that out of the total Rs. 694 worth of shares acquired  
Contd… 
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  by Sanofi, Rs. 514 crore worth of shares were from Indian 
shareholders and the remaining from non-resident 
shareholders. In September 2013 Rs. 16 lakh worth of shares 
were acquired from another Indian shareholder.  
Tulip Diagnostics Pvt 
Ltd 
Perkinelmer 
Holding 
Luxembourg 
SARL 
Against the company’s disclosure that the Indian company 
was acquired for a total consideration of $125 mn., the SIA 
Newsletter shows an inflow of $64.11 mn. (Jan-Mar 2017) 
Source: Based on a comparison of the share transfers reported by individual companies to the Ministry of 
Corporate Affairs with the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter.  
 69 
Section V 
Data Infirmities and Distortions at the Sectoral Level 
n the following, we shall provide some broad indications of the extent of 
distortions caused by various facets of the reported data, first at the aggregate 
level and later at the sectoral level, as the distortions have the potential to seriously 
undermine the integrity of the FDI data system, thereby undermining its relevance 
for policy analysis. As will be elaborated in Section VI, the powers to condone certain 
violations of FEMA were delegated to the regional offices of the RBI in April 2014. 
We tried to identify the possible changes in the pattern of reporting before and after 
the change and the relative contribution of inflows of different vintages and types of 
the reported remittances to the record inflows of 2016-17. The former is examined 
by categorising the individual remittances each amounting to at least $100 million 
reported for the five-year period 2012-13 to 2016-17. The 216 remittances thus 
identified, accounted for about 38 per cent of the reported equity inflows for the 
period. 
Fifty-six out of the 216 remittances examined belonged to April 2012 – April 
2014. The remaining were reported during May 2014 to March 2017 (Table-20). 
During the second period, while the current year reporting improved, reporting of the 
preceding year’s remittances declined significantly. Simultaneously, reporting of the 
earlier years’ inflows increased, thereby suggesting some improvement in current 
reporting as also efforts to clear the backlog. The relative share of wrong and duplicate 
entries had a higher share in the second period. A similar picture could be seen in 
terms of the amount of inflows (Table-21). While in both the periods a little more 
than one-sixth of the inflows can be attributed to incorrect and duplicate entries, the 
fact that there were considerably larger number of such entries in the second period 
raises the possibility of their distorting the distribution of inflows at different levels 
of disaggregation to a much higher degree. 
An analysis of large tranches of inflows during 2016-17 each of at least $50 million 
reveals that duplicate and notional inflows constituted 10.3 per cent and 12.2 per cent 
of the inflows covered by the 137 tranches, which accounted for about 52 per cent of 
the inflows reported for the year. About 27 per cent of the inflows were on account 
of acquisitions (Table-22). Thus, only about half of the large inflows could have 
contributed to new capacity creation. On the other hand, inflows relating to current 
year share allotments also account for only a little more than half of the total. Realistic 
FDI not only accounted for all the notional investments, but also and more 
importantly, for majority (60 per cent) of the investment covered by duplicate entries. 
Only about 45 per cent of the RFDI inflows represented by large tranches could have 
contributed to new capacity creation. One-third of the inflows belonged to the shares 
allotted during the earlier years. 
I
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Table-20: Distribution of Very Large Remittances* during April 2012 to March 2017  
According to the Time of Allotment and Time of Reporting (Nos.) 
Issue of Shares No. of Remittances Against which Shares were issued Share in Total (%) 
Apr 2012 – Apr
2014
May 2014 - Mar 
2017
Total Apr 2012 - Apr 
2014
May 2014 - Mar 
2017 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Current Financial Year 24 81 105 42.9 50.6 
Previous Financial Year 19 34 53 33.9 21.2 
Older Financial Years 6 25 31 10.7 15.7 
Difficulty in Matching 5 4 9 8.9 2.5 
Duplicate Reporting 1 12 13 1.8 7.5 
Incorrect Entries 1 4 5 1.8 2.5 
Grand Total 56 160 216 100.0 100.0 
Source: Based on the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
* $100 million and above. 
Table-21: Distribution of Very Large Remittances* during April 2012 to March 2017 
According to the Time of Allotment and Time of Reporting (Amount) 
Issue of Shares Value of the Shares Issued ($ mn.) Share in Total (%) 
April 2012 -
April 2014
May 2014 -
March 2017
Total Apr 2012 - 
Apr 2014 
May 2014 - 
Mar 2017 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Current Financial Year 7,347 19,229 26,576 41.7 45.1 
Previous Financial Year 4,429 8,732 13,161 25.1 20.5 
Older Financial Years 1,719 5,893 7,612 9.8 13.8 
Difficulty in Matching 1,171 1,308 2,479 6.7 3.1 
Duplicate Reporting 108 2,382 2,490 0.6 5.6 
Incorrect Entries 2,836 5,104 7,940 16.1 12.0 
Grand Total 17,610 42,648 60,258 100.0 100.0 
Source: Same as Table-20. 
* $100 million and above. 
Table-22 Distribution of Large Remittances* during 2016-17 
According to their Type and Time of Allotment 
Period of Allotment Type of Inflow
Acquisition Notional 
Inflows 
Duplicate 
Reporting
Others Total Share in 
Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Current Financial Year 3,426 2,741 5,806 11,973 53.1 
Previous Financial Year 1,116 3,292 4,408 19.6 
Older Financial Years 1,528 2,312 3,840 17.0 
Duplicate Reporting 2,325 2,325 10.3 
Total 6,070 2,741 2,325 11,410 22,547 100.0 
Share in Total (%) 26.9 12.2 10.3 50.6 100.0 
Source: Same as Table-20. 
* $50 million and above.  
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During the second half of 2016, the government started issuing a series of 
brochures to highlight the achievements made in different sectors under MII. Services 
of a private company were enlisted as ‘Knowledge Partner’99 in preparing these 
brochures. One finds that the brochures put together some routine information 
provided by various ministries, departments and agencies. Besides incorporating the 
steps taken in respect of the concerned sector they give lists of FDI inflows selected 
from the database maintained by the DIPP. The brochures, however, do not highlight 
the names of large Indian investors in the respective sectors. It is difficult to 
understand why some effort was not made to look into the IEMs which could have 
provided a more complete and comparative picture of the new investments. On the 
other hand, neglecting them reflects the special importance attached to FDI 
compared to domestic investments. Interestingly, the lists cover different periods 
often beginning with some months much before the MII was announced and even 
before the present government came into being.100 If MII’s performance was to be 
projected, obviously April 2014 could not have been taken as the starting point. There 
appears to be no systematic approach in including or excluding some tranches of 
inflows.101 In some cases the related recipients were grouped together even while the 
DIPP reports individual remittances in the SIA Newsletter. On the other hand, no 
attempt was made to present the lists on the basis of total inflows received by a 
company. When companies’ names appear in different forms in the lists of inflows 
and name changes do occur, in the absence of a code which identifies the companies 
uniquely, it requires quite some effort to aggregate inflows at individual company level. 
Apparently, neither the Knowledge Partner nor the official agencies made any attempt 
to consolidate inflows at the individual investee level. Incidentally, we tried to do this 
and much more (e.g. Table-8). In the following, we shall examine the lists contained in 
a few brochures. This will be followed by a critical look at the inflows into industries 
that were reported to have received substantial inflows during 2016-17. 
Automotive Sector 
We made an attempt to identify the top inflows reported by the brochure on the 
Automotive Sector, the most important manufacturing industry from the point of 
inflows, according to the time of allotment of shares by the respective recipients. First 
of all, it was difficult to understand why logistics as also transportation companies 
including airlines were clubbed together under the inflows into the sector. In the 
description, however, there was no reference to these activities and the aggregate 
figures also do not include inflows into air and sea transport. Out of the 28 recipient 
companies, seven are in logistics and transportation. They, however, accounted for 
only a small portion of the inflows covered by the 28 companies. While the 
description refers to realistic FDI cases only, the lists contain all types of investments, 
thus including private equity and other portfolio investments. The result of the 
                                                                 
99  The Knowledge Partner belongs to one of the Big Four accounting firms. 
100  E.g.: Electronics & IT (possibly April 2014-March 2016), Automotive (April 2014-March 2016), 
Telecommunications (April 2014-March 2016), Textile (April 2014-March 2016), Leather (March 2014-
September 2016), and Food Processing (possibly June 2014-July 2016). 
101  We cross-checked the entries in the lists with the inflows database maintained by us. 
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exercise done to match the top inflows reported in the DIPP’s sectoral achievement 
report, its disclosures in the SIA Newsletter and the recipient companies’ filings with 
the MCA reveal that only a little less than two-fifths of the reported inflows could be 
attributed to the new period (Table-23). In respect of almost an equal amount, though 
reported in the new period, the shares were issued prior to October 2014. This latter 
group includes shares issued in the current period against the conversion of ECBs 
availed earlier.  About one-fifth of the inflows were reported in the earlier period. A 
good part of this, however, could not be located in the filings with the MCA. Given 
the clubbing of various tranches, this is the best approximation we could arrive at. 
Table-23: An Analysis of the Top Inflows into the Automotive Sector* 
Name of the Foreign Investor Inflow ($ mn.) Share in Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1 Reported in the New Period 1,512.5 39.6 
 a) Incorporated before October 2014 1,417.3
Suzuki Motor Corp (1) 461.0
Ford Motor Co 243.7
Daimler AG 236.8
SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd 183.0
Continental Automotive GMBH 61.1
Isuzu Motors Asia Ltd 59.8
Ford International Services LLC 46.0
Yorozu Corp 33.1
Toyoda Iron Works Co Ltd 27.8
Ainos Holdings Ltd 24.8
Blue Elephant Finance Ltd 23.1
 
Valeo Bayen 11.2
 
Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands 5.9
 
b) Incorporated after September 2014 95.2
 FCC Co Ltd 95.2
2 Reported in the New Period but the shares were issued 
prior to October 2014 
1501.3 39.3 
SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd (2) 790.9
Nissan Motor Co Ltd 169.2
Daimler AG 152.2
Renault Group BV 72.5
 Caparo India Ltd 56.8
Showa Corp 52.9
Fiat Group Automobiles SPA 48.5
Lear Corporation Mauritius Ltd 38.1
Contd… 
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NHK Spring Co Ltd 31.3
Blue Elephant Finance Ltd 30.8
Bussan Automotive (Singapore) Pte Ltd 29.7
 
Lear Automotive Services (Ned) 11.6
 
Valeo Bayen 11.2
 
Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands 5.6
3 Reported in the Earlier Period 806.1 21.1 
 a) Investments that could be traced 130.8  
 
Isuzu Motors Ltd 56.9
 
Man Nutzfahrzeuge AG 42.7
Suzuki Motor Corp 16.7
Ford International Services LLC 14.6
b) Investments that could not be traced 675.3  
Ford Motor Co 438.1
Ford International Services LLC 237.2
Total 3,819.6 100.0 
Source: Based on DIPP, Automotive Sector Achievements Report, Make in India, November 24, 2016.   
* The period covered was April 2014 to March 2016. Investments into non-manufacturing companies have 
been excluded. 
(1) The intention to invest was announced in January 2014 and the company was incorporated in March 2014. 
(2) Includes two tranches relating to issue of shares against conversion of ECBs availed earlier. $229.38 million and 
$117.14 million were converted in October 2014 and March 2015 respectively. 
 
Another important aspect of the inflows into transport equipment and parts is 
that except for FCC Clutch India all the other companies were incorporated prior to 
October 2014. Suzuki Motor Gujarat, the only other company incorporated in 2014, 
was registered on March 31, 2014. The decision to invest in Gujarat by the company 
was announced earlier in January 2014. Obviously, any subsequent investment, 
including the $461 million (Rs. 3,100 crore102) reported during Jan-Mar 2016 and $383 
million reported during Oct-Dec 2016 would be a follow-up of that decision. 
Obviously, the reported inflows cannot be taken as reflecting the achievements in the 
new period. 
Computer Hardware and Software 
The classification of e-commerce related companies, cab aggregators, etc., under the 
computer software and hardware gets clearly established from the list provided in the 
report on achievements made in Computer Hardware and Software sector (Table-
24). It is not merely a question of following some classification system but to respond 
to the needs of policymakers and analysts. Out of the total $3.8 billion inflows into 
the companies listed by the respective brochure, as much as $3.5 billion was invested 
in such companies. Further, more than half of the $3.5 billion was by private 
                                                                 
102  Incidentally, it was reported in January 2014 that the foreign company would invest Rs. 3,000 crore in the 
first phase of the project. See: https://www.autocarindia.com/car-news/suzukis-gujarat-unit-to-be-100-per 
cent-subsidiary-370883. The Rs. 3,100 crore inflow should be seen in this context. 
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Table-24: List of Major Foreign Investments in Computer Hardware & Software Sector 
Type/Name of the Investee Company Website/Activity Reported Inflow ($ mn.) 
(1) (2) (3) 
A. E-commerce & Online Information 3,498.6 
Jasper Infotech Pvt Ltd. Snapdeal 1,067.4 
Ani Technologies Pvt Ltd. Olacabs 870.3 
One97 Communications Ltd. Paytm 473.1 
One97 Communications Ltd. & Jasper Infotech 
Pvt Ltd. 
Paytm & Snapdeal 344.2 
Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd. Ibibo 213.9 
Getit Infoservices Pvt Ltd. Askme 163.6 
Amazon Seller Services Pvt Ltd &  
Amazon Internet Services Pvt Ltd. 
Amazon 114.9 
Ebay India Pvt Ltd. Ebay 93.7 
Indiaideas.Com Ltd. Billdesk 90.2 
Maxheap Technologies Pvt Ltd. Commonfloor 29.4 
Urban Ladder Home Décor Solutions Pvt Ltd. Unrbanladder 25.2 
Solvy Tech Solutions Pvt Ltd. Zopper 12.7 
B. Others 322.6 
Integrascreen Services Pvt Ltd. Software for securities trading 115.3 
Quest Global Engineering Services Pvt Ltd. Engineering services 92.5 
Aon Consulting Pvt Ltd. Risk management services 84.1 
Citius IT Solutions Pvt Ltd. Healthcare software 
development
17.2 
Omnesys Technologies Pvt Ltd. Software for Securities Markets 13.5 
Total (A+B) 3,821.2 
Source: Based on DIPP & Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Electronics and IT Sector 
Achievements Report, Make in India, November 8, 2016. 
 
equity investors. Incidentally, no company belonging to the hardware sector finds a 
place in the list. In fact, it remains a puzzle why the DIPP has been clubbing computer 
hardware with software for many years. From a less-highlighted tabulation of DIPP, 
it becomes obvious that hardware contributes negligible amounts. During 2016-17, it 
was just $70 million out of the total $3,652 million reported under this head.103 In this 
context, it would be relevant to note that according to the government, FDI into the 
e-commerce sector was only $8.84 million during 2015-16 and 2017-18 (Apr-Oct).104 
This is surprising, particularly in the context of market-based model of e-commerce 
                                                                 
103  Out of the $6,630.72 million inflow reported for computer hardware and software during 2015, only 
$133.01 million were in the hardware industry. The corresponding figures for 2016 were: $2,412.28 million 
and $89.05 million. 
104  This was mentioned in the reply to the Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 288, answered on February 5, 
2018. 
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which has been defined in the FDI policy as “Marketplace based model of e-
commerce means providing of an information technology platform by an e-
commerce entity on a digital & electronic network to act as a facilitator between buyer 
and seller.”105 We are not able to express any opinion as to why inflows into Amazon, 
Flipkart, Snapdeal and other market-based players were not counted as investments 
in e-commerce. 
Food Processing Industries 
As was discussed in Section II, there has been considerable emphasis on attracting 
FDI into the food processing sector. The justification offered for this as well as for 
opening up the trading sector wider was to create the much-needed infrastructure for 
the Indian agricultural sector, minimise wastage and in the process help the farmers. 
One vividly remembers the arguments for and against opening up MBRT, put forward 
inside and outside the Parliament. Given the importance  attached to the sector one 
would expect that the investments would be looked into closely. We shall, therefore, 
try to describe the data related issues at some length. Interestingly, unlike in other 
sectors where the focus was on ‘top inflows’, the inflows into the food processing 
industry listed in the initial version of the brochure contained only those cases where 
the inflow was less than $15 million. It is difficult to fathom why instead of top inflows 
those at the lower end were being projected and the rationale for choosing $15 million 
as the cut-off.106 A later version of the brochure listed seven remittances all less than 
$75 million.  
At this stage, it may not be out of place to discuss the confusion in compiling and 
presenting the data. In response to a question in the Rajya Sabha it was informed that 
FDI in food processing industries increased from $170.2 million in 2011-12 to 
$505.88 million in 2015-16 and that it was one of the reasons for the 5.78 per cent 
growth in gross value added in food processing industries in 2014-15 (at 2011-12 
prices).107 Besides this assertion, the Lok Sabha was also informed that the sector 
attracted FDI amounting to $5,005 million during 2013-14 to 2015-16. Inflows of 
2015-16 could not have contributed to the growth in 2014-15. Interestingly, as much 
as $3,983 million of this came in 2013-14 alone.108 The information provided to the 
Parliament also shows that in 2013-14 just one country, namely the United Kingdom 
(UK) contributed as much as $3,023 million, i.e. nearly 76 per cent of the total for the 
year. It should, however, be noted that the total inflow from UK into all the sectors 
during the year was $3,215 million. The question that arises here is whether 94 per 
cent of the FDI from the UK went into the food processing industries.  
A perusal of the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter reveals that during 2013-
14 Unilever PLC was the top most investor with $1,789 million from UK (obvious 
recipient was Hindustan Unilever Ltd - HUL). The ‘item’ mentioned was 
‘CONSUMER GOODS BUSINESS’. Since the remaining investment from UK was 
                                                                 
105  5.2.15.2.2 (iii) of the Consolidated FDI Policy (Effective from August 28, 2017). 
106  While in the text $15 million was mentioned, the title of the annexure referred to $20 million. The maximum 
investment listed was, however, $14.99 million. 
107  Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2227, answered on August 5, 2016. 
108  Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1500, answered on July 26, 2016. 
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$1,426 million, unless Unilever’s investment was treated as belonging to food 
processing industries, the totals would not tally. Packaged foods and beverages 
contributed only 18.0 per cent of the revenue of HUL during 2014-15. Even if all the 
sales under the head ‘Others’ is taken as belonging to the foods category, the share 
would not be more than 22.3 per cent. Soaps and detergents and personal products 
accounted for bulk of the company’s sales during the year. Additionally, the 
investment that was brought in was on account of buying out the public shareholders 
in order to increase the parent company’s share in the Indian subsidiary. No new 
project in the food sector was associated with it.  
What is also worrying is that while the consolidated country-wise inflows reported 
during the year show that investors from UK invested $3,215 million, monthly data 
on individual tranches show that the investment was only $ 1,997 million. Further, 
initially inflows under the acquisition route were reported by the SIA Newsletter as 
$2,131 million for the month of September 2013. The figure was, however, revised 
two months later to $3,349 million – an increase of $1,218 million. The SIA Newsletter 
Annual Issue for the calendar year 2013 shows Unilever as the largest investor from 
UK with $3,008 million during 2000-2013. There is no other single investor belonging to the 
food processing industry which invested a minimum of $100 million during the period. The fact 
that the SIA Newsletter Annual Issue for the year 2012 did not list Unilever’s investment 
in the top 25 investors from UK, it suggests that the additional investment in 
September 2013 which was reported with a delay of two months, could be related to 
Unilever’s attempt to hike the parent company’s stake by partially buying out the 
public shareholders. Since the share of FIIs reduced substantially (from 20.23 per cent 
at the end of June 2013 to 15.33 per cent at the end of September 2013) following the 
hike in the parent company’s share, funds would also have flown out of India through 
the selling FIIs. Since they accounted for about one-third of the increase in Unilever’s 
share, one can safely assume that the outgo would have been about $1 billion. That 
is, an overwhelming part of the inflows in the sector were on account of Hindustan 
Unilever, a company that cannot be strictly termed as a food processing company. 
On top of that, the inflows did not lead to any additional capacity creation. 
Incidentally, the company increased the rate of royalty paid to its parent company 
and decreased the R&D expenditure. During 2009-10 to 2015-17, it remitted 
dividends to the tune of $2,097 million and royalty of about $ 691 million. From the 
high of $32 million in 2011-12, R&D expenditure by the company came down to 
$4.25 million in 2016-17. These figures are based on CMIE Prowess IQ database. It 
is obvious that most of the inflow has already been neutralised by the net outgo during 
the past eight years. It is also relevant to note that the company demerged the 
erstwhile Modern Foods business which it acquired in 2000 following the privatisation 
of the public sector enterprise Modern Food Industries India Ltd. The business was 
transferred in 2015 to a new company Modern Food Enterprises Ltd., a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) set up by the Everstone group, which is an India-based private 
equity and real estate investor/fund. So far the SPV received $25 million inflows from 
a Singapore arm of the PE investor.109 Hindustan Unilever also divested its rice 
                                                                 
109  See:http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notice_order_document/Modern%20Foods%20 
order%20C-201510315.pdf. 
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exports business to LT Foods Middle East DMMC, belonging to India’s LT Foods 
group further reducing its engagement with the food processing sector. Two major 
components of the remaining food products category are Foods (Packaged Foods 
and Popular Foods) and Refreshments (Tea, Coffee, Ice cream and Frozen Desserts). 
The former accounted for 3.25 per cent of the sales during 2016-17 while the share 
of the latter was 14.15 per cent – combined share of 17.40 per cent. 
Further, according to the official review of the MII, over the last two years,110 the 
sector, besides investment by Indian companies, has attracted over $1 billion by nearly 
40 companies which include Mondelez India Foods (earlier Cadbury India, mainly 
chocolate confectionary), Kellogg (breakfast cereals) and Mars International 
(chocolate confectionary and pet foods). The Review further states that 32 lakh tonne 
cold chain capacity was added with an estimated investment of around Rs 9,000 
crore.111 There are, however, no details about who were responsible (FDI companies 
or Indian) for this addition. It is unlikely that these three companies would have 
contributed to the enhanced capacity the brochure was referring to. In fact, we did 
not find any inflow on account of Mondelez India Foods (MIF) during the period. 
Instead of bringing in fresh equity, MIF followed the external commercial borrowings 
route which obviously entails interest payments and depresses profits. One is aware 
that MIF had set up a new facility in Andhra Pradesh. The ECB funds could have 
been meant to part-finance the project. It may not be out of place to mention that the 
company started paying substantial amounts as royalties and management charges 
abroad. During the past six years (2010 to 2015-16) it paid out Rs. 466 crore as 
royalties and an additional Rs. 510 crore towards consultancy fees, information 
technology expenses and regional/global management expenses, making a total of Rs. 
976 crore. Even when corresponding receipts from abroad are taken into account, the 
outgo works out to be substantial. In contrast, the dividend paid was only Rs. 24 crore. 
Indeed, no dividend was paid during the last two years. Obviously, quantum of profits 
and dividend payment have no relevance for unlisted foreign subsidiaries. In fact, by 
not paying dividends they can save on dividend distribution tax. 
Mars International, which announced setting up its facility in Maharashtra, 
brought in $62.8 million (Rs. 402 crore) during 2015. Subsequently, $99 million (Rs. 
661 crore) inflows were reported till June 2017. The company paid out Rs. 108.8 crore 
towards reimbursement of expenses during 2013-14 to 2015-16.112 The $12.4 million 
inflows (Rs. 75 crore) on account of Kellogg were actually reported in April 2014. 
Incidentally, in just four years (2009-10 to 2012-13) Kellogg India made royalty 
payments worth Rs. 64 crore. Obviously, much of the inflow could be set-off against 
royalty payments. We did not come across information about Kellogg setting up any 
                                                                 
110  Here we are necessarily going by the year of reporting rather than the year in which the investments were 
actually made. 
111  “Government begins review of 'Make in India' targets”, The Economic Times, August 18, 2016, accessed from 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-begins-review-of-make-in-
india-targets/articleshow/53753700.cms. 
112  Due to change in the reporting format prescribed by the MCA, it is going to be difficult to get information 
on transactions in foreign exchange in a consistent manner. 
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production facility in the new period other than the one in Sri City Andhra Pradesh, 
which was planned earlier in 2013.113  
As mentioned above, the revised brochure picked up seven remittances into six 
companies. The top most remittance ($73.72 million) was related to the acquisition of 
Anik Milk Products Pvt Ltd (carved out of Anik Industries Ltd) by BSA International. 
Two remittances ($31.34 million and $24.32 million) were reported against Ferrero 
India Pvt Ltd., a confectionary maker. Next comes Cavin Kare Pvt Ltd which received 
$25.47 million from an India-based financial investor, namely ChrysCapital, through 
its Mauritius arm. Incidentally, this amount was invested in 2013. The financial 
investor sold back its stake to the Indian promoters of Cavin Kare in March 2017, i.e. 
in less than four years, at double the amount invested by it.114 The case of the next 
placed Modern Food Enterprises Pvt Ltd has already been explained above. 
According to the brochure, Kellogg brought in $23.97 million. Had the Knowledge 
Partner searched the FDI database, it would have come across three other tranches 
together amounting to $9.99 million, reported in Jul-Sep 2016 quarter along with the 
$23.97 million tranche. Incidentally, the item mentioned was “Manufacture of cereal 
breakfast foods obtained by roasting or swelling cereal grains”. The last company in 
the list, namely Kerry Ingredients India Pvt Ltd., a manufacturer of food ingredients, 
received $21.53 million It can once again be seen how little the investments 
highlighted under MII could have contributed to the Indian agricultural sector. 
Interestingly, DIPP reports inflows under the heads (i) food processing industries, 
(ii) sugar, (iii) fermentation industries, (iv) vegetable oils and vanaspati, and (v) Tea and 
coffee (processing & warehousing coffee & rubber). The FDI figures referred to at the 
beginning of this sub-section relate to the first category only. On the other hand, when 
referring to the food processing sector in general all five are considered. The industries 
listed under food processing indeed include “Food preservation by fermentation: wine, 
beer, vinegar, yeast preparation, alcoholic beverages” and “Consumer food: packaged 
food, aerated soft drinks and packaged drinking water”.  
 As was noted earlier (Table-8), out of the $1,145 million inflows in the food and 
beverages industry, as much as $419 million went into confectionary and beverages while 
spirits and wines received $308 million, $201 million went into grain milling and vegetable 
oils leaving $216 million that went into sugar ($131 mn), food preparations ($44 million) 
and milk products115 ($41 million). It is difficult to visualise which of these investments 
would create the type and extent of storage capacity one is looking forward to. Further, 
in the context of the claim that FDI is one main reason for the growth of the sector, the 
fact that a good part of the inflows were of the acquisition variety and some of the 
recipients may not be strictly termed as food processing companies, there may not have 
been new capacities of the required type, large enough to justify the conclusion drawn 
by the government. Further there are serious public health concerns associated with the 
type of processed foods that such companies, whether Indian or foreign, promote. It is 
                                                                 
113 See: http://1nellore.com/4591/kelloggs-flakes-to-be-made-in-sri-city-sez-nellore/. 
114  See: http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/chryscapital-exits-from-cavinkare-with-2x-
returns-117031300227_1.html. 
115  One of the companies acquired the food business of Wockhardt and thus there is no additional capacity 
creation. The other one is a probiotic manufacturer. 
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time the policymakers spell out the additional benefits they perceive from FDI in the 
food processing sector other than those that Indian companies cannot offer and which 
directly help the Indian farmers and minimise wastage.  
Telecommunications 
i) Vodafone 
The telecommunications sector which received much media attention provides 
another important case study. Vodafone India appears at the top in the inflows listed 
in the corresponding brochure with an inflow of $1,501 million. But, the shares 
corresponding to this tranche were actually acquired by a Vodafone group company, 
namely Prime Metals Ltd, in May 2014, much before the announcement of MII. It 
was widely reported in September 2016 that Vodafone India received more than Rs 
47,000 crore from its parent company. This was said to be the largest FDI infusion 
as it exceeded British Petroleum’s investment of $7.2 billion in the Reliance group 
earlier. The funds were to be utilised to strengthen the company’s telecom operations 
as also to retire debt. Most commentators attributed this huge investment to the threat 
posed by the entry of Reliance Jio in the Indian telecom market. It should also be 
noted that the Vodafone group in India has been under heavy debt burden. The 
reported borrowings from banks at the end of 2015 were as much as Rs. 45,700 
crore.116  The total inflows on account of Vodafone India during March 2015 to 
September 2016 were of the order of Rs. 54,600 crore, or approximately $8.4 billion 
(Table-25).  
Incidentally, some of these amounts against which shares were allotted to foreign 
investors could be found among the inflows under the approval route reported in the 
SIA Newsletter till June 2017. The unreported ones totalling $5,893.54 million were 
finally reported in the SIA Newsletter for the period Jul-Sep 2017, i.e. after almost a 
year. The amount was thus credited to 2017-18. Had these inflows been reported in 
the relevant financial year, i.e., 2016-17, the year would have seen a substantial jump 
as the equity inflows would have been boosted by almost $6 billion, i.e. higher by 13.6 
per cent. Correspondingly, equity inflows for the year 2017-18 would most probably 
have ended much lower compared to 2016-17. Incidentally, the unusual steep jump 
in the inflows through the approval route during August 2017 was due this delayed 
reporting (Graph-B).  
ii) NTT Docomo 
The sector also provides another important example of the uncertainty surrounding 
the reported inflows. The brochure on the sector’s achievements lists an investment 
of $1,458 million in Tata Teleservices by NTT Docomo. One does find the inflow of 
$1,458 million among the individual tranches of inflows reported in the SIA 
Newsletter for the Jul-Sep 2016 quarter. We, however, felt that it was highly unlikely 
that NTT Docomo would invest such huge amount in Tata Teleservices  during  the 
past two years as it was contemplating to exit from the latter since April 2014 and the 
dispute between the two has become a subject of international arbitration. Not  
                                                                 
116  Vodafone Group Plc, Annual Report 2015, p. 144. 
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Table-25: Inflows into Vodafone India since March 2015 
Date of Allotment of Shares* Corresponding filing with
the MCA 
Amount Remitted 
(Rs. Cr.) ($ million) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A: Inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter during Oct-Dec 2016
09/03/2015 Form PAS-3-
060415.OCT
4,521.1 668.54 
12/03/2015 Form PAS-3-
060415.OCT
1,478.9 218.70 
31/05/2016 Form PAS-3-
28062016_signed
7,749.0 1,145.86 
10/06/2016 Form PAS-3-
28062016_signed
2,251.0 332.86 
B: Reported in the SIA Newsletter during Oct-Dec 2016 but could not be 
traced in filings with MCA 
917.4 135.20 
C: Reported in the SIA Newsletter of Jul-Sep 2017
16/09/2016 Form PAS-3-
27102016_signed
30,819.5
26/09/2016 Form PAS-3-
27102016_signed
6,880.5  
Total A+B+C 54,617.4 8,394.70 
Source: Based on the company’s filings with the MCA. 
* Al-Amin Investments Ltd, Asian Tele-communication Investments Mauritius Ltd, CC II Mauritius Inc., 
Euro Pacific Securities Ltd, Vodafone Tele-communications India Ltd, Mobilvest, Prime Metals Ltd and 
Trans Crystal Ltd, all registered in Mauritius, were the allottees. 
 
surprisingly, there was no corresponding entry in the filings of Tata Teleservices with 
the MCA for the recent years. The alliance between the Tata group and NTT Docomo 
dates back to 2008  and the investment was to be a combination of fresh capital 
infusion, acquisition of existing shares and tender offer for purchase of about 12 per 
cent shares of Tata Teleservices Maharashtra Ltd. Among the various tranches of 
inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter for the quarter Jul-Sep 2016 in respect of this 
alliance three were through the automatic route. These were: Rs. 97,966.01 million 
($1,457.66 million); Rs. 3,899.62 million ($58.02 million); and Rs. 3,940.00 million 
($58.62 million). The corresponding dates of allotment of shares as reported to the 
MCA were, however, March 25, 2009; March 30, 2011; and May 30, 2011. That means 
$1,574 million inflow of the earlier years was credited to 2016-17.  Had the Knowledge 
Partner and the DIPP viewed the reported inflows in 2016-17 in the context of the 
strained relationship between the two parties, the mistake would have been detected. 
While delayed reporting of investments into Vodafone depressed the inflows for the 
year 2016-17, those into Tata Teleservices increased the same, though to a much lesser 
extent. In essence, the reported data suffers from serious omissions and commissions. 
The two cases demonstrate how large inflows can seriously affect year-to-year 
comparisons.  
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Other Problem Cases 
There are some major misclassifications in the brochures. For instance, United Spirits 
with $ 998 million inflow was shown as the largest investee in the Oil & Gas sector 
while the entire inflow into the sector mentioned by the brochure was $1.18 billion 
(Exhibit-A). This acquisition-related inflow associated with an open offer made in 
April 2014 into United Spirits by Relay BV, a subsidiary of Diageo, was actually 
reported in July 2014. This inflow was related to the open offer by the foreign acquirer 
to buy a part of the public shareholding of United Spirits. It should be underlined that 
there was no ambiguity in the product mentioned in the entry corresponding to this 
amount in the SIA Newsletter. It clearly read “BREWERIES & DISTILLERIES”. The 
next placed Praxair India with $48 million is essentially a company engaged in 
industrial gases and not in natural gas. The next two investments are by an Indian 
business group (Jubilant). Portfolio investments follow these. The realistic FDI into 
the sector among those listed in the brochure could be just about $25 million of the 
total $1.18 billion.  
Another important case is that of Signode India Ltd, the largest inflow listed 
under the chemicals and petrochemical industry in the corresponding brochure. 
Though Signode India has plastic packing material business also, it accounts for less 
than 10 per cent of its total turnover. In fact, its most recent expansion was through 
setting up of steel strap manufacturing facility in Gujarat. The company’s classification 
under the chemicals and petrochemicals industry, therefore, appears to be 
inappropriate.  
Though two separate brochures were prepared for Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology sectors, the two major investments (Glaxo and Sanofi) listed under the 
latter were also listed in the former. Incidentally, the reported $228 million inflow 
reported against GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals (GSK Pharma) actually came 
much earlier in May 2014 and was meant to acquire shares of existing shareholders 
whereby the foreign promoter’s shareholding increased from 50.6 per cent to 75.0 per 
cent. The offer was made in December 2013. Even in case of Abbott Healthcare Pvt 
Ltd., the one listed at the top, the inflow came in the same month.  
It is also relevant to note that one of the recipients reported by the brochure 
relating to the leather sector was ZF India Pvt Ltd. ($4.81 million from ZF 
Friedrichshafen AG, Germany), a manufacturer of automobile steering gears. The 
corresponding entry in the DIPP list did read “MANUFACTURE OF TRAVEL 
GOODS LIKE SUITCASES, BAGS & HOLDALLS ETC”. While this is yet another 
example of the types of deficiencies which the official data suffer from, it is expected 
that the analysts would have paused and cross-checked the correctness of the entry 
instead of merely going by the given description before reporting the same in a 
prominent manner. This adversely reflects on the care with which the data are handled 
by the Knowledge Partner.  
Mere listing of the inflows and ignoring the associated characteristics could 
provide a grossly misleading picture. Probably, the Knowledge Partner tried to 
highlight the achievements instead of critically looking at the inflows. Such publicity 
brochures can hardly provide guidance to the policymakers and analysts.  
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Exhibit-A: An Alcoholic Beverages Company Topping the List of Inflows into the Oil & Gas Sector 
 
Source: DIPP, Oil & Gas Sector, Achievements Report, Make in India, January 18, 2017, p. 5. 
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Incidentally, Videocon Energy Mauritius Holdings Ltd is the largest among those 
listed under the electronics industry’s inflows accounting for one-third of the total $220 
million. It needs to be underlined that India’s Videocon group is also a major outward 
investor. Since 2007-08 it invested more than $1 billion in a number of foreign 
subsidiaries and joint ventures in the form of equity and loans. This shows how one has 
to discount the already low investment in the industry. The Videocon and the Jubilant 
(referred to in the discussion on inflows into the Oil and Gas sector) cases also give a 
dimension of reported FDI flows which are related to Indian entrepreneurs. That a few 
of the inflows/outflows by Indian entrepreneurs either remain unreported or shrouded 
in controversies should be of particular interest to the policymakers. How are these 
inflows funded? Earlier the Reliance group explained that its investment through 
Biometrix Singapore was financed by the ICICI Bank’s Singapore Branch.117 In another 
case, the ED investigated whether the loan raised from the Dubai branch of IDBI Bank 
was used in round-tripping by the Deccan Chronicle group.118 The NDTV group is also 
under investigation for alleged round-tripping.119 One was also aware that the Tata 
group was financed by SBI at the time of acquiring Corus. It was reported last year that 
the Essel group was raising funds to the tune of $1 billion abroad to refinance the debt 
incurred for its investments in India.120 Obviously, inflows financed by foreign branches 
of Indian banks and outward investments by group companies cannot be called FDI by 
any stretch of imagination.  
Largest FDI Recipient Manufacturing Industries in 2016-17 
In response to a question the Parliament was informed that FDI equity inflow into 
the manufacturing sector during Apr-Nov 2016 was $ 16.13 billion which was 82 per 
cent higher than that received during the corresponding period of 2015 ($8.85 
billion)121 thereby suggesting that investments into the manufacturing sector were 
picking up rapidly. If one regroups the officially reported sectoral aggregates, inflows 
into manufacturing industries increased from $10,260 million in 2015-16 to $14,271 
million in 2016-17 – an increase of 39.1 per cent. The sector’s share in total inflows 
correspondingly increased from 25.4 per cent to 32.6 per cent (Table-5). The 
individual industries each receiving at least $1 billion during 2016-17 were: (i) electrical 
equipment ($2.2 billion); (ii) cement and gypsum products ($2.1 billion); (iii) 
automobile industry ($1.6 billion); (iv) metallurgical industries ($1.4 billion); and (v) 
chemicals (other than fertilisers) ($1.4 billion) (Table-6). We shall describe some of 
the top inflows into these industries other than automobiles in the following.  
                                                                 
117  “Reliance hits out at AAP, says Biometrix investment was from ICICI bank loans”, The Times of India, 
February 28, 2014, accessed from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Reliance-hits-out-at-AAP-
says-Biometrix-investment-was-from-ICICI-bank-loans/articleshow/31184412.cms. 
118  “Enforcement Directorate looking into Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd affairs”, The Times of India, August 
21, 2012, accessed from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Enforcement-
Directorate-looking-into-Deccan-Chronicle-Holdings-Ltd-affairs/articleshow/15579531.cms. 
119  “Unravelling the tax travails of NDTV”, The Hoot, June 22, 2017, accessed from 
http://www.thehoot.org/media-watch/media-business/unravelling-the-tax-travails-of-ndtv-10163. 
120  See: http://www.livemint.com/Companies/kCuEyZsKKLRcBMRnt2giqK/Essel-Group-may-raise-1-
billion-to-refinance-offshore-debt.html. 
121  Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 649, answered on February 8, 2017. 
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i) Electrical Equipment 
We have indicated earlier that electrical equipment reached the 5th position in the 
overall inflows and top position in the manufacturing sector (far exceeding the 
automobile sector) in 2016-17. To understand the sudden surge of FDI into this 
industry an attempt was made to identify the inflows which could have been classified 
under the electrical equipment industry from out of the reported individual tranches 
of inflows during 2016-17. Since the officially reported data do not contain industrial 
classification we relied upon the item description. There could, therefore, be some 
issues relating to classification of companies. The companies which received at least 
$5 million during the year are shown in Table-26. The contents are summarised in 
Table-27. The eighteen companies listed therein received $2,318.62 million. Since the 
official figures show the inflows into the sector at $2,230.70 million, there could be a 
few companies among the eighteen which would not have been classified under the 
industry by the official agencies. Since the difference in the total is quite small, the 
classification could have affected only those which received tiny amounts.  
The cases described in Table-26 further reflect the different types of issues relating 
to the data on FDI inflows. The topmost case of Essar Power seems to be a case of 
gross misclassification. Similar is the case with Suryadev Alloys & Power. The two 
together account $994.3 million or 43.0 per cent of the $2,318.6 million received by the 
eighteen companies. In the context of the financial difficulties the group has been going 
through, we wished to check how the Essar group could invest almost $1 billion during 
2016-17. It was not surprising to find that none of the shares were allotted during the 
year.122 In almost all cases the shares were allotted between 2009-10 and 2010-11. In 
one case ($12.30 million) it was March 2014. Further, there was duplicate reporting to 
the tune of $242.80 million. Thus, even in the most unlikely event of Essar Power taking 
up manufacturing of electrical equipment, it would not have added to the inflows into 
the sector during 2016-17. We are not aware whether at the time of inflow the company 
was planning to enter manufacturing. It should also be noted that Essar Oil, a group 
company, was ordered to pay as much as Rs. 241 crore as compounding charges for 
contravention of FEMA Notification 20/2000-RB.123 As noted earlier, inflows on 
account of Suryadev Alloys & Power also belong to earlier years (Table-12). 
The second placed Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals, which accounted 
for 13.1 per cent of the inflows covered, is a case of hiving off an existing unit and 
divestment to financial investors. Though GE India Industrial appears to be a case of 
large realistic FDI, there was no actual inflow as it involved only an inter se transfer 
of shareholdings following the restructuring of the group in India (Diagram-B). This 
‘inflow’ accounted for a further 12.6 per cent of the reported inflows examined by us. 
A portion of the inflows on account of Toshiba JSW Power System were allocated 
on conversion of ECBs availed earlier.  
                                                                 
122  In only one case amounting to $12.79 million we could not identify the date of allotment. 
123 See:https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/CompoundingOrders/PDFs/09ESSAROIL8D38878C80394E65877 
EBF4E8327CFB0.PDF. The contraventions sought to be compounded were: (i) equity instruments issued 
to the foreign investor, beyond 180 days of the receipt of the inward remittance and (ii) delay in reporting 
receipt of foreign inward remittance towards subscription to equity. 
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Table-26: Nature of the Reported Inflows into Companies that could have been Classified under  
Electrical Equipment Industry during 2016-17 
Name of the Company Reported Inflows Remarks
Rs. (mn.) $ (mn.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Essar Power Ltd [1991] 
-- $ 968.52 mn. 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (electrical 
apparatus for switching or
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 9,960.24 149.24 This investee is a power generation 
company operating power plants in various 
locations (http://www.essar.com/ 
section_level1.aspx?cont_id=VQnaaH3tLm
I=). There is nothing which suggests that 
the company has taken up manufacture of 
electrical apparatus. 
Moreover, in almost all the cases, the shares 
were allotted during 2009-10 to 2010-11. 
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 3,197.15 47.91
Hazira Steel 3,197.15 47.91
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 8,102.08 121.40
Essar Power Hazira Holdings Ltd 8,102.08 121.40
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 8,102.08 121.40
Essar Power Hazira Holdings Ltd 8,102.08 121.40
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 735.08 11.01
Essar Power Holding Ltd 9,264.15 138.81
Essar Power & Essar Power 
Hazira Holdings 
820.79 12.30
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 853.50 12.79
Essar Power Holdings Ltd 4204.12 62.99
2. Crompton Greaves Consumer 
Electricals Ltd. [2015] -- 
$299.68 mn. 
Manufacture of electric lighting equipment
Macritchie Investments Pte Ltd 6,999.83 104.89 The recipient company was formed through 
hiving off the consumer products division 
of Crompton Greaves Ltd in February 
2015. The first named investor is a 
subsidiary of Singapore government’s 
Temasek. The second one belongs to 
Advaent International Corp, a global private 
equity firm. The mode of investment is 
acquisition.
Amalfiaco Ltd 12,999.69 194.79
3. GE India Industrial Pvt Ltd  
[1992] -- $293.25 mn. 
Manufacture of other electrical equipment
GE Pacific Pvt Ltd 19,630.00 293.25 The shares were issued “in consideration of 
transfer of shares of GE India Exports 
Private Limited and GE India Technology 
Centre Private Limited”. Hence there was 
no actual funds transfer from abroad.  
4. Toshiba JSW Power System 
Pvt Ltd [2008] -- $250.46 mn. 
Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle 
engines
Toshiba Corp 3,300.00 50.09 Conversion of ECBs availed earlier. 
Toshiba Corp 4,500.00 68.31 SA: Apr 2016
Toshiba Corp 8,700.00 132.06 SA: Aug 2016
5. Luminous Power 
Technologies Pvt Ltd. [1988] -
- $144.65 mn.
Manufacture of primary cells and primary batteries and rechargeable 
batteries, cells containing manganese oxide, mercuric oxide silver oxide 
or other material
Schneider Electric South East Asia 4,057.50 61.59 Acquisition of the remaining 26% 
shareholding of the promoters. 
Schneider Electric South East Asia 3,964.26 60.18
Schneider Electric South East Asia 1,507.36 22.88
Contd… 
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6. Sunk Rock Metal Foundries 
(I) Pvt Ltd [2016] -- $86.15 mn. 
Manufacture of other electrical equipment
Sunk Rock Mauritius Acquisition 
Co 
1,921.02 28.41 SA: Oct 2016
Sunk Rock Mauritius Finance Co 3,904.03 57.73 SA: Oct 2016
7. Techno Electronics Ltd [2007]
-- $67.43 mn. 
Manufacture of domestic electric appliances such as refrigerators, 
washing machines, vacuum cleaners
Videocon Mauritius Energy Ltd 4,500.75 67.43 This can be viewed as return investment by 
the Videocon group which has substantial 
overseas investments.
8. TMEIC Industrial Systems 
India Pvt Ltd [2010] -- $65.49 
mn. 
Manufacture of power generators (except battery charging alternators 
for internal combustion engines) 
Toshiba Mitsubishi Electric Indl. 1,042.03 15.48 These inflows, reported in the Apr-Jun 
quarter of 2016, were not found among the 
filings of the company with the MCA till 
August 2017. Further, the number of shares 
allotted for which details are available at the 
MCA website tally with the outstanding 
shares and those reported in the company’s 
financial statement for the year 2015-16. It 
is thus unlikely that these two tranches were 
reported correctly. 
Toshiba Mitsubishi Electric Indl. 300.00 4.46 
Toshiba Mitsubishi Electric Indl. 300.00 4.50 SA: Dec-2015
Toshiba Mitsubishi Electric Indl. 1,750.00 26.14 SA: May-2016
Toshiba Mitsubishi Electric Indl. 1,000.00 14.91 SA: Nov-2016
9. Emerson Network Power 
India Pvt Ltd [1993] -- $32.22 
mn. 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (electrical 
apparatus for switching or  
EMR Mauritius Ltd 2,150.00 32.22 SA: Sep-11
10. Suryadev Alloys and Power 
Pvt Ltd [2006] -- $25.76 mn. 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (electrical 
apparatus for switching or
Coral Power Development Ltd 765.22 11.51 This investee describes itself as a “leading 
manufacturer of steel products, with a wide 
and specialized range in TMT and Wire Rod 
Coils.” 
(http://www.suryadev.in/about.html). 
There is nothing which suggests that the 
company has taken up manufacture of 
electrical apparatus. All the shares were 
issued much earlier. (See Table-12) 
Coral Power Development Ltd 34.78 0.52
Coral Power Development Ltd 629.69 9.47
Globusstar Trading Pte Ltd 117.80 1.77
Greta Industries 165.77 2.49
11. Haier Appliances (I) Pvt Ltd 
[2003] -- $15.85 mn. 
Manufacture of domestic electric appliances such as refrigerators, 
washing machines, vacuum cleaners.
Haier Singapore Investment 
Holdings Pte 
1,076.16 15.85 SA: Aug 2016
12. Panasonic Minda Storage 
Batteries India Pvt Ltd [2011] -
- $13.78 mn. 
Manufacture of primary cells and primary batteries and rechargeable 
batteries, cells containing manganese 
Panasonic Holding 
(Netherlands)BV 
926.00 13.78 While the shares were allotted in July 2016, 
Panasonic exited from the JV completely 
within a few months, namely in September 
2016. 
Contd… 
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13. Agile Electric Sub Assembly 
Pvt Ltd [2005] -- $ 18.82 mn. 
Manufacture of electric motors (except internal combustion engine 
starting motors)
Jose K Joseph 62.81 0.93 SA: Aug-12 (Non-cash). May not be foreign 
investment because the address given is 
Indian.
Igarashi Electric Works (H.K.) 
Ltd 
8.66 0.13 SA: Aug-12 (Non-cash)
Yangwell International Co Ltd 14.79 0.22 SA: Apr-11 (non-cash?)
Blackstone Capital Partners 
(S’pore) 
395.01 5.87 SA: Aug-13
Igarashi Electric Works (H.K.) 
Ltd 
82.80 1.23
Igarashi Electric Works Ltd 379.10 5.63
Igarashi Electric Works Ltd 3.60 0.05
Igarashi Electric Works Ltd 25.79 0.38
Igarashi Electric Works Ltd 30.19 0.45
Yangwell International Co Ltd 22.93 0.34
Yangwell International Co Ltd 23.07 0.34
Yangwell International Co Ltd 67.33 1.00
 There is no change in the number of outstanding equity shares between 
September 2013 and March 2016. The financial statement for the year 
ending March 2016 reported change in promoters on July 30 2015. 
Blackstone group (holding 97.9% of the shares) sold its shareholding, 
among others, to Igarashi Japan and a Singapore based financial 
investor. Thus sum of these transactions are acquisition related which 
fact does not get reflected in the reported inflows. In general there 
appear to be other inaccuracies as well.
14. Wago Pvt Ltd [1995] --$10.63 
mn. 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (electrical 
apparatus for switching or
Wago Auslandsbeteiligungs-
GMBH 
700.00 10.63 SA: Feb 2017
15. Spanco Power Distribution 
Pvt Ltd [2011] -- $7.49 mn. 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus (electrical 
apparatus for switching or
Bessemer Venture Partners Trust 500.00 7.49 Financial investor
16. BTW-Atlanta Transformers 
(I) Pvt Ltd [2012] -- $7.29 mn. 
Manufacture of electric power distribution transformers, arc-welding 
transformers, fluorescent ballasts,
Baoding Tianwei Baobien 
Electric Co. Ld. 
495.15 7.29 SA: Nov 2016
17. Leoni Cable Solutions India 
Pvt Ltd [2006] -- $5.95 mn. 
Manufacture of other electronic and electric wires and cables (insulated 
wire and cable made of steel,
Leoni Kabel Holding GMBH 400.00 5.95 SA: Feb 2015 & Mar 15. Those issued in 
Nov 2105 have not been reported so far. 
18. TSMT Technology (I) Pvt 
Ltd. [2016] -- $5.21 mn. 
Manufacture of other electrical equipment
TSMT Technology Singapore 
Pte Ltd 
349.00 5.20 SA: Nov 2016
Total for the eighteen companies 1,54,598.66 2,318.62
Source: Details of inflows were taken from the SIA Newsletter. 
Note: SA: Month and year of allotment of shares according to the respective company’s filings with the MCA. 
Figures in brackets in Column (1) are the year of incorporation. These are followed by the reported inflows 
into the company during 2016-17.  
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Table-27: Nature of the Reported Inflows into the Electrical Equipment Industry  
during 2016-17: Summary 
Classification of Inflows Amount ($mn.) Share in Total (%) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Misclassification of industry 994.28 42.9 
Financial Investors (Acquisition and New Investment) 307.17 13.3 
India-related Investors 67.43 2.9 
Possible Duplicate/Non-existent inflows 19.94 0.9 
   
RFDI: Pre-period allotments 107.08 4.6 
RFDI: Book Entry 293.25 12.6 
RFDI: Acquisition 144.65 6.2 
RFDI: Other received during the year 384.82 16.6 
Total 2,318.62 100.0 
Source: Same as Table-26.  
Diagram-B: Changing Group Structure of Some GE Group Companies in India 
 
Source: Based on company documents. 
 
Inflows into Luminous Power Technologies were related to acquisition of 
remaining shareholding of the Indian promoters and hence did not add to the funds 
available to the company. The investment into Emerson Network Power actually 
came in 2011. Agile Electric Sub Assembly Pvt Ltd offers mixed experience as some 
of the investments are by financial investors and belong to an earlier period. There 
appear to be some serious reporting mistakes in respect of this company. If all such 
cases are excluded realistic FDI that could have added to new capacities or revival of 
struggling ventures would work out to about $385 million or 16.6 per cent of the 
inflows into the electrical equipment industry (Table-27). It is thus easy to see how 
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aggregate figures could be extremely misleading. Incidentally, except for three, all the 
remaining companies were incorporated before 2014.124 
ii) Cement & Gypsum Products 
Another important case is that of cement & gypsum products, the second largest 
recipient in the manufacturing sector with $2,130 million reported inflows. It is 
relevant to note that just two companies account for $1,979 million of these inflows. 
Similar to GE India Industrial, referred to in the above, in the case of Ambuja 
Cements the inflow of $1,660.59 million (Rs. 11,084 crore) is notional (Exhibit-B). 
The company issued shares to Holderind Investments Ltd, Mauritius (HILM) 
following the amalgamation of Holcim India Ltd with it. The other two major inflows 
were on account of HILM’s acquisition of public shareholding in ACC Ltd ($179.35 
million) and Ambuja Cements Ltd ($139.48 million). These three inflows which 
together accounted for $1,979 million did not contribute to any additional capacity 
creation. It is also relevant to note that Ambuja Cements Ltd had paid Rs. 3,500 crore 
to HILM for acquiring its shareholding in Holcim India ltd. The amount involved in 
buying out the public shareholders of ACC and Ambuja Cements by HILM was 
considerably lower at Rs. 2,171 crore. Lafarge Aggregates & Concretes (I) Pvt Ltd was 
the other major recipient with an inflow of $109.78 million reported for the quarter 
Oct-Dec 2016. It should, however, be noted that the company was amalgamated with 
Lafarge India Ltd during 2015.  In view of this,  either this inflow refers to an earlier  
Exhibit-B: Shares Issued to Foreign Investors without Payment  
in Cash Consequent to Amalgamation 
 
Source: Ambuja Cements Ltd, Annual Report for the year ended December 2016, p. 184. 
                                                                 
124  However, Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals has been incorporated to take over an old business. 
Indirectly, Sunk Rock seem to be doing the same. Thus, TSMT Technology seems to be the only one 
incorporated in the new period to take up new activities. 
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period or there was some other problem in reporting because a company which no 
longer exists would not have received FDI and reported them. As a result, only a 
small amount of about $40 million remains that could have financed new capacity 
creation in this industry during the year.  
One finds similar problems in respect of some other large inflows into the 
manufacturing sector during this period. In case of the fourth placed metallurgical 
industry, the inflow of $719 million into JSW Steel amounts to duplicate reporting. It 
thus nullifies about half of the $1,393 million reported inflows into the industry. The 
fifth-placed chemical industries (excluding fertilisers) having a reported inflow of $1.4 
billion should have covered Procter & Gamble Home Products Ltd which accounts 
for $356 million (about one-fourth of the total during 2016-17). However, as can be 
seen in Table-28 none of this came in 2016-17.  In the case of UPL Ltd,   which also  
Table-28: Duplicate & Delayed Reporting in Case of Procter & Gamble Home Products Ltd  
which Completely Nullifies the Inflow of $515 million Reported for the MII Period 
Year end/Date of 
Allotment of New 
Shares 
Outstanding 
Number of 
Shares 
Increase over 
the Previous 
Year
New Shares 
Issued during 
the Previous 
Year
Issue Price 
including 
Premium 
(Rs.)
Value of Shares 
Issued – Matches 
with reported Inflows
Month of Reporting 
in the SIA 
Newsletter 
(Rs. mn.) ($ mn.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2009-10 11,292,247 
Apr 2010-Mar 
2011 
3,600,000 750 2,700.00 40.45 Sep 2011 & Dec 
2016 
 2010-11 14,892,247 3,600,000 3,600,000
May 11, 2011 4,600,000 750 3,450.00 51.69 Dec 2016 
Oct 13, 2011 4,800,000 750 3,600.00 53.93 Dec 2011 & Dec 
2016 
Feb 2, 2012 3,866,667 750 2,900.00 43.45 Mar 2012 & Sep 
2016 
 2011-12 28,158,914 13,266,667 13,266,667
Sep 26, 2012 
  
5,808,830 770 4,472.80 67.02 Jan 2013 & Sep 
2016 
Nov 7, 2012 2,178,312 770 1,677.30 25.13 Mar 2013 & Dec 
2012 
Dec 6, 2012 3,630,519 770 2,795.50 41.89 Sep 2016 
Mar 14, 2013 2,805,194 770 2,160.00 32.37 Sep 2016 
 2012-13 42,581,769 14,422,855 14,422,855
Jun 10, 2013 3,064,935 770 2,360.00 37.61 Apr 2015 
Oct 9, 2013 3,681,818 770 2,835.00 45.18 Apr 2015 
Mar 31, 2014 3,168,832 770 2,440.00 38.88 Apr 2015 
 2013-14 52,497,354 9,915,585 9,915,585
Sep 29, 2014 4,500,000 524 2,358.00 37.58 Apr 2015 
 2014-15 56,997,354 4,500,000 4,500,000
 2015-16 56,997,354 0
 2016-17 Not 
Available 
Total   515.18
Source: Same as Table-12.  
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belongs to this industry, the $480 million inflow reported for the quarter Jan-Mar 
2017 relates to the amalgamation of Advanta Ltd with it. Thus, a major chunk of 
inflows into the chemical industry are only book entries. The reported inflow of 
$33.95 million on account of Bayer Seeds was again such an entry consequent to the 
issue of 9,577,557 shares pursuant to the scheme of amalgamation.  
iii) Medical Devices 
It may be recalled that the FDI policy applicable to medical devices was relaxed in 
January 2015. The sharp rise in the reported inflows into ‘Medical and Surgical 
Appliances’ to $480 million during 2016-17125 might, at the first glance, be attributed 
to this change. Going by the description in the annual sectoral distribution provided 
in the SIA Newsletter, the entire investment was classified under the manufacturing 
sector in our tabulations. However, since the reported inflows into trading activities 
appear to be covering only (i) Wholesale Cash & Carry, (ii) e-commerce and (iii) Single 
Brand Retail126, it is imperative that ‘Medical and Surgical Appliances’ would consist 
of investments in both manufacturing and trading companies. This is especially 
because there is no such heading as ‘Medical and Surgical Appliances’ in NIC 2008. 
After intense search in the description of items and going through the names of 
companies we could identify inflows of the order of $408.9 million that fall under this 
category. Within these, inflows under ‘Wholesale of scientific, medical and surgical 
machinery and equipment’ and ‘Wholesale of pharmaceutical and medical goods’ 
together accounted for as much as $231.5 million Interestingly, a few companies 
which had some manufacturing activity were also part of these two classifications. 
Those that were directly referred to as manufacturing attracted $138.5 million or 
about one-third of the inflows into the identified companies.  
An analysis of the inflows into the top twenty companies which received $331.3 
million revealed, as expected, the presence of inflows against which shares were issued 
in the earlier years. Such inflows accounted for about one-third of the total. Nearly 
two-fifths of the inflows went into manufacturing companies. The remaining went 
into trading companies including those having some manufacturing activity. Since 
most of the inflows are of the RFDI variety, they follow a similar sectoral pattern. 
Though the mode of entry of RFDI was predominantly non-acquisition type, much 
of it did not go into manufacturing. On the other hand, the acquisition type RFDI 
was directed at taking over Indian companies. Overall, non-acquisition type RFDI 
that went into manufacturing companies constituted only 7.4 per cent of the total 
inflows into the 20 companies. The relevant observations are depicted in Graph-D. 
This exercise further confirms that most of the investment cannot be credited to 
manufacturing of medical and surgical appliances and a considerable portion of the 
investment should have been credited to the earlier years. Thus, the reported inflows 
into ‘Medical and Surgical Appliances’ do not necessarily represent increased interest 
in the manufacture of medical devices. 
                                                                 
125  Average for the earlier five years was $145 mn. 
126  This is apparent from the calendar year-wise sectoral distribution of inflows reported in the SIA Newsletters. 
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Graph-D: Distribution of the Reported Inflows into Medical and Surgical Appliances during 2016-17 
 
Source: Based on an identification of the inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
 
The examination of top inflows into ‘Medical and Surgical Appliances’ suggests 
the possibility of FDI into trading and manufacturing activities of the relevant 
industry being clubbed together in the official tabulations. There is a clear possibility 
of the estimated share of manufacturing sector being on the higher side when derived 
from official tabulations. Incidentally, the FC-GPR and FC-TRS require the 
companies to report their main business activity (See Section-VI). Ideally, the inflows 
should be classified based on the specific activity into which the funds are intended 
to be deployed. The companies may be under no compulsion to report precisely when 
they receive FDI through the automatic route. Further, when the funds are going to 
be utilised for general expansion purposes or for working capital needs it may not be 
possible to apportion the funds to a specific activity.  The problem is more severe in 
case of diversified companies and holding companies. 
It is thus important not only to know the date of allotment, but also the context 
and the manner in which the shares were allotted. An attempt has been made in 
Diagram-C to depict the problems and possibilities that have been described above 
and which need to be kept in mind while analysing inflows during a period. 
Earlier, in the introductory section it was indicated that the growth in global FDI 
flows during 2015 over the previous year would have been 15 per cent instead of 38 
per cent had the inflows on account of corporate reconfigurations been excluded. The 
case of Ambuja Cement cited earlier shows how in some sectors the actual inflow 
would get reduced drastically if intra-group reorganisation of ownership is taken note 
of. A few more cases are given in Table-29. The case of Optum business solution has 
been included in the list, though it does not exactly fall in this category because, it 
illustrates how a part of the funds brought in are withdrawn. Do the timing and pricing 
suggest advance planning? 
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Diagram-C: Problems and Possibilities when Analysing FDI Inflows during a Period 
 
 Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 Table-29: Some Large Notional (Almost) Inflows relating to Acquisitions 
Investee Indian Company Foreign Investor Remarks
(1) (2) (3)
Hitachi Consulting 
Software Services Pvt Ltd 
Hitachi Consulting 
Software Services Inc 
Issued shares worth Rs. 1,177.99 crore (March 19, 
2014) and Rs. 88.18 crore (March 30, 2016) to the 
parent company to fund the acquisition of Hitachi 
Payment Services (I) Pvt Ltd (HPS). The acquisition of 
HPS being from the parent company, the company was 
to pay it a total consideration of Rs. 1,494.08 crore. The 
parent company was already paid back Rs. 1,299.49 
crore. The remaining amount was to be paid in two 
instalments on March 31, 2017 and March 31, 2018. 
The company had already issued shares worth Rs. 
32.72 crore on March 30, 2017.  
Obviously, all these inflows amount to mere book 
entries as far as India is concerned. Incidentally, the 
Inflow of Rs. 1,177.99 crore of March 2014 has not 
been reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
Further, the amounts corresponding to the shares 
acquired by Hitachi Ltd in HPS in March 2014 have 
not been reported possibly because the selling 
shareholders were foreign. 
Yazaki India Ltd 
 
YGP Pte Ltd Shares valued at Rs. 268 crores were issued in 
December 2016 pursuant to amalgamation of Yazaki 
Wiring Technologies India Pvt Ltd. No cash inflow. 
Contd… 
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Accenture Solutions Ltd Accenture Services 
(Mauritius) Ltd
Shares were issued against amalgamation of Accenture 
Services Pvt Ltd. Amount: Rs. 5,361 crore. 
UPL Ltd As per list. Two tranches: Rs. 3,270 crore and Rs. 82 crore 
reported during Jan-Mar 2017. The instruments were 
issued consequent to the amalgamation of Advanta Ltd 
with the company. The allottees appear to be GDR 
holders. 
Optum Global Solutions 
(I) Pvt Ltd 
Optum Global Solutions 
Intl BV 
This case is particularly interesting as the Company’s 
board resolved to issue 2,820,975 shares at a premium 
of Rs. 12,610 on a share having nominal value of Rs. 
10, on Aug 10, 2016.
Board Resolution to issue shares: Aug 10, 2016
Hon’ble High Court order for convening Transferor’s Shareholders and unsecured creditors Meeting: Sep 1, 2016. 
Date of Court/NCLT Order: Mar 20, 2017 
Resolution for Buyback passed: Mar 22, 2017. 
Buy back was of 458,700 shares at a premium of Rs. 15,984.64, worth Rs. 733.67 crore the maximum permissible 
amount. 
A question arises when amalgamation was already on the cards shares were issued at a premium of Rs. 12,610 per 
share. But, the buyback as soon as the amalgamation was sanctioned was made at a much higher premium of Rs. 
15,984.64, i.e., higher by 27%. So, the company paid much more to buyback the same shares. Out of the Rs. 2,929 
crore against which shares were issued in August 2016, Rs. 734 crore went back in the form of buyback leaving a 
net inflow of Rs. 2,195 crore.  
Source: Same as Table-12. 
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Section VI 
Changes in the Reporting Requirements 
nder the rules governing the reporting of FDI inflows which were in force 
till November 7, 2017, companies which receive funds under the FDI 
automatic and approval routes have to inform the concerned regional office 
of the RBI within 30 days of their receipt and further they have to inform the RBI 
within 30 days of issue of shares/instruments through Authorised Dealer Category - 
I banks. Additionally, the instruments have to be issued within 180 days of receipt of 
the funds. Otherwise, the amounts have to be refunded127 (Diagram-D1). If the RBI 
is reporting ‘inflows’, there cannot be a gap of more than a month between inflows 
and their reporting. If the reporting is based on issue of shares/instruments, the gap 
could be as much as seven months. If shares are issued against convertible 
debentures/preference shares/ECBs, there could be long gap between inflow and 
conversion. In case of full conversion of ECBs into equity, the RBI has to be 
informed within seven days of the conversion. Reporting of transfer of shares 
between residents and non-residents, however, needs to be done within 60 days. 
There are severe penalties in case of non-compliance.128 From the cases we have 
examined, it appears that RBI may be going by the date of issue of instruments, reported 
in Form FC-GPR. This is in spite of the fact that the titles given to the respective lists in 
the SIA Newsletter start with “Statement on Remittance-Wise Details of FDI Equity 
Inflows Received … During”. Diagram-D1 given below illustrates this possibility.  Hence, 
the gap could be as much as seven months.  
The Notification issued on November 7, 2017 reduced the time of allotment from 
the date of receipt of funds from 180 days to 60 days in line with the provisions of 
the Companies Act, 2013 (Diagram-D2). This should be only a technical amendment 
because under the Companies Act, 2013 shares have to be issued within 60 days. Since 
most of the recipients are bound by the Companies Act, they should normally issue 
shares within 60 days. The gap between receipt of funds and reporting to the RBI 
should not be more than 3 months. However, the cases cited above and those listed 
in Annexure-C indicate, that in large number of instances there is considerable gap 
between actual inflow and its reporting.129 Given this built-in gap, the practice of 
taking October 2014 as the reference point for MII purposes appears inappropriate. 
                                                                 
127  The penalties are imposed under Paragraphs 9(1)(A), 9(1)(B) and 8 respectively of Schedule I to 
FEMA 20/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000. See RBI Master Direction No. 4/2015-16. 
128  For details, see: Annexure-6 of the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 2016. 
129  In fact, the SIA Newsletter never reported the inflows relating to the takeover of Ranbaxy by Daiichi. 
It was only from the annual issue of the SIA Newsletter which gave the list of top inflows, one could 
gather information on the size of the amount involved. In case of Walmart’s investment in the CCDs 
of Cedar support Services, it is known that RBI did not take the inflow into account as it was not sure 
whether the investment was in conformity with the extant FDI policy or not. 
U 
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Diagram-D1: Timelines for Reporting FC-GPR (prior to November 7, 2017) 
 
Source: http://www.ebiz.gov.in/fc-gpr-central 
Diagram-D2: Timelines for Reporting FC-GPR (since November 7, 2017) 
 
Source: http://services.ebiz.gov.in/content/services/fc_gpr_central 
 
The RBI has been seized of the problem of non-reporting and delayed reporting 
for quite sometime. After the government delegated to it the powers (which till then 
were being exercised through the Enforcement Directorate) in September 2004 to 
compound contravention of the provisions of FEMA, 1999130, the RBI formulated 
the relevant procedures in February 2005.131 The RBI identified in January 2013, inter 
alia, the following problems in this regard. 
i) Delay in submission of the Advance Reporting Format in respect of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to the concerned Regional Office of the Reserve 
Bank …; 
ii) Delay in filing of details after issue of eligible instruments under FDI within 
30 days in form FC-GPR to the concerned Regional Office of the Reserve 
Bank …; and 
iii) Delay in filing of details pertaining to transfer of shares for FDI transactions 
in form FC-TRS by resident individual/companies … 
It was noted that more than 70 per cent of the cases which came up for 
compounding pertained to FDI. Within the FDI cases, most (72 per cent) relate to 
delay in advance reporting/submission of FC-GPR.132 Problems were also found in 
                                                                 
130  Except clause (a) of Section 3 of the Act which essentially deals with hawala transactions. 
131 RBI/2004-05/355, A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 31, February 1, 2005. 
132  Form in which the issuing company has to file through its Authorised Dealer Category – I bank with 
the Regional Office of the RBI under whose jurisdiction the Registered Office of the company making 
the declaration is situated as and when shares/convertible debentures / others are issued to the 
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respect of reporting outward investments. It may be noted that delay in share transfers 
(FC-TRS) was mentioned specifically. In view of this severe problem, RBI underlined 
the need for reliable data on FDI and said that: 
All the transactions involving Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), External 
Commercial Borrowing (ECB) and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(ODI) are important components of our Balance of Payments statistics 
which are being compiled and published on a quarterly basis. Any delay in 
reporting affects the integrity of data and consequently the quality of policy 
decisions relating to capital flows into and out of the country …133 
 
In April 2014, the powers to compound the violations were given to the regional 
offices of RBI.134 The pace of reporting of old cases might have increased following 
the delegation of powers and what we have described above may be a reflection of 
the same.  
Reliable Data on FDI is not required for BoP Purposes Alone 
From the above quotation it appears that the RBI is not adequately sensitive to the 
use of FDI data other than for BoP related issues. It would, therefore, be in order to 
delve on this aspect at some length. Since the reporting by RBI/DIPP appears to be 
based on issue of instruments, the gap between receipt of funds and their reporting 
could be considerable even if there is no technical delay. Implication of this practice 
for assessing the impact of MII on inflows is obvious. Absence of information on the 
time of receipt of funds resulted in directly associating the surge in inflows to changes 
in policies and procedures. Given its importance, users (especially the government) 
should have been explicitly cautioned about this phenomenon by incorporating the 
same in the data reported by the RBI. While there is no doubt that the delayed 
reporting of earlier investments could have contributed to the spurt in inflows in a 
significant manner, the extent of this problem cannot be easily estimated. A possibility 
about which we cannot comment upon is regarding the delays in compiling the data 
on inflows/issue of instruments received135 by different regional offices of the RBI. 
In fact, where does the problem lie: with the investee companies, AD Category-I 
banks, RBI regional offices or RBI headquarters?  This will be examined to a limited 
extent in the following. 
Since the middle of 2016, the RBI has been reporting individual cases of 
compounding of FEMA violations which, inter alia, relate both to inward and 
outflows. In the context of delayed reporting and non-reporting noticed by us, it is 
apparent that these cases136 appear to provide only a glimpse of the problem. They 
do, however, offer instances where there is a long gap between the reporting of share 
                                                                 
foreign investor. 
133  RBI/2012-13/383, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 76, January 17, 2013. 
134  RBI/2013-14/553, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 117, April 4, 2014. 
135  Form of submitting -- online, soft copy or paper -- of the respective forms is also relevant. 
136  See: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/Compoundingorders.aspx. 
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issues by the company to the AD Bank/RBI and their finally being taken on record. 
A few relevant cases are listed in Table-30. 
During the Workshop on the draft version of the present study it was suggested 
that RBI would also be examining whether the reported investments fall under the 
category of FDI or not and such scrutiny could explain some cases of delayed 
reporting. It, however, does not repudiate the fact of delays in final reporting which 
was underlined by the RBI itself and the large number of cases discovered by us 
suggest. Some cases cited in Table-30, however, raise further questions about the 
reporting practices. For instance, Kellogg India Pvt Ltd which delayed reporting of 
one instance of receipt of funds and two instances of issue of shares approached the 
RBI towards the end of October 2016 for condoning the delays. The relevant order 
was issued on January 6, 2017 and the company was asked to pay Rs. 4,20,000 for 
getting the delays condoned. What is more relevant in this case, however, is that a lot 
of time elapsed between the company informing the RBI about the issue of shares 
and their being reported in the SIA Newsletter (Serial No. 19 of Table-30). While some 
shares issued in May & October 2010 were reported in April 2014, those issued earlier 
in February and June 2012 were reported in the Apr-Jun 2016 quarter along with 
those issued in October 2013 and June 2014. The one received in June 2016 was 
reported in the Newsletter of the following quarter, namely Jul-Sep 2016 (Graph-E). 
Since the order condoning the delay was passed in January 2017, the RBI was 
obviously not waiting to complete the compounding proceedings. In any case, the 
delay affected only three of the tranches of inflows. The remaining should have been 
reported at the earliest. Why did the RBI wait till the second quarter of 2016 to report 
the information it received as far back as in February 2012, i.e. by more than four years 
even while it reported other share issues about which it obtained information later? 
Table-30: Select Cases of Long Gap between Reporting of Allotment of Shares  
to the AD Bank/RBI and Taking them on Record 
SN Investee Company Investor & 
Country 
Inflow 
(Rs. 
Mn.)
Issue of 
Shares
 Reporting to 
Ad 
Bank/RBI
 Reported 
in SIA 
Newsletter 
(NL)
Remarks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 Acciona Energy 
India Pvt Ltd 
Acciona Energy 
Intl, Spain 
53.47 13.09.2010 12.10.2010 2011 Apr Long gap between 
reporting to AD 
Bank/RBI and 
reporting in the NL. 
   Acciona 
Energia Intl, SA
38.84 01.03.2011 30.03.2011 2011 
Aug
 
   - do - 16.66 30.05.2014 12.06.2014 2014 Sep  
2 Aspen Care Pvt 
Ltd 
University of 
Pasadena, USA 
105.07 25.02.2015 19.03.2015 2017 
Apr-Jun
Compounding 
Order (CO) was 
passed on Nov 30, 
2017. 
  - do - 33.30 27.06.2016 26.07.2016 2017 
Apr-Jun
 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  - do - 20.13 04.10.2016 19.10.2016 2017 
Apr-Jun
 
3 Arani Agro Oil 
Industries Ltd 
Premium 
Nutrients Pvt 
Ltd, Singapore 
545.57 31.12.2012 30.01.2013 2016 
Apr-Jun
12 other allotments 
totalling Rs. 78.30 
mn. have not been 
reported in the NL. 
4 Bashkent (India) 
Education Pvt 
Ltd 
Teyfik 
Aydinliaglu, 
Turkey 
1.34 15.09.2010 19.08.2011 2013 
Nov
  
5 C-Kam Steel 
Wire Solutions 
Pvt Ltd 
Kiswire 
Arcelormittal 
Ltd, South 
Korea 
232.23 18.02.2011 25.02.2011 2016 
Jul-Sep
CO passed on 
5.7.2016. 
  - do - 127.50 23.06.2011 05.07.2011 2016 
Jul-Sep
 
  - do - 0.10 27.08.2010 25.02.2011 2016 
Jul-Sep
 
6 Carryage 
Technologies 
Pvt Ltd 
K2 Investment 
& Advisory Ltd
36.26 02.02.2016 08.04.2016 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
    - do - 2.86 15.03.2016 02.01.2017 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
7 Changyou.com 
India Pvt Ltd 
Changyou.com 
HK Limited 
70.00 24.02.2014 12.03.2014 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
8 Daechang 
(India) Seat Co 
Ltd 
Daechang Seat 
Co Ltd., South 
Korea 
135.03 08.06.2011 24.06.2011 2015 
May
  
9 Dentsu One Pvt 
Ltd (earlier 
Dentsu Marcom 
Pvt Ltd) 
Dentsu Inc., 
Japan 
110.00 30.08.2011 23.09.2011 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
      5.21 18.03.2006 17.04.2006 2008 Feb   
     - do - 7.40 14.04.2004 27.05.2009  Not reported in the 
NL. 
10 Dropsa 
Spicelube India 
Pvt Ltd 
Walter Frank 
Divisi 
0.10 22.08.2015 16.11.2015 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
    - do - 6.43 24.09.2015 16.11.2015 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
    - do - 6.57 11.12.2015 14.04.2016 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
    - do - 4.89 04.01.2016 14.04.2016 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
11 DSRK Holdings 
Chennai Pvt Ltd 
Silva Ltd., 
Mauritius 
1200.00 15.03.2007 11.01.2008 2017 
Apr-Jun
The compounding 
order covering 
various violations 
was passed on 
23.12.2016. 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
12 Durag India 
Instrumentation 
Pvt Ltd 
Durag GMBH 10.00 26.04.2006 29.06.2007 2017 
Jan-Mar
The compounding 
application was filed 
on June 9, 2017 and 
the CO was issued 
on 15.12.2017. 
    - do - 20.00 15.12.2006 31.01.2008 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
    - do - 60.00 26.09.2011 03.11.2011 2017 
Jan-Mar
  
13 EDAC 
Engineering Pvt 
Ltd 
EDAC 
Universe Pte 
Ltd., Singapore 
80.40 07.07.2008 05.08.2008 2009 
Dec
  
      42.00 25.09.2009 01.10.2009 2010 Feb   
14 Guetermann 
India Pvt Ltd 
Guetermann 
SE Holding, 
Germany 
43.79 25.06.2014 04.08.2014 2015 Feb   
    Guetermann 
SE, Germany 
29.38 30.03.2010 29.09.2010 2011 Feb   
15 Hyoseong 
Electric India 
Pvt Ltd 
Hyoseong 
Electric Co Ltd, 
South Korea 
20.29 15.06.2007 06.07.2007 2016 
Oct-Dec
All these were 
reported to the RBI 
at various points of 
time. 
    - do - 1.14 06.07.2010 06.05.2015 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
    - do - 30.11 27.01.2015 13.02.2015 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
    - do - 30.34 26.02.2015 23.04.2015 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
    - do - 129.00 20.06.2016 06.10.2016 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
     - do - 90.91 20.06.2016 06.10.2016 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
16 Ion Exchange 
Waterleau Ltd 
Wateleau 
Group, Belgium
11.10 14.05.2010 07.12.2016 2017 
Jul-Sep
  
     - do - 8.90 25.06.2007 10.05.2016 2017 
Jul-Sep
  
17 Jupiter 
Corporate 
Services Pvt Ltd 
Royal Exports 
Ltd,  
146.32 06.06.2007 03.01.2011  Not reported in the 
NL. 
18 Kadavanthara 
Builders Pvt Ltd 
Elbit India Real 
Estate 
Holdings, 
Cyprus 
1397.65 10.12.2007 02.01.2008 2012 Jan Entire amount was 
reported as a single 
remittance in the 
Jan. 2012 NL. The 
CO was passed on 
9.11.2017. 
      244.29 11.07.2008 10.09.2008    
      164.93 04.09.2009 25.09.2009    
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      210.43 02.11.2009 16.11.2009    
      212.97 17.02.2010 08.03.2010    
      67.68 13.04.2010 06.05.2010    
      742.02 13.10.2010 09.11.2010    
19 Kellogg India 
Pvt Ltd 
Kellogg Co., 
USA 
195.75 11.01.2012 03.02.2012 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
    - do - 203.16 30.05.2012 18.06.2012 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
    - do - 481.72 19.04.2013 15.05.2013 2014 Apr   
    - do - 268.70 19.09.2013 17.10.2013 2014 Apr   
    - do - 1593.30 27.09.2013 21.10.2013 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
    - do - 265.54 25.03.2014 13.06.2014 2016 
Apr-Jun
  
20 Kukdong 
Coolant India 
Pvt Ltd 
KukdongJeyen 
Co.Ltd, South 
Korea  
0.13 28.07.2008 29.07.2008  Yet to be reported 
in the NL. 
      10.22 03.11.2008 13.01.2014    
      28.02 07.06.2013 20.06.2013    
21 MYK Scomburg 
India Pvt Ltd 
Aquafin 
International, 
Germany 
14.00 24.10.2007 02.11.2016 2017 
Jul-Sep
  
    Aquafin 
International, 
Germany 
55.49 30.03.2016 27.01.2017  Not reported in the 
NL. The company 
transferred shares 
without obtaining 
certified copy of 
FC-TRS. 
22 Network 
Solutions & 
Consulting Pvt 
Ltd 
NSC Global 
Ltd., UK 
18.20 29.12.2013 29.01.2014 2016 
Jan-Mar
  
23 Novus Animal 
Nutrition India 
Pvt Ltd 
Novus 
International 
Pte Ltd., 
Singapore 
5.00 04.10.2010 05.08.2016 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
    35.00 11.03.2011 25.05.2011 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
24 Perstorp 
Chemicals India 
Private Ltd 
Perstorp 
Speciality 
Chemicals 
Holding BV, 
Netherlands 
46.72 4.10.2000 01.08.2016  Not reported in the 
NL. 
   - do - 126.20 26.03.2003 01.08.2016  Not reported in the 
NL. 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   - do - 97.59 27.05.2005 02.12.2016 2017 
Oct-Dec
Reported in the NL 
in two tranches 
Rs.74.44 mn.+ 
Rs.23.15 mn., 
almost a year after 
the FC-TRS was 
filed. 
25 Polypeptide 
Laboratories Pvt 
Ltd 
Polypeptide 
Laboratories 
BV. 
Netherlands 
64.16 26.03.2007 19.04.2007 2007 
Aug
  
    - do - 29.40 30.05.2011 21.08.2015 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
    - do - 156.40 30.07.2011 25.08.2015 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
    - do - 101.03 02.03.2012 22.08.2015 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
26 RA Chem 
Pharma Ltd 
Laxmi RA 
Holdings 
22.57 13.10.2015 15.07.2017
@
2017 
Oct-Dec
  
      22.48 13.10.2015 18.11.2016
@
2017 
Oct-Dec
  
27 Raqmiyat 
Information 
Technology Pvt 
Ltd 
Raqmiyat LLC 17.84 25.05.2009 03.08.2016 2017 
Jul-Sep
 
28 RMZ Somerset 
Galleria Hotels 
Pvt Ltd 
Ascot 
International 
151.75 28.01.2011 25.02.2011 2017 
Apr-Jun
  
29 Shiva Mall & 
Hotels Pvt Ltd 
Pavillion 
Developments 
Ltd, UK 
110.00 01.10.2014 31.07.2015 2015 
Jul-Sep
  
   Shiva Hotels 
(Mauritius) Ltd 
251.00 01.10.2014 31.07.2015 2015 
Jul-Sep
  
   Shiva Hotels 
(Mauritius) Ltd 
189.00 01.10.2014 31.07.2015 2015 Sep   
   Verite Trust Co 
Ltd 
50.00 01.10.2014 04.08.2015 2016 
Jan-Mar
AD bank further 
reported eight 
months later to the 
RBI on 18.03.2016. 
30 South Asia FM 
Ltd 
South Asia 
Multimedia 
Tech, Mauritius 
149.23 28.02.2008 31.03.2008 2008 Jun  
  - do - 19.23 22.06.2009 04.11.2009 2010 
May
 
  - do - 193.89 23.07.2009 04.11.2009 2010 
May
 
  - do - 439.00 03.08.2009 04.11.2009 2010 
May
 
Contd… 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  - do - 28.00 20.12.2010 01.02.2011 2016 
Jul-Sep
 
31 Southside 
Hotels & 
Resorts Ltd 
Mahadevan 
Ganesh 
199.00 12.3.2008 01.06.2009 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
      17.11 31.05.2010 03.07.2010 2016 
Oct-Dec
  
32 Statkraft India 
Pvt Ltd 
SN Power 
Holding 
Singapore Pte. 
Ltd. 
32.00 12.03.2012 12.03.2014 2015 Jan   
    - do - 26.00 10.05.2012 10.05.2014 2015 Jan   
    - do - 12.14 30.08.2012 15.09.2014 2015 Jan   
    - do - 11.00 08.11.2012 30.09.2014 2015 Jan   
33 Tinius Olsen 
India Pvt Ltd 
Tinius Olsen 
Ltd U.K. 
1.80 24.09.2009 08.02.2011 2016 
Jul-Sep
  
34 Toyotsu Rare 
Earths India Pvt 
Ltd 
Toyota Tsusho 
Corp., Japan 
325.00 19.07.2012 21.08.2012 2013 Apr   
    - do - 200.00 23.04.2013 17.06.2013 2014 Jan   
35 Turmeric Vision 
Pvt Ltd 
South Asia 
Creative Assets 
Ltd, Mauritius 
90.60 19.11.2010 07.12.2010 2011 Apr   
    - do - 177.23 29.05.2015 30.10.2015 2016 
Jan-Mar
  
    - do - 165.00 10.04.2013 28.06.2013 2016 
Mar
  
    - do - 153.00 09.12.2013 08.01.2014 2016 
Mar
  
    South Asia 
Assets Creative 
Ltd, Mauritius 
70.00 20.03.2014 19.06.2014 2014 Jul   
    - do - 30.00 23.02.2015 17.04.2015 2016 
Jan-Mar
  
36 Universal 
Sportsbiz Pvt 
Ltd 
Accel India III 
(Mauritius) Ltd 
131.97 24.05.2016 22.06.2016 2017 
Jul-Sep
  
37 YSI Automotive 
Pvt Ltd 
Yushin Preci- 
sion Indl, Japan 
130.62 02.06.2008 25.10.2016 2017 
Oct-Dec
Reported a year 
later in the NL 
   - do - 68.19 01.10.2008 03.09.2016 2017 
Oct-Dec
  
   - do - 6.97 27.03.2009 03.09.2016 2017 
Oct-Dec
  
   - do - 1.47 04.10.2009 03.09.2016 2017 
Oct-Dec
  
Source: Based on company-wise details provided by the RBI at https://m.rbi.org.in/scripts/Compoundingorders.aspx 
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Graph-E: The Gap between Informing the RBI about the Issue of Shares by Kellogg India  
and their Reporting in the SIA Newsletter 
 
Source: Based on the information provided in the compounding order available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs 
/CompoundingOrders/PDFs/11KELLOGGINDIA3098E9D2EC66487AA8EADBD3A7839921.pdf 
 
In case of Kadavanthara Builders Pvt Ltd (Serial No. 18, Table-30), the inflows 
were reported with some delay in January 2012. The compounding order was issued 
after many years in November 2017, in response to the application filed by the 
company in June 2017. It is relevant to note that there was a gap of more than five 
years between the filing of information regarding issue of shares and the company’s 
request to the RBI to condone the delay. By implication, these investments were 
credited to later years instead of the years in which the shares were issued and the RBI 
was informed. Another important example for lumpy reporting is that of Volkswagen 
Finance Ltd (Table-31). A number of tranches, most of which are duplicate in nature, 
were reported in one go during Apr-Jun 2017, i.e. a long time after the powers to 
compound were delegated to the regional offices of the RBI. This case was not, 
however, reported by the RBI on its website thereby raising doubts whether it was a 
case of default by AD Bank/RBI. 
Does RBI force companies to file compounding applications after finding from 
the returns that they had delayed reporting beyond the permissible limits?  Sectoral 
inflows would also be affected to that extent. It is also relevant to note that not many 
large companies figure in the list of cases mentioned at the RBI’s website. As 
explained in Section V, very few large tranches of inflows into Vodafone India Ltd 
were reported with considerable delay. Will its case come up for compounding at a 
future date? Or, has RBI delayed its announcement as it was examining whether the 
investment was in conformity with the FDI policy? Or, was it a case of mere 
oversight?   
Duplicate Reporting has been a Continuing Phenomenon 
The problem of duplicate reporting in the post-September 2014 period was discussed 
at some length in the previous sections. A few instances in the earlier years involving 
large inflows indicate that it was happening earlier too and that is seems to be 
continuing even after 2016-17 (A glimpse of this was provided in Tables 20 and 21). 
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Table-31: Inflows Reported against Volkswagen Finance Pvt Ltd during the quarter Apr-Jun 2017 
Name of the Foreign Investor Inflow (Rs. mn.) Earlier Reporting, if any Allotment of Shares 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 60.97 200906 N.A. 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas BV 6.03 200906 N.A. 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 62.48 201002 Dec-09 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas BV 6.18 201002 Dec-09 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 54.16 201009 Aug-10 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas AG 5.21 201009 Aug-10 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas BV 31.64 201108 Mar-11 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 318.36 Mar-11 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 630.63 201109 Jun-11 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas BV 62.37 201109 Jun-11 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 1,436.66 201201 Nov-11 
Volkswagen Finance Overseas BV 142.09 201201 Nov-11 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 3,977.84 201205 Feb-12 
Volkswagen Financial Services BV 393.41 201205 Feb-12 
Volkswagen Financial Overseas BV 405.00 Aug-12 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 4,095.00 Aug-12 
Source: Same as Table-12. 
 
We did think initially that duplicate reporting could be due to the defaulters’ anxiety 
to be on the safe side.  However, it may not fully explain the problem. A few instances, 
which give raise to this doubt, are described briefly in the following. 
 On February 28, 2008, TPG Axon (Mauritius) II Ltd, was allotted 70,00,000 
equity shares of Rs. 10 each, on preferential basis, by Mahindra & Mahindra 
Financial Services Ltd. at a premium of Rs. 370 per share for a total 
consideration of Rs. 2,660 million. Simultaneously, Standard Chartered 
Private Equity was allotted equity shares priced at Rs. 1,482 million. These 
amounts were reported twice: first in August 2008 and later in April 2009. 
The entire stake was offloaded by TPG-Axon in June 2009, i.e. within one 
and a half years. 
 Golboot Holdings Ltd., a controlled entity of Goldman Sachs, subscribed to 
93,95,974 FCDs of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd at the issue price of Rs. 700 
crore in July 2008. The same were converted into equity shares in January 
2010. It appears that both the instances were reported separately in 
November 2008 and March 2010: each of Rs. 700 crore. Obviously, there 
was only one inflow of Rs. 700 crore. 
 With effect from October 30, 2012, Timesofmoney Ltd became a subsidiary 
of Network International Investment Pte Ltd. following the acquisition of 75 
per cent stake by the foreign company. The deal value was reported to be Rs. 
2,643.3 million or $48.30 million. The reported inflow figures, however, 
suggest that there were two tranches of Rs. 2,643.31 million in the months 
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of November 2012 and December 2012 which were valued at $48.26 million 
and $48.37 million respectively. 
 In case of Agile Real Estate two inflows of Rs. 3,828 million each were 
reported against the months of February 2012 and May 2014 from Stillwind 
Holdings Ltd of Cyprus. From the filings with the MCA one finds that as on 
September 29, 2012, the foreign investor held CCD of Series I and II which 
together were valued at Rs. 3,828 million which it continued to hold on 
March 31, 2015. In case of equity shares issued to Vostok Ltd of Mauritius 
also, duplicate reporting in the same months was noticed. Obviously, the 
same inflows were reported again in May 2014. 
 BOC India issued shares worth Rs. 5,973 million to BOC Group PLC on 
January 19, 2008. There were, however, two entries for the same amount in 
the SIA Newsletter for the months of June 2008 and August 2012. 
 Morgan Stanley (India) Securities Pvt Ltd. allotted 198,550,000 equity shares 
at the face value of Rs. 10 and 137,793,700 preference shares at Rs. (including 
a premium of Rs. 99 per share) to Morgan Stanley Mauritius Co Ltd on 
October 5, 2007. The corresponding amounts were Rs. 1,985.50 million and 
Rs. 13,779.37 mllion respectively. Both the amounts were reported twice 
against the months of February 2008 and April 2009. 
 Two tranches of Rs. 4,249.99 million were reported against Asianet 
Communications Ltd. for the month of August 2010, one through the 
automatic route and the other by way of acquisition. The annual return of the 
company corresponding to the AGM held on 29 September 2010 shows that 
SVJ Holding Ltd acquired 4,657,113 shares from Westex Infotech Pvt Ltd. 
on 10 June 2010. As on the date of AGM, these were the only shares held by 
the foreign investor in the company. It thus implies that the reported inflow 
through the automatic route was reported erroneously. 
 Two tranches of Rs. 3,485.10 million were reported as inflows into Suzuki 
Motor Cycle India Pvt Ltd. against the months of June 2009 and August 
2009. Going by the total number of shares issued by the company as on 
September 10, 2010 and the available lists of allottees, it becomes obvious 
that shares against this amount were issued only once i.e. in June 2008.  
 The June 2008 and December 2008 the SIA Newsletter reported one trance 
each of Rs. 8,100.30 million inflow into Ambuja Cement India Ltd. The 
company’s annual reports and annual returns filed with the MCA, however, 
show that the foreign investor held only $8,100.30 million worth of cumulative 
preference shares which appear to have been issued on April 7, 2005. 
The period also witnessed a major case of incorrect reporting involving more 
than $2.8 billion. This was in a way comparable in terms of size with that of Serene 
Senior Living described in Section IV. An investment of $2,836.43 million, equivalent 
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to Rs. 154,884.49 million, by Blue Ridge Holdings Ltd of Mauritius in Blue Ridge 
Hotels Pvt Ltd through the automatic route was reported against the month of 
September 2012. We could trace the following share allotments to the foreign investor 
from the filings of the investee company with the MCA.  
 
30-7-2008 444 shares consideration: Rs. 43.02 million 
16-8-2012 185 shares consideration: Rs. 17.93 million 
 
Net worth of the investee company at the end of March 2013 was Rs. 255 crore and 
borrowings stood at Rs. 269 crore.137 Obviously, there is no way such huge inflow of 
nearly Rs. 16,000 crore would have been directed at the investee company. The total 
project cost for setting up a 543 Room, 5-Star business hotel, in Mumbai was reported 
to be Rs. 714 crore, way below the purported inflow.138 The reported improbable 
inflow works out to as much as 13 per cent of the equity inflows reported for the year 
2012-13. In the context of the steep fall of 37.3 per cent in the reported FDI inflows 
during the year, the actual fall would have been 45.5 per cent, had this incorrect entry 
not been there!  
RBI Receives Considerable Amount of Data 
The form of FC-GPR in which issue of instruments has to be reported underwent a 
few changes over the years. Particularly the 2008 amendment139 required the investee 
companies to report about the nature of the foreign investor under the following 
categories. 
1. Individual  
2. Company  
3. FII  
4. FVCI  
5. Foreign Trust  
6. Private Equity Fund  
7. Pension / Provident Fund  
8. Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) *  
9. Partnership / Proprietorship Firm  
10. Financial Institution  
11. NRIs / PIO  
12. Others (please specify)  
*  Government investment vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages 
those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary authorities 
 
                                                                 
137  See:https://www.brickworkratings.com/Admin/PressRelease/Blue-Ridge-Hotels-
BankLoan_358Cr_ USD_25_Ml -Reaffirmation-Rationale-5Jun2014.pdf. 
138  See: IL&FS Financial Services Ltd., “Execution of financing documents of Novotel Hotel, Mumbai 
- Blue Ridge Hotels Private Limited (BRHPL)”, dated July 29, 2012 accessed from 
http://www.ilfsifin.com/pdf /blue%20ridge-website%20write-up.pdf. 
139  See: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/84724.pdf. 
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Besides, information was sought regarding the nature of issue (IPO, Preferential 
allotment, rights, bonus, ESOPs, conversion, etc.), type of security (equity, CCD, CCPS, 
etc.), post-issue pattern of shareholding, location of the project, whether the investee 
company was new or existing, etc. Part-B of the FC-GPR was an annual report on all 
foreign investments made into the investee company which were outstanding as on the 
date of the balance sheet, indicating separately “direct/portfolio investments/re-
invested earnings/others”. Both foreign assets and liabilities were to be reported as also 
the retained earnings and disinvestments under the FDI head. Names of all those 
investors who were holding 10 per cent or more of the shares were to be furnished. 
Portfolio investments were to be reported separately. End-March non-resident 
shareholdings were to be reported under the same 12 categories which are listed above. 
The number of employees, direct and indirect separately, also was to be reported.  
While the FC-GPR continues to ask for the above information even now, Part-
B was discontinued in 2011 and in its place a separate ‘Annual Return on Foreign 
Liabilities and Assets reporting by Indian Companies’ was introduced. The Annual 
Return once again seeks information on investors according to the above 12 different 
categories, reinvested earnings and disinvestments, both with respect to inward and 
outward investments. Foreign direct investment in India is required to be reported 
separately for investors holding 10 per cent or more of equity participation and those 
holding less than 10 per cent share in equity. Unlike the earlier Part B, it seeks 
information on employees who are on payroll only. Form FC-GPR now asks the 
investees whether they are old or new companies. It makes a simple distinction: new 
company means greenfield and old company means brownfield!140 In case of FC-TRS 
also the category of the foreign investors has to be reported.  
It is relevant to note that FC-GPR has been modified over the years, the most 
recent one being in February 2014. Even more importantly, from the middle of 2015 
inflows have to be reported mandatorily online through the ebiz portal 
www.ebiz.gov.in. A few months later the mandatory online filing was extended to FC-
TRS (transfer of shares). That means data for the full year 2016-17 must have been 
captured online. Had the RBI started analysing this information thoroughly it would 
have quickly come to know about some of the issues pointed out by us. Far from 
cautioning the users and bringing out a more realistic picture, it is surprising to find 
RBI, the custodian of the inflows data, to come out with routine explanation for the 
reported rise in inflows during 2016-17 by mentioning many conceivable factors. On 
top of that, observations by international agencies have been referred to without 
examining them critically.  
This jump [in inflows during 2016-17] was catalysed by wide ranging domestic 
reforms, in particular, easing of FDI norms; the Goods and Services Tax; the 
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016; the new corporate insolvency 
framework, including the National Company Law Tribunal and the National 
Company Law Appellate Tribunal; and ease of doing business. Services topped 
the list of recipient sectors, followed by manufacturing and construction. A 
recent report by FDI Intelligence reveals that India was ahead of China and 
                                                                 
140  See: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Forms/PDFs/AP110214_ANN.pdf. 
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the US as the world’s top destination for greenfield FDI in 2016. Further, the 
UNCTAD’s survey of multinational enterprises ranked India as the third most 
favourite host country for FDI for 2017-19 after the US and China.141  
 
One would not expect such generalised catchall explanation from the country’s 
Central Bank. Nor does one look forward to repeating statements made by other 
sources without providing further insights. India’s problem is that the official agencies 
who have data do not examine it closely and critically and those outsiders who are 
entrusted by them with such a job are TOR-bound and are keen to meet the deadlines 
instead of getting to the bottom of the things. Often, they will also not be privy to the 
vast amount of information lying with the agencies. Some of them may even suffer 
from ideological bias, have vested interest or are stuck with their own beliefs. On their 
part, the official agencies may be worried about the weaknesses of their systems 
getting exposed if the information is fully shared with outsiders. The agencies are also 
known to preserve their individual turfs, thus adversely affecting information sharing 
among themselves.  
When the information on industrial classification is readily available in the 
database, what prevents the same from being provided to the public through the SIA 
Newsletter?142 When a UIN is generated at the time of initial remittance, what prevents 
the RBI from matching the same with data on allotment of instruments? What 
prevents RBI from sending notices when after the stipulated time FC-GPR is not 
filed? When millions of transactions on the stock exchanges are captured real-time 
why similar systems could not be developed for the inflows which are far fewer in 
number? Should the scope of FLA and FATS be restricted to a few variables only? 
Why was an important parameter like employment dropped from the FLA? Why a 
part of the information on foreign investors remain unanalysed? Is it that the 
responses provided are not good enough for analysis? Table-32 lists some of the key 
elements of the forms submitted by investee companies. Far from remaining silent, 
what is required is enhancing the scope of FLA/FATS and full analysis of FC-GPR 
and FC-TRS. One finds that a lot of useful information is also collected on the 
functioning of Indian JVs and Wholly-owned Subsidiaries abroad in the form of 
Annual Performance Report.143 One is not aware about its analysis by the RBI. When 
even US, which is important for both inflows and outflows of FDI, collects and 
disseminates data on more key operational aspects144 of foreign companies in the 
country and of its own companies in host countries, should India not expand the 
scope of its own analysis?  
                                                                 
141  Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2016-17, p. 60. 
142  We made a futile attempt at getting the same some years back. 
143  See: 
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/13MDRD77DCF42C4E64B6C9A83C24EF5 
D4E188.PDF. 
144  These include assets, capital expenditures, employment, compensation of employees, R&D spending 
and value added. Besides the industry, the tabulations are also based on the particular States of USA 
and country of the ultimate beneficial ownership in case of inward investments. For details one may 
visit: https://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=2&step=1#reqid=2&step=1&isuri=1&202 
=1&200=2&201=3 
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Table-32: Key Elements of the Reporting of Inflows and Others to the RBI 
Type of Information Advance 
Remittance 
Form (ARF) 
FC-GPR FC-TRS FLA FA
TS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Date of Receipt of Funds      
PAN No of Investee   X   
Unique Identification Number 
allotted by the RBI for the Amount 
Received (UIN) 
  X   
Route (Automatic or Approval)      
Date of Issue of Shares/Convertible 
Debentures 
     
Investor Category      
Investee Company Registration No.      
Existing or New      
Registration Number of the Investee 
allotted by RBI,  
if any 
X  X CIN  
Main Business Activity (NIC 2008 
Code) 
     
Location of the Project (State & 
District) 
     
Investee details (Foreign Subsidiary, 
Associate, etc.; Asset Mgt. Co.; 
Technical Collaboration) 
     
Details of Foreign Investor (under 
12 Categories) 
     
Nature and date of Issue (IPO, 
Private Placement, Rights, 
Conversion, etc.) 
     
Type of Security Issued (Equity, 
CCD, CCP, etc.) and Inflow 
  Details of 
Inflow/ 
Outflow 
  
Details of Premium (control, non-
compete, etc.) 
     
Method of Valuation      
Post-issue Pattern of Shareholding 
Non-resident (12 categories) as well 
as Resident – Number of Shares, 
Value & % Share 
   
(post-transfer 
foreign 
shareholding)
Details of 
foreign Share-
holding (12 
categories) for 
past 2 years  
 
Nature of Transaction: Resident to 
Non-Resident or other way Round 
     
Details of the Buyer /Seller (12 
categories) 
     
Particulars of Earlier RBI/FIPB 
Approvals 
     
PBT, PAT, Tax on Dividend, 
Retained Profit, Net worth 
     
Contd… 
Changes in Reporting Requirements 
111 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sales, purchases, Exports, Imports 
during past two years in case of a 
single foreign investor holding more 
than 50% share in equity 
     
Details of Foreign Investors holding 
10% or more, less than 10% for past 
two years 
     
i) Disinvestments during the year 
ii) Employees on Payroll 
   Missing in the 
latest version 
 
Source: ARF, FC-GPR and FC-TRS: Based on Master Direction – Reporting under Foreign Exchange Management 
Act, 1999 (updated as on May 15, 2017).  
Notes: ESOPs, Depository Receipts, LLPs, ODI, etc., are not covered here. 
FLA: Foreign Liabilities and Assets; FATS: Foreign Affiliate Trade Statistics  
At this point, it is relevant to note that indirect subsidiaries of foreign companies 
might be outside the scope of FATS and the studies of finances of FDI companies. 
In the former case, the instructions for filing the return run like the following: 
To be filled in by company where single foreign direct investor holding is 
more than 50% in total equity (i.e. if reporting Indian company is subsidiary 
of foreign company).145 
 
Thus, it appears that the provision leaves out step-down subsidiaries in India 
of companies having more than 50 per cent foreign equity. The implications of this 
for cases where the foreign investor opts for holding company structure are 
obvious. At times, such omitted companies can be large and/or leading companies 
in their respective activities as the cases listed in Table-33 suggest. There is also the 
possibility of companies in which a foreign investor invests in India through 
multiple arms each holding less than minority shares but the combined shareholding 
exceeds 50 per cent. Vodafone India Ltd offers a prime example in this regard. 
While direct shareholding of the group entities together works out to 89.11 per 
cent, as on March 31, 2017, the one which held the highest share was Euro Pacific 
Securities Pvt Ltd, Mauritius with 26.98 per cent share.146 While the company 
describes itself as a wholly owned subsidiary of Vodafone Plc., Vodafone India 
would not be required to file information under FATS.  On the other hand, its 
subsidiaries numbering nine147 would not be covered under FLA because they do 
not have foreign equity ‘directly’. Similar is the case with Saint-Gobain India Ltd 
and its subsidiary Saint-Gobain Research India Pvt Ltd.  The two main shareholders 
of Saint-Gobain India Ltd, which belong to the Saint-Gobain group and which 
together held majority shares at the end of March 2016, were: Saint-Gobain Glass  
                                                                 
145 See: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Forms/DOCs/FLR180614FL_A.XLS. 
146 The remaining were: Prime Metals Ltd (14.79%); Mobilvest (11.33%); Vodafone Telecommunications 
India Ltd (10.99%); Trans Crystal Ltd (9.88%); Asian Telecommunication Investments (Mauritius) 
Ltd (6.63%); Al-Amin Investments Ltd (5.49%); and CCII (Mauritius) Inc (3.02%). 
147 These were: Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd; Mobile Commerce Solutions Ltd; Vodafone Towers Ltd; 
Vodafone Business Services Ltd; Vodafone m-pesa Ltd; Vodafone Technology Solutions Ltd; 
Connect (India) Mobile Technologies Private Ltd; Vodafone India Ventures Ltd; and Vodafone India 
Digital Ltd. 
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Table-33: Select List of Step-down Subsidiaries that would Possibly Remain  
outside the Purview of FLA/FATS 
Immediate Foreign Parent  Indian Subsidiary Step-down Indian Subsidiary 
(1) (2) (3) 
Adidas International BV Adidas India Pvt Ltd Adidas India Marketing Pvt Ltd 
Holderind Investments Ltd, 
Mauritius 
Ambuja Cements Ltd  ACC Ltd 
CAG Tech Mauritius Ltd Agro Tech Foods Ltd  Sundrop Foods India Pvt Ltd 
Cummins Inc, USA Cummins India Ltd  Cummins Sales & Service Pvt Ltd 
Federal Mogul Holdings Ltd, 
Mauritius 
Federal-Mogul Goetze (India) 
Ltd.  
Federal-Mogul TPR (India) Ltd 
GE Pacific, Singapore GE Power India Ltd  GE India Exports Pvt Ltd 
Hindustan Coca-Cola Overseas 
Holdings Pte Ltd., Singapore 
Hindustan Coca Cola Holdings 
Pvt Ltd $ 
Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt Ltd 
Hindustan Coca-Cola Marketing Pvt Ltd 
Unilever Plc., UK Hindustan Unilever Ltd  Unilever India Exports Ltd 
Lakme Lever Pvt Ltd 
Hyundai Motor Co., Korea Hyundai Motor India Ltd Hyundai Motor India Engg Pvt Ltd 
John Deere Asia (Singapore) John Deere India Pvt Ltd John Deere Financial India Pvt Ltd 
Suzuki Motor Corp., Japan Maruti Suzuki India Ltd  JJ Impex (Delhi) Pvt Ltd 
PepsiCo Panimex Inc. 
Mauritius  
Pepsico India Holdings PepsiCo India Sales Pvt Ltd 
Koninklijke Philips NV, 
Netherlands 
Philips India Ltd Preethi Kitchen Appliances Pvt Ltd 
Philips Homecare Services India Pvt Ltd 
Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc., 
UK 
Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt. 
Ltd.  
Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare India Pvt Ltd 
Reckitt Piramal Pvt Ltd 
Buzzer Investments, Mauritius Star India Pvt Ltd.  Novi Digital Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. 
Relay BV, Netherlands United Spirits Ltd.  Sovereign Distilleries Ltd 
Four Seasons Wines Ltd 
Tern Distilleries Pvt Ltd 
Zoetis Inc., USA Zoetis Pharmaceutical Research 
Pvt. Ltd. $ 
Zoetis India Ltd 
Source: Based on information collected from documents filed with the MCA, Prowess IQ database and 
public sources.  
$ Only these have “FTC” in the CIN number indicating that they are subsidiaries of foreign companies. 
 
Deutschland GMBH, Germany (25.69 per cent) and Societe De Participations 
Financieres et Industrielles, France (36.82 per cent). Akzo Nobel India, BASF India, 
Clariant Chemicals, Colgate-Palmolive India, Crisil, Esab India, Gillette India, 
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare, Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals, Goodricke 
Group, Grindwell Norton, Merck, Morganite Crucible, Nestle India, Pfizer and SKF 
India are the other possible omissions.  One can imagine how the exclusion of these 
important companies will affect sectoral values. For instance, Vodafone's absence will 
seriously dent the representation of foreign companies in the telecomm sector.  On the 
other hand, RBI’s FATS data suggests that foreign subsidiaries in pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal and chemical products show positive trade balance of Rs. 1,580 crores for the 
year 2015-16.  The negative trade balance of pharmaceuticals companies which might 
have been omitted, namely Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals, Merck and Pfizer during 
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the same year were Rs. 387 crore, Rs. 115 crore and Rs. 347 crore respectively.  Had 
these companies been included in FATS, the surplus of Rs. 1,580 crore the trade balance 
would have been less than half at Rs. 731 crore! 
Incidentally, one finds that the CIN number assigned by the MCA which has 
provision for the status of a company does not always reflect its current status as 
subsidiary of a foreign company.  It can be seen  from Table-33  that only two of the 
companies listed therein have “FTC” (subsidiary of a foreign company) in their CIN 
numbers. In fact, CIN numbers cannot remain static as a company’s status can change 
from public to private, listed to unlisted and vice versa as also the registered offices can 
be shifted from one state to another. This makes comparisons overtime and across 
different data sources difficult. At another level, one should take a re-look  whether 
arms of large  Indian and global companies should be extended exemptions available 
to small and private limited companies under the Companies Act, 2013.148  
When evidence-based policymaking is the need of the hour, official agencies 
cannot be too protective of critical data. One wonders why the filings are treated as 
confidential when one can get considerable amount of information about the investee 
companies, including ownership details (Indian as well as foreign shareholders), by 
paying just Rs. 100 per company to the MCA. There is little justification for treating 
the entire information furnished in the filings through FC-GPR, FC-TRS or FLA as 
confidential. If these statutory filings are properly designed, they can help assess the 
role and place of FDI, which has been given a pride of place in India’s economic 
policies. But, what one gets today are perfunctory analysis of finances of ‘FDI 
companies’, broad aggregates based on the FLA and a few tables regarding the 
operation of foreign subsidiaries. The evasive/irrelevant replies one finds in the 
Parliament are a logical outcome of this ill-preparedness.  
On its part, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has changed the forms for filing 
information repeatedly. In fact, with the latest set of reporting norms it would not be 
possible to get information on transactions in foreign exchange in a consistent 
manner. The MCA should consult a wider body of stakeholders including academic 
researchers to make the information furnished in company annual returns amenable 
for a broader and deeper analysis of the Indian corporate sector with ease. The RBI, 
MCA and other official agencies may also devise a mechanism similar to the “Special 
Sworn Employee Program” of US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) which 
enables qualified researchers to analyse data as unpaid employees of the BEA.149 
Though contribution of FDI to India’s economic development should be of great 
interest by itself, the concerns raised recently by the Discussion Paper on industrial 
policy, add further urgency to this dimension.  
                                                                 
148 For an elaboration, see: Foreign Investments Study Team, “FDI Companies and the Indian Company 
Law: Regulations vs. Disclosures”, a Discussion Note, July 1, 2014. The note was prepared under the 
ISID-ICSSR FDI Project.  Accessible from http://isid.org.in/pdf/DN1405.pdf. 
149  Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., “American Multinationals and American Interests 40 Years Later What Have 
We Learned From Research Using BEA Data?”, Survey of Current Business, November 2017, pp. 1-4. 
Available at https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2017/11-November/1117-american-multinational-
enterprises-research-using-bea-data.pdf. 
 The MCA has made a good beginning by introducing a scheme whereby it will share select data with 
researchers. The Ministry has also started publicising the scheme for the benefit of users. 
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Section VII 
Summing Up 
s we had mentioned at the outset, this study is part of an on-going research 
programme of the ISID, which has been analysing the changing behaviour of 
FDI in India. Data and information for the recent years have been used for 
the analysis here. The accompanying discussion on FDI policy changes was meant to 
put the reported increase in inflows during the last few years in perspective. An 
important backdrop of this study is the Discussion Paper released by the Department 
of Industrial Policy and Promotion in August 2017. This paper expressed the need to 
review the FDI policy, which being largely aimed at attracting investment has failed 
to harness technology to the extent possible. Coming as it did in the wake of 
formulation of new industrial policy and the spurt in inflows having been widely 
attributed to the Make in India initiative, it was an unexpected but welcome 
development. Incidentally, this rethinking on FDI is in line with the observations and 
recommendations of an expert group set up by the then Prime Minister in 2008 and 
which the previous government did not act upon. While the Discussion Paper 
reopened the issue of quality versus quantity of FDI, this study examined, for the first 
time, the problem of quality of the reported FDI data from the point of its utility in 
understanding the ground level developments appropriately. 
FDI Policy Changes 
There remaining very little scope for further opening up of the manufacturing sector 
to FDI, the attention of the new government was naturally on defence industries and 
the service sectors. The changes not only reflect the government’s keenness to reduce 
its intervention and the desire to increase inflows (by trying to differentiate between 
FDI and non-FDI and raising the caps on share of FDI in the equity of individual 
companies), but also indicate the tacit admission that the extant policy failed to attract 
large enough inflows into defence industries. As has been the general practice of 
incremental opening since 1991, this opening up was also not based on studies that 
have been publicly referred to.  
The very first change made in June 2014 covered defence industries which by 
narrowing the ambit of industrial licensing indirectly enhanced the scope for FDI 
participation. In addition to defence industries, railway infrastructure and 
construction were covered in the changes announced in August 2014. In all, four 
announcements were made till June 2016 regarding FDI in defence industries. The 
other changes made in respect of manufacturing industries were only with regard to 
easing the constraints on brownfield investments in pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices. There had been otherwise no restriction on greenfield FDI in these 
industries. In specific, major changes in FDI policy were introduced at two points, 
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namely November 2015 and June 2016. Construction, trading, civil aviation and 
plantations were the main areas addressed in November 2015. Trading, civil aviation 
and broadcasting again featured in June 2016 along with animal husbandry, defence 
industries and pharmaceuticals. 
Broadly speaking, the FDI policy changes relating to the trading sector reflect a 
faith in the contribution of foreign trading companies to the development of critical 
infrastructure needed by the Indian farmers. It is well-known that benefitting the 
farmers/agriculture was the main plank used to permit FDI in multi-brand retail trade 
in 2012. It is difficult to justify how far the major chunk of inflows into the food 
processing sector on the one hand and the storage and distribution infrastructure 
created by the foreign traders (online, wholesale and retail) on the other help the 
Indian farmers. The amendments in the FDI policy applicable to agriculture and 
animal husbandry would facilitate the operations of the producers of genetically 
modified seeds. These changes, however, expose the Indian agricultural sector further 
to global companies. In retail, the door for foreign traders is now open wider. Pressure 
is being built up to further liberalise the facility to permit foreign retail trading 
companies to sell non-food items along with food products manufactured in India.  
In the pharmaceutical sector, by further facilitating takeovers the interests of 
domestic industry which is closely intertwined with public health have been 
compromised. Now there is even greater scope for foreign companies to consolidate 
control over the medical devices industry, too. In defence, foreign companies are not 
too keen to manufacture in India. They might be encouraged to take up some 
manufacture to meet defence offset obligations with the inevitable caveats on 
technology transfer. In any case, even if some advanced home countries permit their 
companies to set up manufacturing facilities in India to serve their own strategic 
interests, technology would still be controlled by the foreign companies. In civil 
aviation, while the policy change was relevant for portfolio investors, the latest 
amendment was aimed at privatising Air India.  
Limited Impact of FDI Policy Changes on Inflows 
The reported total FDI inflows during 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 were $45.1 
billion, $55.6 billion and $60.1 billion respectively. The corresponding equity inflows 
were $31.9 billion, $41.1 billion and $44.7 billion (Table-2). It may be noted that earlier 
equity inflows came off the 2011-12’s peak of $35.9 billion and fell to $22.9 billion in 
2012-13. The inflows recovered partially to $25.3 billion in 2013-14. Thus, at the first 
glance, the recent experience appears to be a continuation of the recovery that started 
in 2013-14. In fact, if one takes into consideration the inflows in the immediately 
preceding quarters, the recovery in inflows appears to have started in the last quarter 
of 2013-14 following the steep fall in 2012-13 (Graph-A). 
It would not be logical to expect the inflows to respond within a few days of 
announcing the policy initiatives. If nothing else, such an assumption ignores the basic 
reporting requirements and practices followed in India. Further, unlike portfolio 
investors, RFDI investors who invest for the long-term will take considerably long 
time to commit themselves to any country. Be that as it may, since most comparisons 
have taken October 2014 (MII was announced in September 2014) as the reference 
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point, our exercise also followed this practice. The next issue is to determine to what 
extent the FDI policy changes could have influenced the increase in inward FDI. The 
major changes in FDI policy effected at the two points, namely November 2015 and 
June 2016 (Table-1), might not have led to immediate strong response from foreign 
investors in the corresponding financial years. More specifically, the November 2015 
changes could not have had a reflection in the increased inflows of 2015-16 and the 
June 2016 changes on the inflows during 2016-17.  
A regrouping of the officially reported sector-wise inflows suggests that the share 
of manufacturing sector fell from 47.8 per cent during October 2012 - September 
2014 to 30.3 per cent in October 2014 - March 2017 and that it staged a considerable 
recovery during 2016-17 (Table-5). At the broader level, the activities in respect of 
which FDI policy was relaxed accounted for 18.6 per cent of the total inflows during 
October 2014 to March 2017. The corresponding share for the years 2012 and 2013 
was slightly higher at 20.8 per cent. Further, a regrouping of the inflows according to 
the 25 MII thrust sectors suggests that the MII sectors did not gain in the post-MII 
period compared to 2012 and 2013; there was actually a slight decline in their share 
in the total inflows (Table-7 and Annexure-B). Further, whichever way one looks at 
it, the share of manufacturing sector fell substantially. The share of manufacturing 
sector remained low and that too was concentrated heavily in automotive and allied 
industries, which in any case have been among the top recipients for many years.  
It is also relevant to note that just three activities accounted for 83.0 per cent of 
the inflows into the sectors that were subjected to FDI policy changes in the post-
MII period – trading (42.8 per cent), insurance (25.5 per cent) and information and 
broadcasting (14.7 per cent). The policy changes could, at the most, have influenced 
the inflows into these three activities. It should, however, be noted that there has been 
intense competition in the e-commerce sector and private equity is pouring in from 
abroad. On the other hand, most of the investment into the insurance sector was 
directed at partially buying out the shares of Indian partners following the hike in the 
permissible foreign share in equity from 26 per cent to 49 per cent. In fact, the articles 
of association of JVs in the insurance sector generally contained clauses which gave 
the foreign partner the right to increase its stake as and when the official policy 
permitted the same – it was thus just waiting to happen. It appears that an incorrect 
entry might have boosted the reported inflows into information and broadcasting 
services. 
The relative share of medical devices increased while that of pharmaceuticals 
declined substantially in the post-MII period. The combined share of the two fell 
from 5.9 per cent to 2.7 per cent. However, there appear to be major classification 
issues with regard to medical and surgical appliances. Most of the reported inflow 
seems to have gone into trading and a substantial part of RFDI that went into 
manufacturing companies was directed at acquisitions (Graph-D). The policy change, 
which allowed 100 per cent brownfield FDI through the automatic route, would in 
any case encourage sell-offs rather than promote greenfield investments. By its very 
nature, brownfield FDI more often than not supplants existing capital instead of 
supplementing it. The case of medical devices indicates the possibility of the estimated 
share of manufacturing sector being on the higher side when derived from official 
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tabulations. The fact that the official data on inflows so far do not contain much 
additional investment in defence industries and railway infrastructure shows that the 
relevant policy relaxations have yet to influence the inflows. 
Influence of Past Decisions on Recent Inflows 
The reported large inflows during the past three years have been widely attributed to 
the initiatives taken by the new government. We have seen in the above that FDI 
policy changes, if at all, could have only a limited influence. Further, contrary to the 
expectations, the first few months of 2016 recorded a fall in the quantum of inflows 
(Table-3). Such a fall would not have occurred had the foreign investors responded 
consistently to the more liberal policy environment and the steps taken towards 
improving the investment climate. Among the variety of situations in which further 
investments are made into existing companies, a prominent one is acquisition of 
existing shares. It is relevant to note that while the increase in equity inflows during 
2016-17 was $3,589 million, the increase on account of acquisition of existing shares 
was as much as $3,228 million. The increase in inflows through the approval route 
($2,326 million) almost matched the fall of $2,077 million in inflows through the 
automatic route. Thus, acquisitions provided sustenance for the rise in inflows during 
2016-17. While focusing on the quantum of inflows, this important dimension should 
not be lost sight of.  
Equally importantly, the contribution of newly incorporated companies is not 
significant in terms of their share in total inflows. The number of new companies is 
also not large enough to indicate a strong and unambiguous response from the foreign 
investors (Table-9). The few that were incorporated since October 2014 would have 
most likely come into being even if the MII did not happen. Most of the investments 
thus appear to be follow-up of the earlier envisaged investments. 
The real test of FDI policy is in attracting what we term as realistic FDI (RFDI) 
and getting the expected benefits from it. Financial investors who differ from RFDI 
investors invest mainly in projects initiated by domestic entrepreneurs. Compared to 
RFDI investors, these would respond quickly to the changed environment. The 
behaviour of India-related ones also cannot be equated with that of RFDI investors. 
During October 2014 to March 2016, the share of RFDI was a little above 50 per 
cent. Thus, there was no drastic change in the broad character of the inflows 
compared to the earlier years (2004-05 to 2013-14) to indicate a shift in the nature of 
inflows received till March 2016 (Table-8).  
However, a Number of Factors Cast Doubt on the ‘Real’ Size of Annual 
Inflows 
Although a few of the limitations of India’s FDI data which prevent it from properly 
representing the related aspects (location in India, source country, nature of investors, 
etc.) are known, at least among select audience, the accuracy of the size of yearly 
inflows, which has turned out to be the policymakers’ main focus, was never in doubt. 
The present study, however, finds that the data on inflows reported by the official 
agencies suffer from major weaknesses. Because of these problems and the 
circumstances surrounding some large remittances, it is difficult to draw firm 
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conclusions, particularly in respect of individual industries. The main observations 
with regard to the reported inflows can be summarised as: 
 
1. Delayed reporting 
2. Duplicate reporting 
3. Non-reporting 
4. Incorrect entries 
5. Notional Inflows 
6. Inappropriate industrial classification 
7. Inadequate representation of acquisitions 
8. Limited disclosure/analysis of the information obtained from investees 
 
A depiction of problems and possibilities associated with the data can be found in 
Diagram-C. 
 Delayed/Duplicate Reporting 
Some delay is built into the reporting requirements themselves. Even if the recipients 
adhere to the guidelines, there could be a gap between the time of remittance of the 
funds and final reporting to the RBI after issuing the relevant instruments (Diagrams 
D1 and D2). Long delays, sometimes running into many years beyond the permissible 
limits, in reporting of the inflows has been acknowledged by the RBI itself. The delays 
also imply that there could be substantial amounts that have been received but are not 
reflected in the official data. Delayed, duplicate and non-reporting are often 
intertwined. The ‘inflows’ on account of corporate restructuring also turned out to be 
a major distorting factor (Diagram-B and Exhibit-B). These multiple issues seriously 
dent the veracity of the effective size of inflows that could be attributed to any single 
year and raise doubts about the inflows scaling a new peak in 2016-17. These also 
make sectoral data less reliable.  
Reporting of many inflows in subsequent years could have been taken as normal 
and not very serious as its regular occurrence would have evened out over the years 
and total inflows would not have been affected unduly. In the present circumstances, 
however, since the discussion centres on the efficacy of the measures taken since 
September 2014, time of inflow/decision-making becomes extremely critical. When 
assessing the impact of the new policies and programmes, even a month’s delay could 
alter the conclusions. Further, if the already invested foreign investors bring back a 
part of the funds transferred by them out of the country under various heads, as FDI, 
the inflow numbers would be illusory. 
Yet another serious problem which surfaced was that of duplicate entries (Table-
18). Obviously, the problem of delayed reporting is a long standing one cutting across 
the tenures of different governments. The delegation of powers to compound the 
delays to regional offices of RBI in April 2014 (i.e. just prior to the forming of the 
new government in May 2014) might have prompted a number of companies to clear 
the backlog subsequently. In the process of clearing the backlog, some companies 
might again have reported a few inflows which were already reported by them either 
due to a slight change in the status or sheer oversight/abundant caution. The existence 
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of duplicate reporting even prior to May 2014, however, suggests the failure of the 
systems to detect such entries. When the amounts involved are large, duplicate 
reporting could significantly (artificially) boost inflows into specific sectors. 
Following the delegation of powers to the regional offices of the RBI, there 
appears to be some improvement in current reporting as also efforts to clear the 
backlog. Incorrect and duplicate entries had a higher share during May 2014 to March 
2017 compared to the April 2012 to April 2014 period (Table-20). A similar picture 
could be seen in terms of the amount of inflows (Table-21). An analysis of large 
individual tranches, each of which was at least $50 million, suggested that during 2016-
17 out of the inflows other than acquisitions, notional and duplicate reporting, only 
about half of the reported inflows match with the shares actually issued during the 
year. Inflows other than those against which shares were issued in the earlier years 
again were close to half of the year’s reported total. If acquisitions and problem cases 
are also kept out, the share comes down to just one-fourth (Table-22). A good portion 
of the increased inflows during 2016-17 may be attributed to reporting of the older 
cases (including duplicate reporting) – a case of past omissions bolstering current 
inflows. Alternatively speaking, the delayed and duplicate reporting may have been a 
major contributing factor for the character of the inflows practically remaining the 
same compared to the pre-MII period. 
 Incorrect Entries 
One of the remittances that caught our attention initially was the single tranche of 
$2,252.38 million into Serene Senior Living which was reported during October-
December 2015. Even after multiple checks, we could not find any evidence to 
support such a large inflow. It is easy to see how much difference a remittance of such 
a large size, which accounted for 5.6 per cent of the reported equity inflows during 
the year, can make to sectoral distribution of inflows and the distribution according 
to the nature of foreign investors. It is also relevant to note that an investment of 
$2,836.43 million in Blue Ridge Hotels Pvt Ltd reported earlier against the month of 
September 2012 also turned out to be suspect. This reported inflow works out to as 
much as 13 per cent of the equity inflows reported for the year 2012-13! We did come 
across a few other entries that are suspect. 
 Investees May not Always be Responsible for the Delays 
In case of acquisition of shares, the onus to report to the AD Bank is on the 
transferor/transferee who is a resident of India. The shares should be transferred to 
the buyer only after the AD Bank certifies FC-TRS for the receipt/transfer of funds. 
Here again, there appear to be quite a few gaps (Table-19). It is in the interest of the 
buyer that the procedure is completed as otherwise the shares would not get 
transferred in his/her name. Do AD Banks fail to report all the receipts to the RBI 
after certifying FC-TRS? Is RBI failing to match the returns in R-Form submitted by 
the AD Banks? The number of compounding cases that are reported by the RBI on 
its website since the middle of 2016 appear to be too small in view of the large number 
of cases of delayed reporting identified by us. It is inexplicable why a number of large 
companies — which would not like to break rules unless there are substantial gains 
(or possibilities of minimising losses) — wilfully expose themselves to severe 
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penalties. Why would not Vodafone India report $5.5 billion inflows, shares against 
which were allotted in September 2016, till August 2017? (Table-25) There is in fact, 
a distinct possibility that the delays cannot be entirely attributed to the investee 
companies as there were instances of considerable delay between reporting to the 
RBI/AD bank and taking them on record (Table-30). The wording ―Remittance-
Wise Details of FDI Equity Inflows Received…. During‖ which describes the 
inflows listed in the SIA Newsletter is thus obviously misleading.  
 Problems get Amplified at Sectoral Level 
Official data suggest that the inflows overcame the dip in the first few months of 
2016 and climbed to a higher peak during 2016-17. It also suggests a sharp rise in 
the share of the manufacturing sector with electrical equipment, cement and gypsum 
products, chemicals and metallurgical industries gaining in importance and pushing 
back the automobile sector which had been the topmost recipient among 
manufacturing industries for a number of years. Here again, the data either suffered 
from long delays in reporting or some of the large tranches were only notional 
because of the ownership restructuring of group companies. In some important 
cases, there are even grave classification errors. The electrical equipment industry, 
reportedly the top gainer in the manufacturing sector, illustrates many facets of the 
problem (Table-26). Out of the total $2,319 million inflows identified by us, only 
about $385 million could actually have contributed to new capacity creation or 
rehabilitation of troubled companies (Table-27). Due to large notional inflows and 
buying out of the public shareholders, the corresponding amount in the case of 
cement industry was $40 million out of the total $2,130 million of the reported 
inflows. One duplicate entry accounted for almost half of the inflows into the 
metallurgical industries during 2016-17! An indication of the different dimensions of 
the inflows could also be seen from the case of the automobile industry. Analysis of 
the top inflows into the automotive sector, listed in the relevant official brochure, 
shows that only about half of the inflows could be identified with the shares allotted 
after September 2014 (Table-23). Even in some important cases falling in this 
category, like Suzuki‘s new plant in Gujarat, the decision to invest in India was taken 
much earlier.  
Discovery of long delays in reporting of inflows and the possibility of grave 
mistakes in the reported figures seriously dented the belief that the increased inflows 
were a result of the policy reforms and other initiatives of the new regime. The 
problem is quite serious because often it involved leading recipients in various sub-
groups of industries/activities. As a result, we were forced to undermine our 
painstakingly constructed exercise at classifying the foreign investors and the 
investees of the October 2014 to March 2016 period. We realised that given the data 
limitations, no useful purpose would be served by extending it till March 2017.  
 Capital Repatriations/Disinvestments 
In India‘s case, on an average, as much as 34.8 per cent of the equity inflows went 
towards balancing the repatriations/disinvestments by the earlier investors during 
the past four years. This ratio seems to be increasing fast as during the previous 
quadrennium (2010-11 to 2013-14) it was 29.4 per cent whereas it was just 4.5 per 
cent during 2006-07 to 2009-10. Acquisitions and disinvestments (not to speak of 
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outward FDI) not only undermine the contribution of the inflows to new capacity 
creation in the economy, but also draw out surpluses. This is where the nature of 
foreign investors and the mode of entry are again relevant. The substantial 
disinvestments might have prompted the Discussion Paper “Industrial Policy – 2017” 
to state that the ‘benefits of retaining investment have not been harnessed to the 
extent possible’. The concern could, however, be related to getting a greater 
proportion of the profits earned by foreign companies reinvested in India instead of 
being remitted abroad in the form of dividends.  It should, however, be noted that 
the reported profits may not adequately reflect the advantage derived by the foreign 
investors as there are many avenues for transferring profits, especially for unlisted 
companies which far outnumber the listed ones. 
The policymakers should take a hard look at the takeovers particularly when the 
targets happen to be healthy companies and/or leaders in their respective 
segments/potential future winners. This is happening in multiple forms and the data 
system is not able to capture the phenomenon fully (Table-11).  
FDI is Neither an Unmixed Blessing, nor is it Homogeneous 
FDI is not an unmixed blessing as a number of adverse effects on host countries are 
identified with it.150 It is a misnomer that FDI invariably provides capital to Indian 
enterprises. FDI as it is being measured now can be categorised into three major 
types.151 First, in a liberalised policy environment, RFDI which is associated with 
capital and the expected attributes of technology, management skills, etc., would have 
little interest to finance domestic entrepreneurs or to transfer advanced technologies 
to them unless they are bound in some subordinate relationship. It will indeed be 
naïve to expect RFDI, especially the market seeking type, to facilitate the emergence 
of local competitors.152 Far from that, it will be inclined to not only displace existing 
entrepreneurs but also to inhibit the emergence of newer ones. In the process, 
national champions, lead firms and start-ups nurtured though various types of 
incentives by developing countries like India could end up as constituents of global 
corporations.  The investors can also be differentiated according to their motives: 
natural resource seeking, efficiency seeking, market seeking and strategic asset seeking. 
The remaining two types of investors can bring in capital but would more often 
than not have very little to contribute in terms of technology. Foreign financial 
investors, the second main type of FDI, would play the financing role. But, the 
downside risks are large capital outflows and loss of control over domestic enterprises 
when RFDI investors provide the exit route to them. The third main form of FDI, 
i.e. inflows on account of domestic entrepreneurs could be return of flight capital 
and/or disguised portfolio investment/borrowings. Such financing could, however, 
                                                                 
150 While it is difficult to generalise the impact of FDI on host country’s development, the negative 
effects generally associated with it are: balance-of-payments problems, crowding out, transfer pricing, 
abuse of market power, labour issues and environmental effects. See: United Nations, The Development 
Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives, New Yok and Geneva, 2003. 
151 Though some overlapping exists (e.g., Corporate Venture Capital arms belonging to companies like Google, 
Qualcomm, Intel and Johnson and Johnson), it  seems to be quite small at present  in India‘s case. 
152 According to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, multinational enterprises “internalise” their firm-specific 
“ownership advantages” through FDI. This is the key element, which explains FDI. 
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be obtained through FIIs, GDRs, ECBs and borrowings from local banks. Only a 
detailed micro-level analysis can help assess the nature of the FDI flows and their 
contribution to national economic development.  Obviously, seen in this context, 
India’s official approach regarding expectations from FDI and its analysis appears to 
be too simplistic (and even misleading). 
Relevant Data on Inflows and Investees’ Operations is Essential 
The problems noted above leave one deeply concerned about the state of India’s FDI 
data and its analysis. These are a legacy of the past, which placed premium on the 
quantum of FDI. The RBI did express concern about the implications of the delayed 
reporting for the BoP data. But, this is only one facet of the problem. It is doubtful 
whether the RBI is aware of the full import of the delays and other anomalies which 
render the data unsuitable for a proper understanding of the trends and characteristics 
of the inflows. Its explanation for the increase in inflows during 2016-17 bears 
testimony to its absence. Obviously, the Indian policymakers are not getting the right 
type of inputs. They should, therefore, refrain from giving undue importance to the 
uninformed interpretation of the ‘record’ FDI inflows even if it comes from highly 
reputed quarters. Such analysts necessarily depend upon the national sources for basic 
information with all its deficiencies. On the other hand, there are many nuances to 
the data on global FDI flows because of which they cannot be taken at their face 
value. Hence, the suggestion that ‘more FDI is coming into India than China’ cannot 
be taken as an informed compliment. In fact, statements which do not distinguish 
between different types of FDI should be best ignored.  
Keeping the nuances of FDI in context, there is a need to put together more 
relevant data on FDI and its related transactions. One should know the character of 
foreign investors which has direct implications for technology transfer, participation 
in global value chains, impact on BoP, stability of investment, etc. For instance, even 
the RBI underlined that while the increased FDI inflows of the past few years 
provided a cushion against CAD, the income payments on account of the larger 
volume of FDI may in turn put adverse pressure on CAD in future. It is, however, 
silent on other forms of payments some of which are avoidable and others which 
emanate from the very nature of the foreign investors. 
A good deal of information collected by RBI through various returns is either not 
analysed or is not reported by it, possibly even to the government (Table-32). Many 
of the problems (delays, duplicates, incorrect entries, notional entries, conversions, 
issue of shares against imports, nature of investors, ultimate home country, purpose 
of investment and industry classification) can be and should be addressed by the RBI. 
One hopes that to begin with the RBI will take advantage of the mandatory online 
filing of returns and release far more useful information and analysis than that is 
available at present as also improve the utility of annual studies of finances of FDI 
companies and the FATS. It should also be explored how step-down subsidiaries and 
those in which the ultimate foreign investors hold majority even while each of the 
individual shareholders own only minority shares. The government may like to 
introduce a one-time amnesty scheme for non-declaration and, on its part, the RBI 
may regenerate the inflows/outflows data with enhanced information content, at least 
for the past five years. Further reporting of inflows could follow in that pattern. When 
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even the USA finds it necessary to monitor the operations of its inward as well as 
outward FDI investors, can India afford to undermine their importance?153 If RBI, 
MCA, CSO, DIPP and the DGCI&S work together, a wealth of information can be 
generated on both foreign and domestic investors.154  
Strengthening Internal Systems is Imperative  
India should strengthen its own institutions. Capabilities thus developed within the 
government will also enable it to assess the advice received from different quarters. If 
a small fraction of what is spent on investment promotion meets, publicity, running 
joint websites with industry bodies and the consultancy fee paid out155 is utilised in 
strengthening data collection, organisation and analysis, coupled with better inter-
organisational coordination, the policymakers would be better informed in their 
efforts to harness the potential of FDI. It will also help India to put its case effectively 
in international fora. The practice of engaging almost the same set of private 
consultants as knowledge partners by the government, industry bodies and individual 
large  companies for analysis and advice is another matter for concern. The 
deficiencies, some of which are quite serious, noticed in the brochures prepared by 
the Knowledge Partner on the achievements in different sectors under the MII, are 
quite harmless in comparison to the serious risk of conflict of interest.  
Further, there is no apparent justification for treating a lot of information that is 
collected as confidential because the same can be obtained from the MCA by paying 
a nominal fee.156 There is no point in collecting information if it is not analysed and 
applied in public policymaking. The government could engage the vast number of 
researchers in public-funded universities and research centres and provide them easy 
and regular access to required information. Many studies conducted in universities 
and institutions could be thus made more policy relevant instead of remaining mere 
academic exercises for obtaining degrees and for career promotion. More time can be 
devoted to analysing data instead of wasting it on ‘data collection’. The Corporate 
Data Management scheme announced by the MCA is a welcome development. The 
Ministry could organise interactions with the user community to improve disclosures 
and to realize the scheme’s objectives better. The official bodies could also devise 
schemes like the special sworn employee programme of the US Bureau of Economic 
                                                                 
153 Regarding the collection of statistics on Activities on Multinational Enterprises, it was indeed emphasised 
that the statistics “which include sales, employment, value added, capital expenditures, and balance 
sheets, are critical for understanding the role played by multinational enterprises in an increasingly 
integrated global economy”. See: United States, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International 
Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods, updated June 6, 2014, p. 1-2.  Even though importance of such 
statistics should be obvious for a developing country like India, reference to the US official source 
had to be made here to impress upon the Indian authorities regarding their relevance. 
154 The need for such a coordination was underlined in an earlier study at the ISID. See: “Impact of FDI 
on Select Sectors of India—A Comparative Study with Select Countries”, project report submitted to 
the Office of the Economic Adviser, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, 2007.  
155  Till 2016-17, the expenditure on Make in India initiative was about Rs. 500 crore. The combined 
revised and budgeted amounts for 2017-18 and 2018-19 work out to Rs. 450 crore.  
156  It is relevant to note that with the change in reporting norms, getting information on transactions in 
foreign exchange by individual companies is going to be difficult as it will also affect RBI’s company 
finance studies. This fact should receive the urgent attention of the authorities. 
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Analysis, beyond the limited efforts that are being made already. Researchers would 
be in a better position to analyse the data as, unlike the official bodies, they do not 
need to go by legal and technical provisions strictly. The feedback mechanism could 
indeed help improve those provisions. On their part, having been exposed to the real 
world better, the researchers could be made to revisit the received wisdom. In sum, 
besides “Ease of Doing Business” let there be emphasis on “Ease of Doing Policy 
Relevant Analysis” also.  
This study has brought out some serious limitations afflicting the aggregate FDI 
figures. It is, therefore, imperative that along with a review of the FDI policy, which 
was proposed by the official Discussion Paper, the reporting mechanism also is 
reviewed to make the data on inflows facilitate drawing of meaningful inferences and 
to provide guidance to policymakers and other national and international analysts. 
One should be able to view the inflows inter alia by the types of investors, modes and 
time of entry as also minimise errors. In parallel, operational aspects of FDI should 
be analysed at more levels and details than at present. The review should also cover 
the impact of FDI on domestic enterprises.157 
 
                                                                 
157 Going by the UNCTAD data, except in 2008, FDI inflows as a percentage of capital formation did 
not exceed 10 per cent for India. Even otherwise, the role of local enterprises has been stressed by 
many.  See for instance, Sanjaya Lall and Rajneesh Narula, “Foreign Direct Investment and its Role in 
Economic Development: Do We Need a New Agenda?”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 
16, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 447–464.  
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Annexure-A 
Major Modifications/Announcements Regarding India’s FDI Policy since August 2014 
 
1. Defence Industries 
Aug 2014: While raising the general cap to 49 per cent, it was stated that the combined share of FII, FPI, 
NRI, FVCI and QFI investment cannot exceed 24 per cent (portfolio investors). However, the 
portfolio investment was allowed though the automatic route. 
Nov 2015: The sub-limit of 24 per cent for portfolio investments within the 49 per cent foreign investment 
in defence industries was removed.  
  An important addition was that the“[I]nvestee company should be structured to be self-
sufficient in areas of product design and development. The Investee/joint venture company 
along with manufacturing facility, should also have maintenance and life cycle support facility 
of the product being manufactured in India”. 
Jun 2016:  The cap on FDI was completely removed. Investments up to 49 per cent can avail the automatic 
route. Govt. can permit shares beyond 49 per cent wherever it is likely to result in access to 
‘modern technology or for other reasons’.  
2. Railway Infrastructure:  
Aug 2014:  FDI policy for railway infrastructure was relaxed -- construction, operation and maintenance of 
high speed trains, freight and passenger terminals and rolling stock, including train sets, and 
locomotives/coaches: 100 per cent FDI through the automatic route. 
3. Construction Development 
Dec 2014:  Relaxed the policy applicable to the sector. 
  Development of serviced plots: minimum land area of 10 hectares removed. 
  Construction-development projects: minimum floor area 20,000 sq. mts. Earlier, minimum 
built-up area 50,000 sq. mts.  
  Minimum inflow $5 mn. (earlier $10 mn.) for wholly-owned subsidiaries and $5 mn. for joint 
ventures. 
  Investor will be permitted to exit on completion of the project or after development of trunk 
infrastructure. The government may permit repatriation of FDI or transfer of stake from one 
non-resident investor to another before completion of the project. Earlier there was a lock-in 
of 3 three years, with provision to exit with prior government approval. 
Nov 2015:  Construction Development: Minimum floor area and investment requirements were removed.  
  Transfer of stake from one non-resident investor to another would neither be subject to lock-
in period requirement nor would specific government approval be needed. 
4. Civil Aviation, Ground Handling and Satellites 
Nov 2015: The limit of 74 per cent was abolished for non-scheduled air transport service. 
  Ground Handling Services: 74 per cent cap and the requirement of approval for FDI beyond 
49 per cent was removed. 
  Satellites establishment and operation: 100 per cent through approval route. Earlier the limit 
was 74 per cent. 
Jun 2016:  Scheduled/Regional Air Transport Service: FDI limit was raised from 49 per cent to 100 per 
cent (automatic up to 49 per cent and approval route beyond 49 per cent).  
  Existing airport projects, 100 per cent automatic. Earlier automatic up to 74 per cent and 
approval route beyond 74 per cent. 
Jan 2018:  Foreign investment was permitted in Air India Ltd. 
5. Trading  
Nov 2015: 30 per cent sourcing norm could be relaxed in case of Single Brand Retail Trading for trading 
of products having ‘state-of-art’ and ‘cutting-edge’ technology and where local sourcing is not 
possible. 
  Unlike earlier, SBRT FDI companies can undertake retail trading through e-commerce also. 
  New provision permitting 100 per cent FDI in Duty Free Shops through automatic route 
introduced. 
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Mar 2016:  Share of a single vendor cannot exceed 25 per cent of the sales effected though marketplace-
based e-commerce entity. Influencing of sale prices was prohibited. 
Jun 2016:  Sourcing norms will not be applicable up to three years from commencement of the business 
for undertaking SBRT of products having state-of-art and ‘cutting-edge’ technology and where 
local sourcing is not possible. 
  100 per cent FDI under approval route is allowed for trading, including through e-commerce, 
in respect of food products manufactured and/or produced in India. 
Jan 2018: 100 per cent FDI allowed in SBRT through the automatic route. 
6. Pharmaceuticals 
Jun 2016:  Limit for automatic approval in case of brownfield investment was raised from 49 per cent to 74 
per cent. 
7. Medical Devices 
Jan 2015: Carving out of medical devices and freeing it from the requirement of government approval in 
case of brownfield investments. 
8. Broadcasting Sector 
Nov 2015: FDI limits applicable to the sector were relaxed substantially. For Teleports, DTH, Cable 
Networks, Mobile TV and Head-in-the Sky Broadcasting Service, the cap of 74 per cent 
removed: up to 49 per cent FDI through automatic route and beyond 74 per cent through 
approval route. For Cable Networks the limit was raised from 49 per cent to 100 per cent: 
automatic up to 49 per cent and approval route beyond 49 per cent. 
  For FM the limit was raised from 26 per cent to 49 per cent; up-linking of News & Current Affairs 
channels: 26 per cent to 49 per cent. Up-linking of Non-‘News & Current Affairs’ channels (limit 
already 100 per cent) the requirement for government approval was done away with. 
Jun 2016:  Teleports, DTH, Cable Networks, Mobile TV, Head-in-the Sky Broadcasting Service, Cable 
Networks: 100 per cent FDI through the automatic route (earlier up to 49 per cent through 
automatic route and approval route beyond 49 per cent). 
9. Insurance, Pension Sector and other Financial Services 
Mar 2015: FDI limit was raised from 26 per cent to 49 per cent: automatic up to 26 per cent and approval 
route for foreign share exceeding 26 per cent. Limit is composite for FDI, FPI (FII/QFI), NRI, 
FVCI and Depository Receipts. 
Apr 2015: Pension sector opened to FDI. Applicable conditions same as for insurance. 
Mar 2016: Foreign investment allowed in the insurance and pension sectors through the automatic route 
up to 49 per cent. 
Oct 2016:  100 per cent FDI was allowed through the automatic route in ‘other financial services’, which 
are regulated by the respective regulators. 
10. ATMs 
Oct 2015: FDI up to 100 per cent was allowed in White Label ATMs (WLAs) through the automatic route. 
Non-bank entity intending to set up WLAs must have a minimum net worth of Rs. 100 crore. 
11. Asset Reconstruction Companies 
May 2016:  100 per cent FDI was allowed through the automatic route. 
12. Credit Information Companies  
Nov 2015:  The 74 per cent cap on FDI was removed. 
13. Stock Exchanges 
Jul 2016:  Cabinet accords approval for raising the limit of FDI in Stock Exchanges from 5 per cent to 15 
per cent. 
Feb 2017: FDI up to 49 per cent in infrastructure companies in Securities Markets, namely stock 
exchanges, commodity exchanges, depositories and clearing corporations, in compliance with 
SEBI Regulations. 
14. Plantations 
Nov 2015: 100 per cent FDI through Automatic Route was allowed in Tea, Coffee, Rubber, Cardamom, 
Palm Oil tree and Olive Oil tree plantations. Earlier 100 per cent FDI had been allowed in Tea 
plantations though the approval route. 
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15. Animal Husbandry 
Jun 2016: The requirement of ‘under controlled conditions’ was removed. 
16. Private Security Agencies 
Jun 2016:  FDI Limit was raised from 49 per cent to 74 per cent -- approval route for FDI between 49 per 
cent and 74 per cent; earlier up to 49 per cent under approval route. 
17. Definition 
Jun 2015:  Definition of NRI was expanded to include ‘Overseas Citizen of India’ in addition to ‘Persons 
of Indian Origin’ cardholders. Further, NRI investments “will be deemed to be domestic 
investment at par with the investments by residents”. 
18. CPSEs 
Feb 2016:  Budget Speech:  
(i) The existing 24 per cent limit for investment by FPIs in Central Public Sector Enterprises, 
other than Banks, listed in stock exchanges, will be increased to 49 per cent. 
(ii) To ensure effective implementation of Bilateral Investment Treaties signed by India with 
other countries, it is proposed to introduce a Centre State Investment Agreement. This will 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations of the State Governments under these Treaties. 
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Annexure-B 
A Distribution of the Reported Inflows  
According to the Make in India Thrust Sectors in Two Periods 
  Sector Reported Inflow ($ mn.) 
2012 & 
2013 
Oct. 2014 to 
Mar 2017 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A Make in India 27,773.09 59,687.28 
 1 Energy 3,150.63 4,285.89 
  Power 1,289.96 2,279.16 
  Non-Conventional Energy 1,565.34 1,799.57 
  Others (Fuels) 295.33 207.16 
 2 Manufacturing 12,614.84 19,021.18 
  Automobile Industry 2,721.75 5,827.20 
  Chemicals (Other Than Fertilizers) 951.13 3,211.86 
  Electrical Equipment 479.22 2,847.20 
  Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 2,428.44 2,018.18 
  Food Processing Industries 3,908.28 1,466.32 
  Textiles (Including Dyed, Printed) 303.37 976.37 
  Medical and Surgical Appliances 227.87 705.27 
  Fermentation Industries 891.00 431.22 
  Electronics 152.21 316.26 
  Vegetable Oils and Vanaspati 126.03 254.53 
  Computer Hardware 1.51 246.33 
  Fertilizers 63.21 200.90 
  Railway Related Components 187.41 169.55 
  Sugar 13.87 148.54 
  Commercial, Office & Household Equipment 51.20 55.92 
  Aircraft Manufacturing 16.38 48.13 
  Leather, Leather Goods and Pickers 54.67 37.43 
  Ship Building 2.51 24.15 
  Oil Refinery 33.05 21.62 
  Dye-Stuffs 0.50 14.02 
  Defence Industries 1.23 0.18 
 3 Services 12,007.62 36,380.21 
  Computer Software Industry 1,169.04 11,153.72 
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  Telecommunications 394.19 7,317.94 
  Construction (Infrastructure) Activities 572.37 7,119.41 
  Information & Broadcasting (Including Print Media) 1,134.15 2,731.30 
  Hotel & Tourism 3,714.49 2,611.12 
  Hospital & Diagnostic Centres 1,053.75 1,844.51 
  Shipping 104.83 1,339.58 
  Mining Services/Mining 71.15 803.96 
  Outsourcing 66.06 464.91 
  Air Freight 40.76 424.21 
  Construction Development: Townships, Housing, Built-Up  
Infrastructure, etc.  
3,594.29 418.97 
  Oil Exploration 2.21 112.71 
  Others (Software) 88.11 30.87 
  Airports 1.30 5.08 
  Ports 0.00 1.91 
  Transportation ( Oil Refinery)   0.01 
  Ground Handling 0.92   
B  Others 17,053.81 40,205.11 
 1 Primary 230.32 191.61 
  Agriculture Services 230.32 191.61 
 2 Manufacturing 7,653.61 11,531.49 
  Cement and Gypsum Products 350.62 2,254.93 
  Metallurgical Industries 2,056.69 2,059.13 
  Miscellaneous Industries 746.01 1,523.20 
  Industrial Machinery 1,066.86 1,276.48 
  Rubber Goods 966.76 723.24 
  Miscellaneous Mechanical & Engineering Industries 414.65 669.32 
  Prime Mover (Other than Electrical Generators) 422.65 582.73 
  Diamond, Gold Ornaments 98.84 442.55 
  Paper and Pulp (Including Paper Products) 127.17 394.91 
  Soaps, Cosmetics & Toilet Preparations 303.04 370.90 
  Printing of Books (Including Litho Printing Industry) 127.69 214.08 
  Earth-Moving Machinery 24.25 166.96 
  Machine Tools 241.54 162.17 
  Boilers and Steam Generating Plants 20.40 131.81 
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  Glass 265.91 117.16 
  Glue and Gelatin 0.28 95.99 
  Ceramics 129.99 93.55 
  Scientific Instruments 85.51 84.48 
  Agricultural Machinery 137.84 83.40 
  Timber Products 53.27 71.28 
  Industrial Instruments 1.11 9.07 
  Tea and Coffee (incl. processing & warehousing Coffee & 
Rubber) 
5.64 4.15 
  Mathematical, Surveying and Drawing Instruments 6.71   
  Coir 0.18   
 3 Services 9,169.88 28,482.01 
  Trading 1,375.88 7,937.13 
  Non-Financial Services/Business Services 3,631.11 5,549.00 
  Financial 1,581.28 5,540.94 
  Insurance 568.55 4,734.51 
  Banking Services 353.30 1,193.23 
  Consultancy Services 341.86 936.70 
  Retail Trading   829.40 
  Other Services 597.30 737.36 
  Education 449.46 452.17 
  Research & Development (R&D) 56.55 376.34 
  Courier 88.85 127.09 
  Technical Testing And Analysis 111.01 68.14 
  Commodity Exchange 9.27   
  Retail Trading (Single Brand) 5.46   
  Grand Total (A + B) 44,826.90 99,892.39 
Source: Based on the sectoral distribution of inflows reported in the SIA Newsletter. 
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Annexure-C 
Illustrative List of Inflows Reflecting the Gap between Reporting of Inflows  
and Allotment of Shares 
SN. Name of the Co/Foreign Investor Month of 
Reporting
Allotment of Shares Inflow (Rs. 
mn.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AAM India Mfg.  
1 AAM International Holdings Inc. Nov-14 10-Mar-14 586.50 
 Acebright India Pharma Pvt Ltd 
2 Couplet Ltd Dec-14 20-May-14 360.72 
Adamas Builders Pvt Ltd  
3 Green World Developments Ltd Feb-15 28-Mar-12 1,150.00 
4 Golden Bella Holdings Ltd Feb-15 Rs. 600 mn. on 15-
04-2014 
1,000.00 
Alexis Multi Speciality Hospital Pvt Ltd  
5 Alexis Healthcare Holding Ltd Mar-16 03-Apr-12 30.87 
6 Alexis Healthcare Holding Ltd Mar-16 26-Nov-12 174.97 
7 Alexis Healthcare Holding Ltd Mar-16 25-Nov-13 171.18 
Alpha-Pharma Healthcare India Pvt Ltd  
8 Alpha-Pharma Group Ltd Feb-15 05-Jun-13 18.13 
9 Alpha-Pharma Group Ltd Feb-15 01-Aug-13 36.15 
10 Alpha-Pharma Group Ltd Feb-15 23-Sep-13 23.52 
11 Alpha-Pharma Group Ltd Feb-15 14-Nov-13 82.28 
12 Alpha-Pharma Group Ltd Feb-15 30-May-14 42.00 
Amazon Seller Services Pvt Ltd  
13 Amazon Asia Pacific Resources Pte Ltd Apr-15 24-Mar-14 3,224.58 
14 Amazon Eurasia Holdings Sarl Apr-15 24-Mar-14 0.05 
15 Amazon Asia Pacific Resources Pte Ltd Apr-15 9-Dec-13 1,116.98 
16 Amazon Asia Pacific Resources Pte Ltd Apr-15 24-Mar-14 3,224.58 
ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd 
17 Matrix Partners India Investment Holding Oct-14 12-Nov-13 365.34 
18 Steadview Capital Mauritius Ltd Oct-14 09-Jul-14 9.55 
19 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Oct-14 09-Jul-14 6.88 
20 LTR Focus Fund Oct-14 09-Jul-14 5.77 
21 Tiger Global Six India II Holdings Oct-14 09-Jul-14 22.20 
22 Sequoia Capital India Investments IV Oct-14 24-Jul-14 277.50 
Apache SEZ Development India Ltd  
23 Apache Investment Holding Pte Ltd Dec-15 31-08-2014 (date 
approved: 15-Feb- 
2014) 
62.01 
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24 Apache Investment Holding Pte Ltd Dec-15 04-Apr-13 19.24 
Archroma India Pvt Ltd  
25 SK Spice Sarl – Pe Mar-15 FCDs already held 
on March 31 2014 
1,692.53 
26 Archroma Textiles Sarl Mar-15 21-Mar-14 304.92 
27 Archroma Textiles Sarl Mar-15 21-Mar-14 126.27 
28 Archroma Paper Sarl Mar-15 21-Mar-14 3.08 
29 Archroma Paper Sarl Mar-15 21-Mar-14 1.28 
Arkray Healthcare Pvt Ltd  
30 Arkray Global Business Inc Jun-15 26-Feb-14 557.97 
Arksun Systems Solutions Pvt Ltd  
31 AIRI Consulting SA Sep-14 12-Jul-14 293.96 
Ashok Leyland John Deere Construction Equipment Pvt Ltd  
32 John Deere Asia (Singapore) Pte Ltd Mar-16 07-Feb-12 100.00 
33 John Deere Asia (Singapore) Pte Ltd Dec-15 29-Nov-12 100.00 
34 John Deere Asia (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 16-Jul-14 50.00 
Baxter India Pvt Ltd  
35 Baxter Pacific Investments Pte Ltd Feb-15 17-Feb-14 1,604.47 
   Issued against conversion of ECBs of earlier years. 
Big India Malls Pvt Ltd  
36 Big Global Enterprises Sep-15 most likely to have 
been issued on 06-
12-2011 
325.06 
37 LBREP II Big India Mauritius Holdings Feb-15 06-Dec-11 141.62 
Bridgestone (India) Pvt Ltd 
38 Bridgestone Asia Pacific Pte Ltd Sep-16 28-Nov-14 1,243.00 
Caparo Engineering India Pvt Ltd  
39 Blue Elephant Finance Ltd Sep-15 17-Jan-12 250.55 
Capital First Ltd  
40 Cleverdale Investment Ltd Dec-16 18-Mar-14 1,285.33 
41 Cleverdale Investment Ltd Dec-16 28-Sep-12 500.00 
42 Cleverdale Investment Ltd Sep-16 28-Sep-12 500.00 
Cargill India Pvt Ltd  
43 Cargill Mauritius Ltd Oct-14 12-Aug-14 3,598.13 
Carlsberg India Pvt Ltd  
44 South Asian breweries Pte Ltd Oct-14 25-Aug-14 802.87 
Carrefour WC &C India Pvt Ltd  
45 Carrefour Nederlands BV Sep-14 16-Dec-13 1,520.00 
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46 Carrefour Nederlands BV Oct-14 16-Dec-13 712.50 
47 Carrefour Nederlands BV Oct-14 16-Dec-13 712.50 
48 Intercross Roads BV Sep-14 16-Dec-13 80.00 
49 Intercross Roads BV Oct-14 16-Dec-13 37.50 
50 Intercross Roads BV Oct-14 16-Dec-13 37.50 
Celio Future Fashion Ltd  
51 Celio International S A Mar-16 20-Nov-09 35.10 
52 Celio International S A Mar-16 27-Dec-11 50.00 
53 Celio International S A Mar-16 28-Jan-13 49.00 
54 Celio International S A Mar-16 13-Jan-14 234.00 
CGI Information Systems & Management  
55 CGI Technologies & Solutions Inc Dec-14 22-Nov-13 1,695.00 
Chiripal Industries Ltd  
56 Orange Mauritius Investment Ltd Apr-15 13-Jan-12 430.84 
Chiripal Poly Films Ltd  
57 Opullance Investments Ltd. Mar-16 30-Mar-13 166.64 
58 Dessert Diamond General Trading Mar-16 16-Jul-10 12.98 
Continental Automotive Brake Systems India  
59 Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands Oct-14 25-Jun-12 275.60 
60 Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands Oct-14 31-Aug-12 69.48 
61 Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands Oct-14 11-Nov-13 80.88 
62 Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands Oct-14 25-Jun-14 81.00 
63 Continental Automotive Holding Netherlands Jan-15 12-Aug-14 350.00 
Continental India Ltd  
64 Continental Global Holding Netherlands Dec-14 31-Jul-14 2,860.90 
Corning Technologies India Pvt Ltd  
65 Corning (Singapore) Holding Co Sep-14 15-Jul-14 3,077.91 
66 Corning Finance Bv Sep-14 15-Jul-14 31.09 
Coslight India Telecom Pvt Ltd  
67 I- Coslight Hong Kong Ltd Nov-14 21-Feb-14 52.87 
68 Harbin Coslight Storage Battery Co Ltd Jan-15 28-Mar-14 53.81 
69 Harbin Coslight Storage Battery Co Ltd Jan-15 29-May-14 83.28 
Cosma International India Pvt Ltd  
70 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Sep-15 11-Sep-13 864.42 
71 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Apr-15 24-Feb-14 751.44 
Daikin Airconditioning India Pvt Ltd  
72 Daikin Industries Ltd Dec-14 18-Dec-13 3,300.00 
Daimler Financial Services India Pvt Ltd  
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73 Daimler Ag Dec-14 16-Jun-11 2,900.00 
74 Daimler Ag Dec-14 11-Jul-11 925.00 
75 Daimler Ag Dec-14 08-Mar-12 1,164.70 
76 Daimler Ag Dec-14 29-Nov-13 1,275.00 
Daimler India Commercial Vehicles Pvt Ltd  
77 Daimler Ag Oct-14 31-Mar-14 9,338.87 
Demag Cranes And Components India Pvt Ltd  
78 Terex Singapore Pte Ltd Mar-16 19-Mar-14 501.60 
Dresser Rand India Pvt Ltd  
79 Dresser Rand Co Mar-16 # 487.65 
  # No evidence of fresh issue of shares/ debentures since 2007 except 1 share being issued for Rs. 78 
on September 21, 2010.  
E Land Fashion India Pvt Ltd  
80 E-Land Asia Holdings Pte Ltd Jan-15 27-Dec-13 795.55 
Ecolab Food Safety & Hygiene Solutions Pvt Ltd  
81 Ecolab Luxembourg 7 Sarl Dec-14 21-May-14 1346.63 
Eicher Polaris Pvt Ltd  
82 Polaris Industries Inc Mar-15 20-Dec-12 55.00 
83 Polaris Industries Inc Mar-15 17-Jul-13 200.00 
84 Polaris Industries Inc Mar-15 03-Feb-14 300.00 
85 Polaris Industries Inc Feb-15 08-May-14 250.00 
Emerson Process Management (I) Pvt Ltd 
86 Rutherfurd Acquisitions Limited Sep-16 01-Oct-13 21,323.76 
Fiat Group Automobiles India Pvt Ltd  
87 Fiat Group Automobiles Spa Oct-14 18-Nov-13 289.00 
88 Fiat Group Automobiles Spa Oct-14 12-Feb-14 500.00 
89 Fiat Group Automobiles Spa Oct-14 27-Aug-14 1,950.00 
Ferrero India Pvt Ltd  
90 Ferrero Spa Jun-15 24-Oct-13 959.74 
91 Simest S.P.A Jun-15 24-Oct-13 165.57 
92 Magic Production Group S.A Jun-15 24-Oct-13 66.30 
Fiat India Automobiles Ltd  
93 Fiat Group Automobiles S.P.A Mar-16 27-Jun-13 3,250.00 
Foundation Brake Manufacturing Ltd  
94 Chasis Brakes Intl BV Dec-16 10-Jun-14 1,160.00 
95 Chasis Brakes Intl BV Sep-16 19-Nov-13 210.00 
Fresenius Kabi India Ltd  
96 Fresenius Kabi AG Oct-14 29-Mar-14 300.00 
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GE India Industrial Pvt Ltd  
97 GE Energy Europe BV Oct-14 25-Mar-13 1,893.32 
98 GE Pacific Pte Ltd Oct-14 25-Mar-13 306.68 
General Cable Energy India Pvt Ltd  
99 GCNZ India Cable Sep-15 14-Oct-13 81.45 
100 GCNZ India Cable 2 Ltd Sep-15 14-Oct-13 81.45 
101 General Cable Trading Sep-15 14-Oct-13 108.96 
102 General Cable Trading Oct-14 18-Jul-14 123.76 
General Motors India Pvt Ltd  
103 SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd Jan-15 18-Dec-12 7,368.54 
104 SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd Jan-15 16-Jan-14 5,062.31 
105 SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd Jan-15 16-Jan-14 2,165.05 
106 SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd Jan-15 28-Feb-14 1,858.70 
107 SAIC General Motors Investment Ltd Jan-15 30-Apr-14 1,814.48 
Geosansar Advisors Pvt Ltd  
108 Gaia Finance Ltd Mar-16 31-Mar-10 6.74 
109 Gaia Finance Ltd Mar-16 01-May-11 4.99 
110 Geosansar Mauritius Ltd Mar-16 03-Oct-11 33.67 
111 Gaia Finance Ltd Mar-16 30-Apr-12 44.99 
112 Gaia Finance Ltd Mar-16 21-Oct-12 49.88 
113 Geosansar Mauritius Ltd Mar-16 21-Oct-13 129.24 
114 Geosansar Mauritius Ltd Mar-16 06-Jun-14 67.17 
Getit Infoservices Pvt Ltd  
115 Astro Entertainment Networks Ltd Jun-16 10-Oct-13 450.00 
116 Astro Entertainment Networks Ltd Mar-16 04-Sep-14 573.24 
117 Astro Entertainment Networks Mar-16 13-Mar-14 1,875.68 
Global Textile Alliance India Pvt Ltd  
118 Oostrofil NV Belgium Oct-14 30-Jun-14 81.20 
GMR Infrastructure Ltd Mar-15 26-Mar-14 7,888.17 
119 Dunearn Investments (Mauritius) Pte Ltd   
Gokaldas Exports Ltd 
120 Blackstone FP Capital Partners Sep-16 20-Aug-07 4,735.84 
  Blackstone exited the company in July 2017. 
Grainger Industrial Supply India Pvt Ltd  
121 India Pacific Brands Mauritius Sep-16 16-Jan-08 86.02 
122 India Pacific Brands Mauritius Jan-15 18-Mar-13 480.15 
Henkel Adhesive Technologies India Pvt Ltd  
123 Henkel KGaA Sep-16 13-Nov-08 2,725.00 
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Hewlett Packard Financial Services India Pvt Ltd  
124 HPFS Venture Holdings Ltd Mar-16 28-Mar-14 935.33 
Highly Electrical Appliances India Pvt Ltd  
125 Shanghai Hitachi Elcectrical Appliances Oct-14 23-Jun-14 206.48 
Hi-Lex India Pvt Ltd  
126 Hi-Lex Corp (Ear: Nippon Cable Sy May-15 31-Mar-14 700.00 
Hitachi Hi Real Power Electricals Pvt Ltd 
127 Hitachi Ltd Mar-16 shares were 
transferred on 13-
06-2014 
2,032.23 
Ibibo Group Private Limited 
128 MIH India Ecommerce Pte Ltd May-15 29-Nov-13 370.74 
129 MIH India (Mauritius) Ltd May-15 02-Feb-13 741.94 
130 MIH India Ecommerce Pte Ltd May-15 21-Mar-14 683.51 
131 MIH India Ecommerce Pte Ltd Sep-15 02-May-14 332.91 
132 MIH India Ecommerce Pte Ltd May-15 06-Jun-14 324.63 
133 MIH India Ecommerce Pte Ltd Sep-15 25-Jul-14 360.69 
Ikea India Pvt Ltd  
134 Ingka Holding Overseas BV Sep-14  were already held 
at the end of March 
2014 
209.79 
Inbisco India Pvt Ltd  
135 Equidad International Pte Ltd Mar-15 20-Mar-13 216.40 
Insitel Services Pvt Ltd  
136 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 30-Oct-12 4,811.40 
137 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 30-Nov-12 2,640.24 
138 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 12-Dec-12 7,037.68 
139 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 20-Dec-12 4,430.46 
140 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 04-Jan-13 1,036.75 
141 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 23-Dec-13 2,032.94 
142 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 20-Mar-14 14,145.48 
143 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 27-Mar-14 1,326.38 
144 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 13-May-14 1,443.00 
145 SSA Fund (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 19-May-14 2,955.35 
Jamshedpur Continuous Annealing & Process  
146 Nippon Steel Corp Jun-15 17-Aug-12 2,180.34 
Jasper Infotech Pvt Ltd (Snapdeal)  
147 Ebay (Singapore) Services Pte Ltd May-15 30-Apr-13 259.97 
148 Nexus India May-15 30-Apr-13 259.97 
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149 Samma Capital II May-15 30-Apr-13 27.00 
150 Anand & Venky LLC May-15 30-Apr-13 13.50 
151 Kenneth Glass May-15 30-Apr-13 5.38 
152 The Entrust Group Inc May-15 30-Apr-13 5.38 
153 Hans Tung May-15 30-Apr-13 2.75 
154 Ebay (Singapore) Services Pte Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 5,517.89 
155 Kalaari Capital Partners-II LLC May-15 04-Mar-14 185.78 
156 Nexus India Direct Investment-II May-15 04-Mar-14 123.97 
157 Baccasnapdeal Mauritius Pvt Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 123.91 
158 Kalaari Capital Partners-II LLC May-15 04-Mar-14 123.91 
159 Saama Capital Us Advisors May-15 04-Mar-14 123.91 
160 Shali Mauritius Pvt Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 123.91 
161 Baccasnapdeal Mauritius Pvt Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 61.82 
162 Shali Mauritius Pvt Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 61.82 
163 Ebay (Singapore) Services Pte Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 28.74 
164 Anand & Venky LLC May-15 04-Mar-14 9.40 
165 Kenneth Glass May-15 04-Mar-14 6.01 
166 Saama Capital II Ltd May-15 04-Mar-14 6.01 
167 The Entrust Group Inc May-15 04-Mar-14 5.92 
168 Nexus Opportunity Fund Ltd May-15 29-Apr-14 929.68 
169 Dunearn Investments (Mauritius) Pte Ltd May-15 13-May-14 1,859.81 
170 Myriad Opportunities Master Fund Ltd May-15 13-May-14 1,332.96 
171 Tybourne Equity Master Fund May-15 13-May-14 929.91 
172 Pan Asia Opportunities Master Fund Ltd May-15 13-May-14 390.38 
173 Blackrock International Opportunities P May-15 13-May-14 316.45 
174 Blackrock International Growth And Income May-15 13-May-14 168.15 
175 Emerging Markets Alpha Master Fund Limit May-15 13-May-14 158.55 
176 Blackrock Global Opportunities Equity Tr May-15 13-May-14 112.38 
177 Blackrock Science & Technology Opportuni May-15 13-May-14 60.42 
178 Optimum International Fund May-15 13-May-14 59.99 
179 Blackrock Global Opportunities Portfolio May-15 13-May-14 34.22 
Jet Airways Ltd 
180 Etihad Airways Mar-16 24-Apr-13 20,576.65 
Jet Privilege Private Ltd  
181 Etihad Airways Mar-16 Investment 
agreement signed in 
Nov 2013 to issue 
54,997 shares 
aggregating to $150  
9,169.65 
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mn. The shares were 
issued on March 24 
2014 - Rs. 8,539.82 
mn 
Jubilant Generics Ltd 
182 Jubilant Pharma Ltd., Singapore May-15 02-Jul-14 4,241.00 
183 Jubilant Pharma Ltd., Singapore Jun-16 28-May-14 4,117.40 
Kobelco Cranes India Pvt Ltd  
184 Kobelco Cranes Co Ltd Oct-14 22-Aug-14 223.57 
Komatsu India Ltd  
185 Komatsu Asia & Pacific Pvt Ltd Sep-16 11-Dec-08 1,500.00 
186 Komatsu Asia & Pacific Pvt Ltd Sep-16 26-Feb-10 2,400.00 
187 Komatsu Asia & Pacific Pvt Ltd Sep-16 07-Jun-13 2,700.00 
Lanxess (India) Pvt Ltd 
188 Lanxess Deutschland Gmbh Sep-16 18-Jul-12 2,063.10 
Liebherr Cmctech India Pvt Ltd  
189 Liebherr Cmctec Gmbh Apr-15 06-Oct-09 230.06 
190 Liebherr Cmctec Gmbh Apr-15 25-Jan-11 246.40 
191 Liebherr Cmctec Gmbh Apr-15 01-Aug-11 463.11 
Magna Closures Automotive Pvt Ltd  
192 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Jan-15 04-Jan-13 193.23 
193 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Mar-16 28-Oct-13 83.18 
194 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Feb-15 20-Jan-14 134.52 
195 Magna Cyprus Holding Ltd Mar-16 07-Mar-14 16.11 
Matix Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd  
196 Essar Capital Holding Ltd Oct-14 14-Dec-10 501.78 
197 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 09-Feb-11 1,114.56 
198 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 31-Mar-11 1,126.70 
199 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 30-Aug-11 1,517.17 
200 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 09-Jan-13 1,511.73 
201 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 10-Apr-13 663.29 
202 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 14-Jun-13 833.57 
203 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 20-Aug-13 829.36 
204 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 16-Oct-13 300.15 
205 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 28-Nov-13 745.72 
206 Matix Fertilisers Holdings Ltd Oct-14 01-Jul-14 389.82 
Mitsuba Sical India Ltd  
207 Mitsuba Corp Mar-15 13-Jul-12 714.00 
208 Mitsuba Corp Mar-15 22-Nov-13 817.83 
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209 Mitsuba Corp Mar-15 26-May-14 634.97 
Nipro Tube Glass Pvt Ltd  
210 Nipro Corp Jan-15 03-Aug-12 412.00 
211 Nipro Corp Jan-15 28-May-13 931.93 
212 Nipro Corp Jan-15 24-Jan-14 396.22 
Nivea India Pvt Ltd  
213 Beiersdorf AG Oct-14 25-Mar-14 379.17 
214 Phanex Handelsgesells Chaft Oct-14 25-Mar-14 3.83 
215 Beiersdorf AG Feb-15 06-Aug-14 1,002.38 
216 Phanex Handelsgesellschaft Mbh Feb-15 06-Aug-14 10.13 
Novateur Electrical And Digital Systems Pvt Ltd  
217 Legrand Nederland BV Mar-16 24-Sep-12 (Eq.) 677.15 
218 Legrand Nederland BV Mar-16 24-Sep-12 (Db.) 7,787.29 
NSK-ABC Bearings Pvt Ltd  
219 NSK Ltd Mar-16 04-Aug-09 440.00 
220 NSK Ltd Mar-16 22-Jul-10 450.00 
221 NSK Ltd Mar-16 28-Jul-11 820.00 
222 NSK Ltd Mar-16 12-Jan-12 1,590.00 
223 NSK Ltd Mar-16 07-Mar-13 1,200.00 
NSK India Sales Company Pvt Ltd  
224 NSK Ltd Sep-15 19-Mar-08 99.80 
225 NSK Ltd Sep-15 27-Dec-12 1900.00 
Nutricia International Pvt Ltd  
226 Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte Ltd May-15 10-Jun-12 53.20 
227 Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte Ltd Oct-14 22-Aug-14 425.00 
Omori India Pvt Ltd  
228 Omori Investments Co Ltd Dec-15 Bought 31,700 shares 
from existing 
shareholders on 
20/09/2013 
366.00 
Par Formulations Pvt Ltd  
229 Par Pharmaceutical Inc Dec-15 13-Aug-12 215.68 
Permian Investments Pvt Ltd  
230 Pill G Raja Jun-15 17-Mar-14 45.85 
231 Ravikumar P Vemuru Jun-15 17-Mar-14 18.43 
232 Shyleshganta Jun-15 17-Mar-14 9.35 
233 Swapna G Patel Jun-15 17-Mar-14 9.35 
234 Sai P Gundlapalli Jun-15 17-Mar-14 9.34 
235 Vikram N Patel Jun-15 17-Mar-14 9.34 
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236 Ashit Singh Jun-15 17-Mar-14 9.22 
237 Pillarisetty G Raja Jun-15 16-Aug-14 15.55 
238 Ravikumar P Vemuru Jun-15 16-Aug-14 7.50 
239 Sreehari Patibandla Jun-15 16-Aug-14 3.71 
240 Srinivas P Kadiyala Jun-15 16-Aug-14 3.71 
241 Sai P Gundlapalli Jun-15 16-Aug-14 3.70 
242 Trupti Patel Dec-15 16-Aug-14 3.58 
243 Shylesh Ganta Jun-15 16-Aug-14 3.10 
Piaggio Vehicles Pvt Ltd  
244 Piaggio & C. Spa Feb-15 30-Sep-13 639.97 
Posco Maharashtra Steels Ltd  
245 POSCO Sep-16 07-Jul-14 4,621.67 
246 POSCO Sep-16 03-Oct-13 1,521.80 
247 POSCO Sep-16 03-Feb-14 1,264.80 
Procter & Gamble Home Products Ltd  
248 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Sep-16 26-Sep-12 4,472.80 
249 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Dec-16 13-Oct-2011 3,600.00 
250 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Dec-16 11-May-2011 3,450.00 
251 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Sep-16 2-Feb-2012 2,900.00 
252 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Apr-15 9-Oct-2013 2,835.00 
253 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Sep-16 6-Dec-2012 2,795.50 
254 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Dec-16 Apr 2010-Mar 2011 2,700.00 
255 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Apr-15 31-Mar-2014 2,440.00 
256 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Apr-15 10-Jun-2013 2,360.00 
257 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Apr-15 29-Sep-2014 2,358.00 
258 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Sep-16 14-Mar-2013 2,160.00 
259 Procter & Gamble Overseas India BV Dec-16 07-Nov-12 1,677.30 
Quest Diagnostics India Pvt Ltd  
260 Quest Diagnostics Inc Sep-15 28-Jun-13 215.20 
Reid & Taylor India Ltd  
261 Indivest Pte Ltd Dec-16 FY 2008-09 6,900.04 
Rieter India Pvt Ltd  
262 Rieter Holding AG Jun-15 Rieter Holding AG 
acquired shares 
from existing 
shareholders on 
May 21 2014 
420.00 
Robert Bosch Automotive Steering Pvt Ltd 
263 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 26-May-10 22.20 
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 264 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 03-Feb-11 66.60 
 265 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 30-Jan-14 175.38 
 266 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 30-Oct-13 296.00 
 267 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 20-Aug-14 429.20 
 268 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 08-Feb-12 509.86 
 269 ZF Lenksysteme GMBH Dec-16 30-Jan-13 509.86 
Roquette Riddhi Siddhi Pvt Ltd  
270 Roquette Freres Sep-14 shares were 
transferred on 25 
june 2014 
1,850.00 
Samhi Hotels (Ahmedabad) Pvt Ltd  
271 Ray Ltd Sep-14 26-Nov-13 11.76 
272 Blue Chandra Pte Ltd Sep-14 26-Nov-13 881.94 
273 GTI Capital Alpha Pvt Ltd Sep-14 26-Nov-13 311.62 
Sacmi Engineering India Pvt Ltd  
274 Holding Partecipazioni Sacmi S P A Nov-14 02-Apr-13 160.96 
275 Holding Partecipazioni Sacmi S P A Nov-14 28-Jul-14 32.26 
SCA Hygiene Products India Pvt Ltd  
276 SCA Group Holdings BV Mar-15 17-Jul-13 436.00 
277 SCA Group Holdings BV Mar-15 16-Dec-13 395.00 
278 SCA Group Holdings BV Nov-14 30-Apr-14 500.00 
279 SCA Group Holdings BV Mar-15 14-Aug-14 200.00 
Scania Commercial Vehicles India Pvt Ltd  
280 Scania Cv Ab Dec-15 12-May-14 255.73 
Schott Glass India Pvt Ltd  
281 Schott Glaswerke Beteiligungs-Und Export Mar-16 28-Jun-13 350.00 
Seiren India Pvt Ltd  
282 Seiren Co Ltd Jun-15 15-Mar-13 1,250.00 
Serco BPO Pvt Ltd  
283 Serco International Sarl Dec-15 04-Nov-11 1,949.87 
Sharp Business Systems India Ltd  
284 Sharp Corp Jun-15 28-Sep-12 316.00 
285 Sharp Corp Jun-15 01-Feb-13 364.00 
Shell India Markets Pvt Ltd  
286 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 21-Mar-07 4,471.08 
287 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 24-Dec-09 478.46 
288 Shell India Ventures Pte Ltd Dec-15 12-Apr-10 4,136.40 
289 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 08-Sep-10 923.90 
290 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 17-Mar-11 678.60 
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291 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 17-Mar-11 89.99 
292 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 30-Aug-11 379.50 
293 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 23-Nov-11 5,145.00 
294 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 15-Mar-12 404.40 
295 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 15-Mar-12 247.80 
296 Shell Gas BV Dec-15 21-Jan-14 316.98 
Showa India Pvt Ltd  
297 Showa Corp Sep-15 25-Oct-06 388.22 
298 Showa Corp Sep-15 21-May-10 799.12 
299 Showa Corp Sep-15 27-Sep-12 1,752.00 
300 Showa Corp Sep-15 27-Sep-13 500.00 
Soma Tollways Pvt Ltd 
301 Airro (Mauritius) Holdings VI Jun-16 28-Jul-11 2,300.00 
302 Airro (Mauritius) Holdings VI Jun-16 28-Jun-12 3,300.00 
Summit Developments Pvt Ltd  
303 Onega Ltd Sep-15 14-Dec-11 128.41 
Syngenta India Ltd  
304 Syngenta Research Services Pte Ltd Dec-14 28-Aug-14 972.69 
Tata Bluescope Steel Ltd  
305 Bluescope Steel Asia Mar-16 15-May-12 300.00 
306 Bluescope Steel Asia Holdings Pty Ltd. Mar-16 28-Mar-13 750.00 
Techno Electronics Ltd  
307 Tusker Overseas Inc Mar-16 27-Feb-08 1,040.00 
 308 Videocon Mauritius Energy Ltd  Dec-16 27-Mar-14 4,500.75 
Telewings Communication Services Pvt Ltd  
309 Telenor South Asia Investment Pte Ltd Jan-15 11-Dec-13 9,785.07 
Thyssenkrupp Elevator India Pvt Ltd  
310 Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ag Mar-15 12-Mar-14 420.00 
Toyo Ink India Pvt Ltd  
311 Toyo Ink SC Holdings Ltd Jan-15 29-Nov-12 243.00 
TPG Wholesale Pvt Ltd  
312 TPG Asia Sfv Pte Ltd Sep-14 23-Apr-14 2170.00 
313 TPG VW Ltd Mar-16 31-Oct-12 415.32 
Unicharm India Pvt Ltd  
314 Unicharm Corp Apr-15 15-Dec-13 500.00 
315 Unicharm Corp Sep-14 16-Dec-13 1,200.00 
316 Unicharm Corp Sep-14 26-Feb-14 190.00 
Uttam Galva Metallics Ltd  
Contd… 
Annexures 
143 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
317 Liberty FE Trade DMCC May-15 05-Mar-12 121.99 
318 Sanjeev Gupta May-15 05-Mar-12 30.00 
319 Banyantree Crowth Capital LLC Mar-16 28-Sep-12 773.12 
320 Liberty Steel Holdings Pte Ltd Mar-16 28-Sep-12 562.09 
321 Liberty Steel Holdings Pte Ltd Apr-15 14-Jan-13 1,095.53 
322 UD Industrial Holding Pte. Ltd. Mar-16 03-Dec-13 478.75 
323 Deg Deutsche Investitions - Und Entwickl Dec-14 29-Mar-14 1,000.00 
324 UD Industrial Holding Pte Ltd Dec-14 29-Mar-14 155.59 
Valspar India Coatings Corp Pvt Ltd  
325 The Valspar (Singapore) Corp Pte Sep-15 04-Jun-12 600.00 
Valeo Lighting Systems India Pvt Ltd  
326 Valeo Bayen Apr-15 06-Aug-08 58.10 
327 Valeo Bayen Sep-15 18-Feb-10 206.15 
328 Equipment 11 Sep-15 18-Feb-10 10.85 
329 Valeo Bayen Apr-15 21-Jun-10 66.50 
330 Equipment 11 Apr-15 21-Jun-10 3.50 
331 Valeo Bayen Apr-15 07-Jan-13 700.00 
Vijay Television Pvt Ltd 
332 SVJ Holdings Ltd Mar-17 07-Jan-09 11,940.85 
WMI Konecranes India Ltd  
333 Konecranes Finance Corp Sep-15 25-Mar-14 1,079.63 
334 KCI Cranes Holding (Singapore) Pte Ltd Sep-15 25-Mar-14 170.38 
Wrigley India Pvt Ltd  
335 WM Wrigley Jr. Co Sep-15 28-Jun-12 110.13 
336 WM Wringley Jr Sep-14 30-Oct-12 189.14 
337 WM.Wrigley J R Co Nov-14 28-Mar-14 119.85 
Wuerth India Pvt Ltd  
338 Wuerth International Ag Mar-16 30-Apr-13 868.11 
Yakult Danone India Pvt Ltd  
339 Danone Probiotics Pte Ltd Dec-14 28-Feb-14 800.00 
340 Yakult Honsha Co Ltd Dec-14 28-Feb-14 800.00 
Yokohama India Pvt Ltd  
341 The Yokohama Rubber Co Ltd Nov-14 31-Mar-14 373.56 
ZF India Pvt Ltd  
342 ZF Friedrichshafen Ag Oct-14 28-Aug-14 294.91 
Note:. (i) Column (2) refers to the reporting in the SIA Newsletter. As the frequency shifted to quarterly 
reporting, from September 2015 onwards, the months refer to quarter ending in those months (e.g. Sep-15 
stands for Jul-Sep 2015).  
 (ii) Some duplicate entries (including those at a later time) cannot be ruled out.  
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